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INTRODUCTION 
 
“A philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don’t know my way around1’” 
 
Problematizing the Restorative Justice 
The Restorative Justice (hereafter RJ) is commonly described by its proponents 
as a tangle of multifaceted discourses informing a growing range of practices 
applied in various human environments (criminal reform, school, community 
policing, etc.)2. Explanations, interpretations and practical accounts on the RJ 
look like a relentlessly conflicting, overlapping, contradicting range of 
positions. Perhaps, there is not even a thing like ‘the’ RJ, but many different 
versions of it, often each other incommensurable. The broad variety of 
theoretical views, goals and operational strategies seems to be a worldwide 
taken-for-granted ‘trademark’ of the RJ. Given such a scattered landscape, this 
work starts out with an eccentric move. We do have authoritative stances in the 
field of the RJ, made possible by processes which extensively define and mark 
the conceptual and epistemic boundaries of this field, what is relevant, 
marginal or illegitimate knowledge within it, of course with tensions, paradoxes 
and inconsistencies. To re-construct the conditions of possibility of those 
versions, drawing the processes which produce the taken-for-granted truths on 
the RJ (which often end up conditioning our work on it, eluding an accurate 
critical reflection) is the main goal of this work. The methodological viewpoint 
adopted, is a specific reformulation of the Michel Foucault’s problematization, 
understood as a critical and historical ontology of our ‘truths’. It aims at 
discursively analyzing ‘true’ discourses, historically re-constructing the 
conditions of their emergence. It tentatively shows, with a de-familiarizing 
attitude, that the discourses which define the taken-for-granted horizons of our 
present are indeed contingent and local, placing them in wider political 
contexts, opening spaces for self-critical and counter-hegemonic accounts. 
 
What is the ‘Restorative Justice’? Meanings and approaches 
I propose to understand the RJ as a historically stratified discursive field, i.e. the 
combination and juxtaposition of all the discourses on the history, concepts, 
and practices of the RJ. They have been accumulated over the last forty years 
across western democracies in a virtual space mainly represented by the 
‘textbook’ literature on the RJ. ‘Discourse’ here means discursive practice3. 
According to this perspective, discourses are more than pure linguistic entities 
which passively describe the reality. They do not refer to texts, in a narrow 
sense, but to “the ensemble of phenomena in and through which social production of 
meaning takes place, an ensemble which constitutes a society as such4”. Discourses are the 
‘substance’ of subjectivities, political struggles, epistemic structures and power 
relations. Among the wide range of discourses which compose the field of the 
RJ, only some can be qualified as ‘authoritative’. The research focus is thus 
placed on the authoritative historical explanations, theoretical 
conceptualizations and procedural accounts of the RJ, i.e. on the discursive 
                                                             
1 Wittgenstein, L. (1968). Philosophical Investigation. Oxford: Blackwell, § 123 (or.ed. Wittgenstein, 
L. (1953). Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigation, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. 
Oxford: Blackwell). 
2 Zernova, M. (2007). Restorative Justice: Ideals and Realities. London: Ashgate. 
3 Foucault, M. (1981). The order of discourse. In R. Young (Ed.), Untying the text: a post-structural 
anthology (pp. 48-78). Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
4 Laclau, E. (1980). Populist Rupture and Discourse. Screen Education, 34, 87-93, p. 89. 
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practices which have reached over the time, a ‘privileged’ status in the 
discursive field of the RJ. They constitute the qualitative hardcore of that field, 
the taken-for-granted truths on ‘why’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ the RJ is like, emerges 
and is applied. I call the combination of these discourses the archive of the RJ, 
whose drawing up is elected as the first step of this work. The main issue then, 
is to identify the conditions of possibility of the authoritative discourses, i.e. 
the processes which set the conditions for knowing, saying and doing 
legitimately within the RJ field. This second phase concerns the “grey and 
meticulous5” exam of the basic units of the authoritative discourses (or 
elementary components the archive), looking into their historical ‘surfaces of 
emergence’. To treat the archive in this way means to elaborate the discursive 
formation of the RJ, the ‘dynamic’ side of the archive as the system of what can 
be ‘said and thought’ about the RJ, in a given period. But a history which aims 
at being critical needs to further look at the political rationality which ‘embeds’ 
the discursive formation of the RJ, and whose in turn RJ is a tool of 
actualization. Using a governmental approach, the discursive formation of the RJ 
will be linked to the ethopolitics as neo-liberal political rationality6. I will 
scrutinize the specific technologies which inscribe in the collective and 
individual ‘bodies’, social and political identities supported and supportive of 
the discursive formation of the RJ, also looking at how they may become 
incorporated in specific strategies of governance. While at a collective level I 
will examine the technologies of securitization, refeudalization and psy-
individualization, at the individual level I will examine the processes of 
‘restorative’ subjectivation, as a ‘sample’ of the ethopolitical micro-technologies. I 
will namely focus on how the subject positions of ‘victim’, ‘offender’ and 
‘community’ (as emerging from the archive of the RJ), are mobilized through 
the Victim-Offender Mediation (as authoritative procedural discourse on the 
RJ), re-constructing the ‘restorative’ subject as a projection of the ethopolitical 
post-social citizen. The last phase of this work consists in looking back to the 
achievements of the problematization. The RJ apparatus is as much a 
conceptual construct and a methodological tool. It represents a new object of 
research characterized by the re-configuration of the RJ as a matter of power-
knowledge structures, as well as a way ‘to cut’ the problem(s) of the RJ in new 
ways, sublimating the problematization’s goals, procedures and 
accomplishments, producing new problems and opening up new paths of 
investigation. The conviction which sustains such a scholarly effort is that this 
specific way of writing about the RJ, might open up counter-intuitive spaces 
for self-critical accounts on it. The systematic doubt on the authority of our 
present and the consequent proliferation/diversification of interpretations are 
driving research values, and as such, the axiological foundation of this work. 
Additionally, making the ‘true’ present more questionable is thought as a way 
of rendering it more available to be changed and improved. 
 
Problematizing the Restorative Justice: reasons, values and implications 
This work is not a history of the RJ as such, how it has emerged, justified and 
practiced over time. Actually, this is an historical reconstruction of the 
                                                             
5 Foucault, M. (1984). Nietzsche, genealogy, history. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), The Foucault Reader 
(pp. 76-100). New York: Pantheon Books, p. 76 (or.ed. Foucault, M. (1971). Nietzsche, la 
genealogie, l’histoire. In S. Bachelard et al. (Eds.), Hommage à Jean Hyppolite (pp. 145-172). Paris: 
Presses Universitaire de France). 
6 Rose, N. (2006). The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-first 
Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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conditions of the main, ‘taken-for-granted’ discourses about the RJ. Accordingly, 
my research questions are: how situated discourses have achieved the status of 
authoritative and ‘true’ histories on rise, justification and application of the RJ? 
Which expertise and authorities are involved? From what the truths on the RJ 
stem and how are they structured? Are these connected with power-knowledge 
relationships? To which political rationality the RJ responds? Do they condition 
human subjectivity? How? The Foucault’s tools of research are as charming as 
problematic, always subject of ‘unintended consequences’, or unthinkable 
developments. Here, this rich reservoir is thought as a range of tracks set along 
two lines, deeply interwoven: a research ethos and some specific heuristical 
devices. The foucauldian ethos expresses itself in the attitude to “multiply lines of 
investigations and possibilities for thought7” from neglected viewpoints, valuing local, 
partial, contextual and counterintuitive knowledges against authoritative and 
taken-for-granted narratives on our present. It is an ethos which looks for 
contingencies, when the meanings of practices and institutions are predicated as 
‘natural’ and ‘essential’. In this work such ethos inspires the will of historicizing 
truth-making processes, to challenge the distinction between discursive and not-
discursive realms and the attention drawn to the productivity of power-
knowledge relationships. As far as the specific research tools are concerned, I 
argue for a particular interpretation of the foucauldian problematization. The 
history of problems (and responses to them), here entails the functional 
integration (and then the overcoming) of archeological and genealogical 
approaches in order to ‘diagnose’ the contingencies of ‘one’ present. In the 
problematization, which is more a style of reasoning than a methodology, there 
is no space for the search for static origins or causal explanation, neither for the 
use of universals-a-priori grids of intelligibility. This approach, deliberately 
unable to create grand récits, allows only for dynamically reconstructing the life-
course of given ‘true’ discourses: from singular, humble contingencies to 
authoritative, taken-for-granted narratives. It makes only possible to chart their 
trivial evolution, describing their ‘groundedness’, challenging their status of non-
questionable products of a progressive history. Of course, the possibility of 
constructing and supporting new truths by criticizing old ones is implicit in this 
project. At the end, this work just aims at introducing “a significant difference in the 
field of knowledge, at the cost of a certain difficulty for the author and the reader, with, 
however, the eventual recompense of a certain pleasure, that is to say of access to another figure 
of truth8”. To exercise a kind of ‘pyrrhonian’ skepticism about the RJ, does not 
mean to be external to it. The systematic doubt on what we take for granted as a 
condition for multiplying and diversifying lines of interpretation on the RJ, is as 
such the ‘truth’ I deliberately aim at constructing. The RJ appears in this 
perspective, a tangle of accounts (some of which authoritative) embedded in 
power-knowledge relationships whose ‘naturalness’ is only the surface of 
broader phenomena. By reconstructing the conditions of the authority and of 
the truth-claims of the RJ, it is hopefully possible to see them as contingent, 
contextual and partial. This new ‘truth’ is meant to stimulate new interpretations 
and more self-critical actions in this field.  
 
 
                                                             
7 Rabinow, P., Rose, N. (2003). Foucault Today. In P. Rabinow, N. Rose, (Eds.), The essential 
Foucault: selections from the essential works of Foucault, 1954-1984 (pp. VII– XXV). New York: New 
Press, p. VII. 
8 Foucault, M. (1991). Des Travaux. In M. Foucault, Dits et Ecrits: 1980-1988, Vol. 4 (Edited by 
Daniel Defert et al.). Paris: Gallimard, p. 567.  
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CHAPTER 1   
RE-WORKING THE MICHEL FOUCAULT’S META/THEORIES: TOWARD 
THE PROBLEMATIZATION 
 
“If a lion could talk we could not understand him9” 
 
1.0. Introductory remarks  
Foucault’s intellectual project can be broadly described as an attempt to ‘use’ 
the past, looking into its most peripheral sides, to gain access to that ‘familiar 
stranger’ represented by our present, its beliefs, practices and institutions which 
reach the state of uncontested truths. In this perspective, the past, rather than a 
mere object of research or end-point, is a medium for interrogating the 
present, while the history rather the recording-activity of a progressive and 
continuous flow of events, is the history of the present, the historicization of our 
truths10. Likewise Foucault himself argued about the influence of Nietzsche in 
his own work11, the only valid way of using Foucault’s thought is to stretch it, 
to generate other kinds of questions and problematize it without considering 
the possible faithfulness to any ‘official’ Foucault. My intention accordingly, is 
to work out, revising (and maybe distorting) the research devices elaborated by 
Foucault -the archaeology and the genealogy- claiming their ‘normative’ 
complementarity, justified on the ground of specific heuristic aims and ethical 
values. The goal is to elaborate a meta/theory12 able to make intelligible the inner 
dynamics of truth-production, to make contingent the authoritative ‘present’ of 
the RJ, opening up for alternative understandings and interpretations. A 
further introductory remark to be made at this point, is to highlight that one of 
the features of Foucault’s work is the striking challenge to the ‘positivistic’ 
boundary between theory and meta-theory, between objects and knowledge. 
Therefore, to choose the problematization implies the choice to pursue a 
knowledge of specific phenomena, specific dimensions of the human realm 
which are in turn interwoven with the knowledge about them. Choosing and 
debating a foucauldian-inspired approach, is not only to select and discuss 
bodies of techniques for the historical investigation of social phenomena, for 
acquiring new knowledge, or correcting and integrating previous knowledge. It 
is indeed, as Martin Saar argues, to decide to ‘construct’ the phenomena 
researched according to specific preferences, to privilege objects whose 
‘meaning’ and validity are affected by revealing their historicity and which 
come to be within the frame represented by those viewpoints13. In this way, the 
boundaries between ‘what it is’ and ‘how to know it’ are irremediable blurred.  
 
1.1. Archeology  
Foucault himself associates his idea of archaeology with Immanuel Kant’s 
philosophical archaeology, as analytical attempt to ‘discover’ the condition of 
the possibility and the condition of the existence of knowledge: “Kant used this 
word [archaeology] in order to designate the history of that which renders necessary a 
                                                             
9 Wittgenstein, L. (1968). Philosophical Investigation, cit., II, XI, p. 223. 
10 See Roth, M.S. (1981). Foucault’s “History of the Present”. History and Theory, 20(1), 32-46. 
11 Foucault, M. (1980). Prison Talk. In C. Gordon (Ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other 
Writings 1972-1977 By Michel Foucault (pp. 37-54). Brighton: Harvester Press, pp. 53-54. 
12 Throughout the text I adopt the sign ‘meta/theory’, referring to the foucauldian-inspired 
approach adopted. ‘Meta/theory’ expresses the mutual implication as well as the tensions 
between ‘what it is’ and ‘how to know it’, between theory and meta-theory. 
13 Saar, M. (2002). Genealogy and Subjectivity. European Journal of Philosophy, 10(2), 231-245, p. 
232. 
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certain form of thought14”. Foucault, of course, does not follow Kant in his 
endeavor to determine the conditions of the possibility of all possible 
experience and the principles governing the progress of philosophy in history. 
Foucault seeks only to understand the effects of that order on historical forms 
of knowledge. The common interest that these two great scholars share, is 
therefore in the way a priori principles affect the historical forms of 
knowledge15. The question is how to identify and where to look for the a priori 
principles which make historically possible specific forms of knowledge. 
Foucault found his answer since the 1960s in the constitutive and governing 
role of discourse in the social and historical contexts where truth, knowledge, 
power and authority are used. For Foucault, our discourses shape what can 
appear to us as knowledge and truth. Objects of knowledge and truths are not 
just simply ‘out there’ waiting for the right representational language: our 
discourses systematically form the objects of which they speak. In the 
foucauldian (archaeological) view, the discourse is analyzed excluding anything 
lying beneath it or hidden within it, focusing only on the level of its basic, 
operative existence, intended as a set of emerging and transforming statements 
(and their relations), instantiated in historical “positivities16”. In this perspective, 
instead of referring the discourse back to the unifying function of a 
transcendental subject or by recourse to a psychological subjectivity17, the 
focus is on what Foucault calls “discursive formations18”. The archaeologist must 
identify, analyze and question from a detached position, these trans-individual 
ensembles of statements, with a specific inner economy, starting from their 
‘site’, the archive. Discursive formations are the economics of the 19th century or 
the analysis of wealth of the 18th, the general grammar or the natural history. 
The archaeological analysis provided in Madness and Civilization19, The Birth of the 
Clinic20, and The Order of Things21, are nothing but the attempts to individualize 
and describe discursive formations22, their historical changes, ruptures, 
discontinuity, tracing back the conditions of the emergence and transformation 
of their statements, as basic units of the discursive formations. Archeology 
then, does not describe history through discourse; it describes the history of 
discourse. Thus, discourse is not just a set of articulated propositions, the 
simulacrum of hidden psychology or universal historical idea; it is the set of 
relations within which historical forms of knowledge, truth and authority gain 
their sense, becoming possible. In sum, archeological analysis seeks to profile 
the history of specific discourses, the set of ‘things said’ in all their 
interrelations and transformations as processes occurring at a very specific 
                                                             
14 Foucault, M. (1971). Monstrosities in Criticism. Diacritics, 1(1), 57-60, p. 60. 
15 McQuillan, C. (2010). Pholosophical archaeology in Kant, Foucault and Agamben. Parrhesia, 
10, 39-49, p. 46. 
16 Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books, p. 118. (or. ed. 
Foucault, M. (1969). L’Archéologie du savoir. Paris: Gallimard). 
17 Ibidem, p. 15. 
18 Ibidem, Chapter II. 
19 Foucault, M. (1964). Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. New 
York: Pantheon Books (or. ed. Foucault, M. (1961). Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge 
classique. Paris: Gallimard). 
20 Foucault, M. (1973). The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception. London: 
Routledge (or. ed. Foucault, M. (1963). Naissance de la clinique: une archéologie du regard médical. 
Paris: Presses universitaires de France). 
21 Foucault, M. (1970). The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New York: 
Pantheon Books (or. ed. Foucault, M. (1966). Les Mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences 
humaines. Paris: Gallimard). 
22 Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge, cit., p. 157. 
15 
 
level, discarding any form of teleology, transcendental subject or unspoken 
Zeitgeist, as the driving forces of history and the informing principles of 
discourses. This analysis abandons all preconceptions about historical unity or 
continuity, describing instead the processes of discourse in all their thresholds, 
alterations, and discontinuities. The ideas that discourse can be described in 
and of itself, not as a representational mark of what is known but as a 
precondition for knowledge, tentatively opens up opportunities for showing 
that what we consider we know is actually depending on how we talk about it.  
 
1.1.1. The discursive formation 
What makes the clinical medicine or the madness a united grouping of 
discourses is not the common reference to given objects, concepts, themes or 
styles, but the presence of discursive regularities (or rules) between dispersed 
statements, which produce certain objects, concepts, themes and styles23. A 
discursive formation is then the “system24” of those statements, which makes 
possible and shape, in a given space/time, particular cultural configurations25. 
The concept of discursive formation is elaborated by Foucault firstly in the 
Archaeology of Knowledge. In the earlier work he uses a similar notion, that of 
“episteme26”. The term episteme, introduced in The Order of Things, refers mainly to 
the orderly ‘unconscious’ structures underlying the production of scientific 
knowledge in a particular time and place27. A grouping of statements that 
suggests a consistent pattern in how they function as constituents of a system 
of knowledge. The concept of discursive formation seems to partially 
encompass the episteme, even if more specific, partial, and, at least apparently, 
less inspired by the structuralist tradition. The individualization and analysis of 
discursive formations are the main tasks of the archeologist. The first 
archaeological undertaking is then, to identify and distinguish a discursive 
formation from others. In a given space/time, in fact, are seemingly ‘active’ 
different discursive formations which fashion a plethora of discourses, in 
different areas of human life. Foucault gives explicitly three criteria of 
individualization. The first is the criterion of formation, which refers to the 
specific set of rules of constitution and existence of all the individual 
components of a discursive formation (objects, enunciative modalities, 
concepts and theoretical options). These rules control the fact that something 
can be talked about, as necessary condition for the appearance of objects of 
discourse. To this cluster of rules belong for instance, the prohibitions about 
speaking of certain things or the rules which establish institutional bodies as 
the proper authority legitimate to talk. In this group we must also include the 
rules concerning who is allowed to speak/write and the prescriptions which 
impose the proper forms that concepts and theories must assume to be 
accepted as knowledge. The second criterion is that of transformation or of 
‘threshold’. The archaeologist must look at the occurrence of new rules of 
formation, how they come into effect and modify the whole ‘architecture’ and 
operation of a precedent assembly of objects, statements, concepts and 
theoretical choices introducing a novel organization through the recomposing 
of some of them, the elision of others and the emergence of new ones. 
Foucault’s focus is on the analysis of transformations in their specificity, rather 
                                                             
23 Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge, cit., p. 37. 
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than a general ‘change’: “I have stressed not discontinuity, but discontinuities (that is to 
say, the different transformations which it is possible to describe concerning two stages of 
discourse)28”. Finally, stands the principle of correlation that is deployed in those 
relations that localize a specific discursive formation from others in the non-
discursive context (the institutions, social relations, economics and political 
conjuncture) in which operates29. Once identified a discursive formation it is 
possible to detect and describe its ‘inner’ structure, by dwelling on its individual 
components (and their process of formation): the objects, the enunciative 
modalities, the concepts and the theories/strategies. The objects of a discursive 
formation are groups of relations established between surfaces of emergence, 
authorities of delimitation, and grids of specification. The “surfaces of emergence30” are the 
fields in which an object first arises. These can be pre-existing fields like family, 
social group, work situation, etc., each of which is normative to some degree, 
each of which has developed a ‘margin of tolerance’ that roughly defines the 
field by what it rejects. The “authorities of delimitation31” denote who has the 
authority to delimit, designate, name, and define objects, the structure of their 
power (both in its organization and in how it was publicly perceived), and the 
processes by which they adjudicated the limits of a given object. Finally, we 
must analyze “grids of specification32”, the systems by which objects are described, 
separated, and classified. What emerges from this overview of the object-
making process within a discursive formation is that objects do not pre-exist 
their emergence under certain complex, relational, discursive conditions, that 
they are not defined by its internal, conceptual nature, but by its exterior 
relations, its triangulation or juxtaposition with other objects. In this 
perspective, we understand the dimension of a discursive formation as a 
discursive practice, a relentless self-regulated process of objects-making. 
The second constitutive element of a discursive formation is what Foucault 
calls “enunciative modalities33”. The premise is that the archaeological method is 
developed to discharge the approaches to knowledge that privilege a 
‘sovereign’ subject anterior to discourse34. Foucault stresses that the meaning 
of a discourse is not transmitted by “a thinking, speaking subject35”, rather it is the 
discursive formation that provides an arrangement of “subject positions36” which 
individuals may occupy. The subject is then substituted in its ‘unifying’ role of 
the discourse by the dispersion of subjectivity in various enunciative 
modalities. The enunciative modalities are then, a set of rules of formation 
which determine the positioning of the subject within a discursive formation. 
Foucault establishes three analytical steps in the identification of enunciative 
modalities. First, one must ask ‘who is speaking?’: “Who, among the totality of 
speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language? Who is qualified to do 
so?37”. Then, ‘which is the institutional sites from which it is possible to speak?’ 
and lastly: ‘which are the subject positions from which legitimate and binding 
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statements can be made?’38. The third component of a discursive formation is 
the complex of concepts. This is also constituted by a group of relations: “[…] 
what properly belongs to a discursive formation and what makes it possible to delimit the 
group of concepts, disparate as they may be, that are specific to it, is the way in which different 
elements are related to one another39”. Therefore, the archaeologist’s task is to 
describe the organization of the field of statements where successive or 
simultaneous emergence of disparate concepts appear and circulate. The 
themes or theories formed by certain discursive organizations of concepts, 
certain regroupings of objects, and certain types of enunciation produced by 
discourses, are defined by Foucault as strategies. Strategies are neither anterior to 
discourses nor the expression of a world-view expressed in words. They should 
rather be described as “systematically different ways of treating objects of discourse, of 
arranging forms of enunciation, of manipulating concepts40”.  
After performed the ‘internal’ analysis of a discursive formation, sorting out 
the basic individual components of a discursive formation, we can wonder how 
they are ‘held together’, how they constitute a unified discursive formation. As 
already hinted, the unity does not depend on the reference to the same object, 
concepts or style. It depends indeed on the relationships and interplays which 
make possible objects, concepts and strategies41. It is s at these relationships 
that the archaeologist must pay attention, in order to understand the unity of a 
given discursive formation. 
 
1.1.2. The role of the discontinuities and the archive 
Foucault shapes a specific perspective or ‘lens’ to distinguish and examine a 
discursive formation in its historical development. Using this lens, it is possible 
to compare the discursive formations, to distinguish from those which do not 
belong to the same time-scale, to map their changes and social effects, in short: 
to carry out a complete archeological research. Foucault describes this 
analytical perspective as opposed to the traditional history of thought, ‘guilty’ 
of having overemphasized continuity and progression in history42. He 
distinguishes clearly between the traditional history (of knowledge and ideas) 
and his archaeology, describing four main differences: the attribution of 
innovations, the analysis of contradictions, the comparative descriptions, and 
the mapping of transformations. Foucault accordingly calls for something 
innovative, a new perspective, and a new focus: the study of discontinuity43. This 
is the keyword in the historical analysis of the discursive formations, expressed 
by the attention paid to thresholds, ruptures, mutations, and transformations 
of discursive formations. The role of discontinuity in the archaeological history 
is threefold44. First, discontinuity is used as a systematic hypothesis by the 
historian; second, is the result of his description and third, it is the concept that 
the historian’s work never ceases to specify45. The other methodological tool 
which complements the attention to the discontinuity, is the issue of the 
institutional ‘sites’ of a discursive formation. From a strictly operational point 
of view, ‘where’ the archaeologist must look in order to grasp the historical 
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development of a discursive formation? Where to find the clues to understand 
and describe it? The answer provided by the Foucault is the archive46. For 
Foucault, the notion of the archive differs greatly from its traditional meaning. 
That is, rather than conceptualizing the archive as the site for the accumulation 
of records, Foucault extends the concept, using it to refer to “the totality of 
discursive practice, that falls within the domain of the research project47” or “the system that 
governs the appearance of statements […] grouped together in distinct figures, composed 
together in accordance with multiple relations […] with specific regularities48”. His concept 
of the archive as “the accumulated existence of discourses49” transforms it from an 
empirical to an abstract notion50, with a “virtual existence51”. The archive is “the 
law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique 
events52”. The archive then, is not just a passive collection of records from the 
past, it is an active and controlling system of enunciation53, which gives form to 
the “great confused murmur54” that emanates from the discursive formation. 
Foucauldian archaeology, focusing on discontinuity and addressed to the 
archive, emphasizing the “trans-personal authority55” of discursive formations, 
ends up setting out a radical destabilization of cultural discourses, devising a 
counter-intuitive narrative of our present, and a sharp challenge for historians.  
 
1.2. Genealogy  
In the foucauldian intellectual journey the term ‘genealogy’ expresses different 
ideas, goals and ways to reach them, evolving along the path of the Foucault’s 
serendipitous research. Indulging to a violent abstraction, it is possible to 
exemplify the meanings of the genealogy, arguing that basically this term refers 
to a differentiated and multi-layered conceptual practice. A good starting point 
for the analysis of this constellation of concepts could be, following Saar, the 
attempt to chart the basic, different but interwoven levels of genealogy56. 
Genealogy can be therefore, understood as a mode of writing history; a mode 
of evaluation (a critique) and as a specific style for a genre57. Genealogy is a 
specific form of writing history of certain objects characterized by a critical 
perspective58. It implies the persistent attempt to make contingent what 
appears necessary, artificial what seems natural, strategically oriented what 
looks as genuinely ingenuous. Its purpose lies in “describing social phenomena to 
signify their ‘instrumentalizability’ in constructing patterns between relations of power on the 
one hand, and norms, facts and systems of belief and knowledge on the other59”. The 
genealogy, as a critical/historical interrogation of the present, expresses itself in 
interpreting the combinations of knowledges, truths and authorities, with a 
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defamiliarizing and performative attitude60. This way of writing history is lastly 
characterized by a precise style of writing, highly rhetorical and irreducibly 
hyperbolic61. What needs to be deepened here is the understanding of the main 
goals pursued through this complex project which works also as the common 
thread among the different applications of it. The overall aim of the genealogist 
can be considered the historicization of truths, to explore how it is that some 
truths and knowledges have come to be accepted as unproblematic62. 
Systematically doubting of any authoritative grand récit, genealogy works as a 
“gray, meticulous and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused 
parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times63”. As 
Nikolas Rose puts it, “genealogy seeks not to reveal falsity but to describe the constitution 
of truths64”. Foucault instructs the genealogist to make visible the cluster of 
correlations underpinning one’s object of inquiry65. Rather than tying historical 
events to a solitary, over-riding ‘cause’, Foucault champions the notion of 
“causal multiplication”; that is, “analyzing an event according to the multiple processes 
which constitute it66”. In other words, “what emerges or comes-to-be does so because of a 
compilation of disparate factors67”. The aim of genealogical research is therefore to 
describe the “polyhedron of intelligibility68” of its object of study, to articulate the 
“multiple elements, relations and domains of reference that incompletely make this event 
intelligible69”. This approach is radically anti-essentialist, it “oppose[s] depth, finality, 
and interiority70”. Behind things there is “not a timeless and essential secret but rather 
the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in piecemeal fashion 
from alien forms71”. The project of genealogical interpretation itself is hence 
interrogated: what underlies the efforts of interpretation? More interpretation. 
“If interpretation is a never-ending task, it is simply because there is nothing to interpret72”. 
There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret because, when all is said and 
done “underneath it all everything is already interpretation73”. 
 
1.2.1. The Nietzsche’s legacy 
Foucault explicitly conceptualizes the idea of ‘genealogy’ first in his seminal 
essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, published in 1971. Rather than seeking to 
describe the history of a concept in terms of a linear development, thereby 
reducing its entire history and genesis to an exclusive concern for utility, 
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Foucault argues that each concept has a genealogy or history, an uncertain path 
of emergence that can be traced. Rather than seeking the ‘telos’ of a particular 
concept, genealogy must record the singularity of events outside of any finality, 
working as the “eventalization74” breaking the self-evidence of its object of study. 
The genealogy’s goal is not to trace the evolution of a concept, but to isolate 
the different scenes where they engage in different roles. In this regard, 
genealogy “opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’75”. In Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 
Foucault states to draw his idea of genealogy upon a critical, and philologically 
mindful interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Genealogy of Morals. He 
argues that only sometimes Nietzsche uses in that book the word ‘Ursprung’ 
which denotes a particular essentialist conception of origin. The “pursuit of the 
origin (Ursprung)76” of anything is essentialist: “because it is an attempt to capture the 
exact, and pure essence of things77” it assumes a world of forms pre-existing the 
world of accident and succession, “But he who listens to history finds that things have 
no pre-existing essence, or an essence fabricated piecemeal from alien forms78”. A genealogy, 
on the contrary, is not a quest for ‘origins’ of phenomena, but the attempt 
reconstruction their ‘Herkunft’ and ‘Entstehung’ Herkunft is, Foucault notes, the 
equivalent of ‘descent’, the ancient affiliation to a group, sustained by the 
bonds of blood, tradition, or social class79. The analysis of Herkunft even if it 
might involve biological considerations, mainly attempts to identify the subtle, 
singular, and sub-individual marks of a given phenomenon, allowing to sort 
out of different traits which characterize it from similar ones. Wherever 
unification or coherence are thought to exist, the genealogist sets out to study 
the beginning, refusing to restore an unbroken continuity that operates beyond 
the dispersion of forgotten things, or to demonstrate that the past actively lives 
in the present. Rather, it attempts to follow the complex course of descent by 
maintaining passing events in their proper dispersion by identifying the 
contingencies that give birth to those things that continue to exist and have 
value for us. Instead of resorting to a teleological search for causes and 
functions, Foucault promotes histories of various phenomena that exist “not in 
order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they 
engaged in different roles80”. Foucault thus advocates the idea that “far from being 
teleologically governed, the historical processes that give rise to the emergence of events are in 
fact […] governed by chance81”. He argues that historians should accept the 
introduction of the chance as a category in the production of events. The 
inclusion of the “dimension of chance82” is, for Foucault, one of the fundamental 
notions required of critical historians. Genealogists aim at demonstrating how 
things that are assumed to be natural or inevitable have in fact resulted from a 
chance event or accident. The origin of particular practices is thus never simply 
‘waiting to happen’; rather, historical events are contingent, serendipitous or 
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accidental: “nothing that has been in discursive or any other relations need have been so83”. 
Foucault is therefore promoting histories that focus on the contingent; that is, 
he argues that the birth of certain practices is never necessary, but always 
merely “one possible result of a whole series of complex relations84”. On the other side 
the concept of ‘Entstehung’ designates the ‘emergence’, the moment of arising. 
As a tool of analysis ‘emergence’ excludes any final telos or historical 
development informed by necessity: “new developments may appear as a culmination, 
but they are merely the current episode in a series of subjugations85”. This ‘emergence’ is 
the arising from historical struggles and subjugations. Therefore, genealogy 
aims at reconstructing the various systems of subjection, the “hazardous play of 
dominations86” from which a given phenomenon slowly emerges, as a product of 
specific social and political struggle of forces. As such, emergence, as analytical 
category, designates “a “’nonplace87’” where virtually takes place the “endlessly 
repeated play of dominations88”, understood as the condition for the emergence of 
historical events, trying to assign them meanings and values. In short, what 
genealogy expresses is that “truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and 
what we are, but the exteriority of accidents89”. Thus, tracing the descent and 
emergence of a phenomenon means to trace back the “unstable assemblage of 
faults, fissures, and heterogeneous layers that threaten the fragile inheritor from within or from 
underneath90”. In sum, genealogy appears as systematic attempt to ‘problematize’ 
teleological, essentialist and foundational historical accounts which look for 
causes and reasons homogeneous to the phenomena to elucidate, which 
privilege continuity and cultivate a-historical teloi, producing unified, static, and 
progressive explanations. Instead, the ‘historical sense’ which informs 
genealogy is heterogeneous, expressing a ‘dissociating view’ which emphasizes 
the mutability and the discontinuity. Even the body and the consciousness are 
refused as the constant variable in history, unmasked as sites of social and 
political struggles and as such historical products. The world, in this 
perspective, is portrayed then as a “profusion of entangled events91”, a discontinuous 
and heterogenous plethora of contingent events without final meaning or 
value. This is because, despite our desires to the contrary, there are no “profound 
intentions [or] immutable necessities92”. All we are left with is an “existence among 
countless lost events, without a landmark or a point of reference93”.  
 
1.2.2. Power-Knowledge 
In the understanding of genealogy, the theme of power plays a central role, 
inextricable tided with the foucauldian journey. For Foucault, power simply 
“produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth94”. Even what we call 
the ‘individual’ and the knowledge we have of the individual is the product of 
relations of power. Foucault claims that we will only understand the real effects 
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of power when we stop looking at power as an external limitation on an 
abstract freedom or an already existing subject and instead look for the myriad 
ways relations of power create the idea of the subject, the rules of truth, and 
our modes of behavior95. Among the ‘products’ or effects of power, according 
to Foucault, none is more important than knowledge. Yet the relationship of 
power and knowledge is neither unidirectional nor exterior. Foucault believes 
they stand in an interior and reciprocal productivity, as indicated by his 
occasional practice of joining the two terms as power-knowledge (pouvoir-
savoir). For Foucault there is “no power relation without the correlative constitution of a 
field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations96”. The crucial feature of Foucault’s genealogy, therefore, is 
the analysis of the mutual productivity of power and knowledge, in its everyday 
and mundane exercise, opposed to the all-encompassing model of power 
analytic. Clearly this idea of power-knowledge as hardcore of the genealogy, is 
interlinked with a specific idea of discourse. The two concepts are intimately 
connected since “power operates in and through discourses […] thus the term power-
knowledge97”. In other words, ‘truth’ is produced by discourse, and power 
cannot be exercised “except through the production of truth98”. When we examine 
what is taken as knowledge or considered ‘truth’, therefore, we are examining 
power. Discourses which are upheld as ‘truth’, are described by Foucault as 
‘veridical discourses’; that is, as those discourses “concerning what is taken as true 
knowledge99”. For Foucault, therefore, power and knowledge are inseparable 
concepts; “power produces knowledge […] a site where power is exercised is also a place at 
which knowledge is produced100”. Discourse can be both an instrument and an 
effect of power, but also “a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a 
starting point for an opposing strategy101”. Foucault goes further: “Discourse transmits 
and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and 
makes it possible to thwart it102”. Having said that, Foucault states that there is not, 
on the one side, a discourse of power, and opposite it, another discourse that 
runs counter to it: “Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force 
relations; there can exist different and even contradictory discourses, within the same strategy; 
they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, 
opposing strategy103”. Therefore, discourses are conceived as the site of tensions 
and struggles concerning power and knowledge. However, Foucault stresses 
that power and knowledge are not identical with each other. Hubert Dreyfus 
and Paul Rabinow emphasize that Foucault does not seek to reduce knowledge 
to a hypothetical base of power, or to conceptualize power as an always 
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coherent strategy104. Rather, Foucault attempts to show the specificity and 
materiality of their interconnections: “There is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose 
and constitute at the same time power relations105”. Conversely, “if power was able to take 
it as a target, this was because techniques of knowledge and procedures of discourse were 
capable of investing it106”. 
 
1.3. Tensions and limits within the foucauldian historical research 
devices 
Over the last fourty years archaeology and genealogy have been targeted by a 
relentless flow of scholarly criticism, appointed on many different aspects and 
at various levels. As far as the archaeology is concerned, first it has been widely 
argued that the logical and theoretical status of the formation rules which make 
possible a discursive formation, is fatally ambiguous, and potentially 
undermines the successful pursuit of archaeology’s goals107. Foucault is blamed 
to have never provided a consistent and convincing definition of formation 
rules108. As David Howarth states, Foucault “conflates the idea that rules represent 
empirical regularities between statements, on the one hand, with prescriptive and causal 
conceptions of rule-following on the other. Not only does this contravene his archaeological 
method, which is predicated on a pure description of the facts of discourse, it hypostatizes rules 
by making them the underlying cause of practices109”. A second, main problem regards 
the very concept of archive. In his analysis of the archive, the archaeologist is 
said to occupy a “privileged position110”. In revealing that any historical discourse 
is simply a dispersion of statements governed by a series of epiphenomenal 
rules, he can automatically dispel any claims to truth, meaning and intelligibility 
as naïve illusions111. However, a paradox undermines the archaeologist’s task: 
in his attempt to articulate his interpretive act, he must reach for the very 
vehicles of meaning and truth that he seeks to dismantle. Foucault not only 
weakens his stance as the detached observer in a ‘blank space’, he also 
engenders a new discursive orthodoxy, complete with rules, concepts and 
terminology. Foucault remains implacably opposed to treating discourses as 
meaningful objects in need of further interpretation, or as combinations of 
essentially meaningless elements that can be abstracted from the changing 
practices of discursive production. On the one hand, he must suspend the 
meaning and truth of discourse by being exterior to its production while, on 
the other hand, he is compelled to be internal to the statements and discourses 
he studies in order to understand their meaning and thus to get the 
archaeological project off the ground112. Another difficulty concerns the 
question of the ‘self-critique’ of the archaeology. As we have seen, a central 
target of The Archaeology of Knowledge is the privileged role of ‘man’ in the 
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modern episteme. Foucault shows that the existence of formation rules forces 
us to recognize that we cannot fully account for our own archive113. We are, in 
short, radically ‘decentered’. This stance poses a critical impasse to Foucault. 
He must either continue to ‘ignore’ the power of discourse “to be the place of 
meaning and truth114”, and thereby risk incoherence, or make explicit the critical 
values and intentions that animate the archaeological project. Such a dilemma 
seems not addressed by Foucault, seriously jeopardizing the consistence of the 
archaeology115. The last issues in Foucault’s archaeology, concerns the 
relationship between discourse and its exterior. At the outset, the very 
distinction between the discursive and the ‘extra-‘ or ‘non-discursive’ seems 
equivocal. On the one hand, although Foucault aims to describe ‘discourse-
objects’ as autonomous systems of dispersed statements, at times he concedes 
an ontological primacy to discursive practices. The main, recurrent issue then, 
is whether Foucault supports a kind of linguistic idealism which denies the 
distinction between discursive and non-discursive, making the first 
encompassing the second. One interpretative solution devised by Foucault is 
to focus on the articulation of different sorts of relations and practices. He 
thus distinguishes between ‘intra-discursive’, ‘inter-discursive’ and ‘extra-
discursive’ dependencies amongst elements. The first refers to the structured 
relationships within discourses between objects, operations and concepts; the 
second to the correlations between different discourses within a particular 
episteme116; and the last to the connections between discourses and processes 
that occur outside discourse117. While this solution does open up the possibility 
of a theory of articulatory practice, Foucault does not develop these ideas 
further. As it stands, the idea of system of dependencies and correlations 
remains too formal, so that in practice it fails to provide a clear division 
between the discursive and non-discursive realms. 
Many limits have been highlighted by scholars over the last thirty years also 
regarding the genealogical way of writing history. Robert Castel118, for instance, 
asks: “How can one write a history of the present, which necessitates a reading of history 
based on a question formulated today, that is not a projection of today’s preoccupations onto 
the past?119”. Castel points out the issue of ‘presentism’ in foucauldian 
genealogy, as one of its main shortcomings120. Another seemingly recurrent 
foucauldian limit is clearly discussed by Roger Deacon. Deacon considers the 
charge frequently brought against Foucault’s methodology, that it is self-
referential: “Any theory that calls the grounds of all theory into question, by doubting or 
relativizing truth, must itself be subject to doubt121”. In other words, if the object of 
criticism is uncertain, then criticism itself is uncertain. Nevertheless, this does 
not deter Foucault from his genealogical critique of Enlightenment’s 
assumptions and presuppositions, perhaps because “the master’s tools may never 
dismantle the master’s house, but they contain fuzzy blueprints of how the house was 
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constructed and might be reconstructed122”. Another general criticism highlighted by the 
literature, about Foucault’s genealogical approach, focuses on the lacking 
emphasis regarding the alternative spaces and counter-logics of resistance123. This 
criticism, differently articulated, stresses the lack of conceptual clarity in 
Foucault’s account of power, and its relationship to the concepts of 
domination, resistance and the subject. These concern questions as to whether 
resistance is to be understood as either internal or external to the structure of 
domination and the play of power struggles, as well as our understanding of the 
emergence and articulation of resistances to systems of power-knowledge. 
Criticisms also point to the scarcity of concrete analyses of resistance in 
Foucault’s writings. In this sense, Discipline and Punish and certain sections of 
The History of Sexuality create the impression that disciplinary power and ‘bio-
power’ are all-encompassing logics of objectification, rationalization and 
subjectivation, which exclude the possibility of resistance. The last difficulty in 
Foucault’s account is the relationship between the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of his 
analysis. As many commentators have suggested, while Foucault is correct to 
problematize a descending concept of power, in which the concrete deployments 
and strategies of power are the manifestations of some global logic, the precise 
linkage between the local and the global is not fully theorized. Thus, though 
Foucault’s writings explore the ‘micro-physics’ of power/resistance, they do not 
adequately address the formation and dissolution of systems of domination. From 
this perspective, the relationship between the global question of domination and 
the more local power/resistance dialectic can only be clarified with a category like 
that of hegemony, that is, as systems of domination which are formed through 
power struggles that become sedimented over time. 
To summarize, we are confronted with several difficulties in Foucault’s ways of 
writing history. As for the archaeology, these are his failure to formalize satisfac-
torily the concept of rule, the paradoxical detachment of the historian, the absence 
of any conceptualization of ‘truth’ and the contradictions in differentiating 
discursive and non-discursive. On the other side, genealogy seems affected by 
presentism and a self-referential attitude. Moreover it shows an inadequate 
conceptualization of power/resistance and a lack of concrete analyses of 
resistances to power. Even if it is not possible to reconcile all these limits within a 
common meta/theoretical frame, it is indeed possible to re-work out and combine 
the conceptual/epistemic strengths of archaeology and genealogy generating a new 
and different approach, eluding some of those difficulties. 
 
1.4. The problematization 
In the Foucault’s words problematization denotes “the ensemble of discursive and 
non- discursive practices that makes something enter into the play of the true and the false 
and constitutes it an object of thought whether in the form of inoral reflection, scientific 
knowledge, political analysis or the like124”. Here I propose to re-think 
problematization as a style of historical/critical reasoning, aiming at 
understanding how the RJ “enter(s) into the play of the true and the false and constitutes 
it an object of thought125”, its political embeddeness and subjectivating effects. 
Problematization works as an historical ontology of discursive practices, “the 
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said as much as the unsaid126”, which constitute the RJ as an academic object and 
political issue. This approach is elaborated starting by the reconstruction of the 
‘normative complementarity’ between archaeology and genealogy. Here is not 
in question whether the foucauldian intellectual life-course is or is not 
characterized by a drastic break, which would justify the clear ‘traditional’ 
distinction in two periods of his work and life. Actually, I will consider the 
technique of delimitation of research objects through archaeological 
“bracketing127” as an integral part of genealogy just because it serves better the 
goal of destabilizing the authoritative discourses on the RJ, contributing to 
make intelligible the process of their emergence, their social and political 
embeddeness. Moreover, to fashion the problematization requires addressing 
some of the main shortcomings identified by the secondary literature regarding 
the foucauldian meta/theories. I will namely focus on the relationship between 
discursive and non-discursive, on the concepts of truth, power and ‘present’. 
The goal again, it is not to find the ‘true’ or ‘real’ foucauldian viewpoint, but to 
benefit of his insights constructing a perspective able “to cut not only to 
understand128”.  
 
1.4.1. Archaeology and genealogy: a ‘normative’ complementarity  
In the literature there has been much debate about the relationships between 
Foucault’s concepts of archaeology and genealogy129. It has traditionally been 
said that Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical periods are radically 
different from each other. Just as it is commonplace to distinguish “between 
Picasso’s Blue period and his Pink period130”, or between the first and second 
Wittgenstein, so there is Foucault’s archaeology and his genealogy131. On the 
other hand, this opinion is not the only interpretative option available and 
subscribed by scholars. Some authors, in fact, have argued that archaeology, as 
Foucault’s method analyzing documents, is indissolubly connected to the 
genealogy, intended as a series of methodological prescriptions that guide the 
writing of history using the results of archaeology132. My position regarding this 
issue, is basically that it is necessary to combine archaeology and genealogy, for 
different heuristical and also ethical reasons. In fact what might make valuable 
the Foucauldian analysis is its double-edged view. On one hand, the structural 
technique of focusing on both discourse and the speaker as constructed 
objects “as a necessary step to free himself from taking the discourses and practices of this 
society as simply expressing the way things are”, depicting the “local discursivities which 
genealogy brings into play”, cutting out the attempt to work out a theory of 
autonomous rule-governed systems of discursive practices. On the other, once 
isolating discursive objects, the elaboration of the genealogical questions: how 
are these discourses used? What role do they play in society? As already stated, 
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archaeologies of the 1960s focused on discursive formations, hoping to isolate 
the rules of production and transformation for discursive practices. The aim of 
archaeology is to enter the interior of discourse in order to determine the rules 
that govern it and to describe the various relations among statements in a 
discursive formation. However, archaeology’s critical force was restricted to 
the comparison of the different discursive formations of different periods. 
Such comparisons could suggest the contingency of a given way of thinking by 
showing that previous ages had thought very differently (and, apparently, with 
as much effectiveness). Of course, “mere archaeological analysis could say nothing 
about the causes of the transition from one way of thinking to another and so had to ignore 
perhaps the most forceful case for the contingency of entrenched contemporary positions133”. 
Genealogy, as deployed in Discipline and Punish, looks for the rules governing 
discursive practices having to do with power relations. If archaeology addresses 
the structure of discursive formations historically situated, the genealogical 
gaze adds the critical attention towards their power embeddeness and 
subjectivating effects. Genealogy must then be thought as based on preliminary 
archaeology, as the attempt to chart the movement of particular discursive 
formations, in order to unearth the conditions of our present realities. It 
“suspends contemporary norms of validity and meaning at the same time as it reveals their 
multiple conditions of formation134”. Moreover, in the genealogy, the concept of 
discourse is still widely deployed, although discourses are no longer treated as 
autonomous systems of scientific statements, but the products of power 
relations and forces that form them. As Foucault puts it, “it is in discourse that power 
and knowledge are joined together135”. What emerges, is that discourses cannot be 
adequately grasped unless we apprehend their underlying conditions of 
possibility, the dimensions of materiality, history and institutional practice in 
which it is embedded. Genealogy becomes the study of how archaeology is 
brought into play in everyday practices: “The genealogist is a diagnostician who 
concentrates on the relations of power, knowledge and the body in modern society136”. It is a 
way of linking archaeology to the enactment of power. It involves spotting 
contingencies, rather than accepting accepted wisdom in the form of causal 
explanations, by exploring the “contemporary limits of the necessary137”.  
The ‘normative’ complementarity of archaeology and genealogy makes possible 
seeing the horizon against which stands out the problematization as 
meta/theory. This complementarity expresses itself in the will to diagnose and 
demythologize ‘truth phenomena’ in their political dimension. The common 
goal is to provide a counter-memory that will help subjects recreate the 
historical and practical conditions of their present existence138, opening new 
possibilities of understanding. The crucial point to grasp here is that what 
counts as truth can (and should) itself be historicized. Truths are the product 
of specific discursive practices to be re-constructed and carefully analyzed as 
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epistemic structures power-embedded, rooted into wider cultural, social and 
political phenomena. 
 
1.4.2. Discursive and non-discursive  
In the problematization’s perspective, a discourse is more than a set of ‘signs’ 
which reflects reality, neither “[…] a consciousness that embodies its project in the 
external form of language139” nor “a language plus a subject to speak it140”. Instead, 
‘discourse’ refers to practices which exhibit a regularity141 and work as “ways of 
constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power 
relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them142”. More than 
‘representing reality’ discourses enable and constrain the imagination and social 
practices: “Discourses are practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak 
[…] discourses are not about objects, they don’t identify objects, they constitute them and in 
doing so, they conceal their own invention143”. By conceptualizing discourse as a 
regularity of practices which shape what can be thought and said, Foucault’s 
work indirectly poses the issue of the relationships between the ‘material’ and 
the discursive. The ‘material’ (or non-discursive), in this reframing of the 
problematization, comes into light in two different ways, with two different 
meanings. First of all, the materiality is one of the attribute of the discourse. In 
this vein, there is not ontological distinction between those two terms. The 
idea of ‘discursive practice’ as such entails the acknowledgement of the 
necessary performativity of any regularity of statements, anchored in a specific 
form of life. At the same time it is possible to dis-joint discursive and material, in 
order to retrieve the heuristical potential of the last term. In this second case, 
material refers to the reality existing outside the discourse, and as such non-
meaningful. From an epistemic viewpoint, the material cannot be either denied 
or affirmed, because it cannot be known (since is non-meaningful by 
definition), but at the same time, insofar as is assumed as a ‘possibility’, can be 
used as a methodological tool to articulate the discursive realm. The non-
discursive is then hypostatized as conditions of possibility of the discursive, as 
the discursive-to-be. Accordingly, to trace back the emergence of given true 
discourses, means to identify the complex discursive framework which makes 
them intelligible (i.e. epistemically accessible) and thus ontological possible. In 
this perspective, true discourses are created at the moment of the identification 
of other discourses which are at the same time their condition of intelligibility 
and possibility. In the case of the RJ, we can talk of ‘restoration’, ‘conflict’, 
‘harm’, ‘crisis of legal system’, etc. insofar as we are able to re-construct the 
discursive ‘reservoir’ out of which these discursive objects are meaningfully 
configured. Scholars, advocates, practitioners as well as opponents of the RJ in 
front of the ‘Kitchner experiment144’ (or the BACRO project in Bristol in 1972) 
were facing the ‘material’, i.e. a till then meaningless series of acts. Drawing 
upon theoretical traditions (often conflicting and overlapping), it has been 
possible to make those acts understandable and then possible as ‘restorative’ 
practices. What is further characteristic of such a conceptualization, is that the 
‘discursive’ shaping of reality, and the specific choices of using specific 
discursive reservoirs to make sense of the material, follows specific power-
                                                             
139 Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge, cit., p. 169. 
140 Ibidem. 
141 Ibidem. 
142 Weedon, C. (1987). Feminist practice and poststructuralist theory. London: Blackwell, p. 108. 
143 Ibidem, p. 49. 
144See further ahead, paragraph 2.3.1.  
29 
 
orientations. This means that discourses by competing, combining or 
overlapping each other, in a given time and space, reinforce, reproduce or 
overturn more or less organized ways of defining individuals’ conducts or field 
of possible actions. This same multiplicity of discourses available to shape 
reality, opens spaces for resistance: “We must make allowances for the complex and 
unstable processes whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but 
also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing 
strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it but also undermines it and 
exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it145”. Foucault thus 
understands discourses to be the substance of social systems, and because of 
their capacity to be transformed, they should not be conceptualized as fixed, 
essentialized entities but rather as a window to a partial and situated ‘reality’. 
From this perspective, a field such as the RJ can be understood as a plurality of 
competing discourses (only some of them ‘authoritative’), spanning different 
disciplines, featuring different actors and producing different meanings which 
are just as likely to change over time and across geographical spaces. Therefore, 
the RJ discourses have a situated character and subsequently produce partial, 
situated knowledges which are open to contestation and negotiation146. 
Understanding and resolving the tensions within these negotiations requires, as 
I will show, at the very least an engagement with power. In short, discourse is 
here understood as an ensemble of practices through which ‘reality’ is made 
possible insofar as it is made intelligible. The question is not that “nothing exists 
outside of the discourse” but that “nothing has any meaning outside of discourse147”. What 
is not intelligible cannot be denied or asserted as ‘lying’ in the material realm, 
but nevertheless it is possible, as long as we are able to construct the 
conditions for its epistemic access. Discourses construct meaningful 
configurations out of the material reality, shaping institutions, knowledges, 
truths, authorities which affect our life. This process must be thought as a 
social enterprise, a collective and mutually conditioning set of engagements, 
historically stratified, performed and understood against a “tissue of 
contingencies148” or a “form of life149”, i.e. group of customs, agreements and habits, 
systems of reference culturally, socially and historically rooted. It is this ‘form 
of life’ that avoids the radical relativity of producing meanings/realities, 
disposing us towards certain courses of action. Such enterprise is reproduced at 
micro (e.g. relationship with oneself) and macro levels (relationship with 
others), following situated power-orientations, which would be naïve to reduce 
to more ‘primary’ processes, such as economic production, social institutions 
or political behaviour. 
 
1.4.3. Truth and power 
Truth here refers to the product of a never finalized struggle between 
discursive practices150, historically situated151 and independent of the conscious 
                                                             
145 Foucault, M. (1980). The history of sexuality an introduction, The Will to Knowledge, Vol. 1, cit., p. 
101. 
146 See McNay, L. (1994). Foucault: A Critical Introduction, cit., pp. 74-76. 
147 Hall, S. (1997). The Work of Representation. In Hall, S. (Ed.), Representation: Cultural 
Representations and Signifying Practices (pp. 13-74). London: Sage, pp. 44-45. 
148 McDowell, J. (2002). Wittgenstein on Following a Rule. In A. Miller, C. Wright (Eds.), Rule 
Following and Meaning (pp. 45-80). Oxford: Acumen, p. 71. 
149 Wittgenstein, L. (1967). Zettel. Oxford: Blackwell, § 241. 
150 Kure, N. (2010). Narrative mediation and discursive positioning in organisational conflicts. 
Explorations: An E-Journal of Narrative Practice, 2, 24-35, p. 26. 
30 
 
speakers152. The discourses which in the course of time gain a prioritized- 
however, temporary power in the production of specific conditions of truth, 
are the ‘authoritative’ discourses, the ‘makers’ of boundaries between true and 
false. Every society, as Foucault claims, has a kind of political economy of 
truth which says what kinds of discourse are true, what the mechanisms and 
sanctions are for distinguishing true from false, the techniques for acquiring 
truth and the status of those who are empowered to say what is true153. It is in 
this way senseless to read Foucault as arguing that truth is ‘relative’, i.e. that all 
possible truth-conditions are equal, depending merely on context or 
interpretative perspective. Foucault views truth-conditions as stable and secure, 
as situated in particular historical milieux (or form of life), which give rise to, 
and are part of, the order of discourse154. As Hook states “a skepticism of truth 
here defers not to a ‘baseless’ relativism, but instead to a carefully delineated set of conditions 
of possibility under which statements come to be meaningful and true155”. The contingency 
of these conditions can be reconstructed through the identification of the 
“whole strata of practices156” underlying the production of truth. These basic 
conditions of possibility are institutions, social structures and practices which 
limit and constrict, reinforce and renew discourses, following a power-
orientation. Starting from these premises, it becomes clear that the goal of the 
problematization is to historicize what counts as truth unveiling the ‘authority’ 
of its makers. The issue at stake is not demonstrating that specific truth 
discourses are false, replacing one truth with another. The goal is to trace back 
the emerge/descent of truth discourses, focusing on their precarious and 
contingent conditions, describing their structures, questioning their authority, 
critically placing them in the history. In the problematization’s perspective, this 
specific concept of truth is linked to a certain theorization of power. Power 
here comes into light as a double-edged concept: a kind of social relationship, 
and a component of any social relationship. In his later papers, Foucault 
elaborates an idea of the kind of power in which he is interested, as “a mode of 
action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their 
actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the 
present or the future […] it incites, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the 
extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely157”. Power appears as a set of practices 
which interweave the social fabric, binding social structures and individual 
agency. Accordingly, “to live in society is to live in such a way that action upon other 
action is possible -and in fact ongoing. A society without power relations can only be an 
abstraction158”. Power as such is a form or a dimension of any social relation, 
“[…] every human relation is to some degree a power relation. We move in a world of 
perpetual strategic relations. Every power relation is not bad in itself, but it is a fact that 
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always involves danger159”. Therefore all relationships are (also) power relations, 
implying that mode of action upon actions which defines the field of 
possibilities of the other and ourselves and involves to some extent ‘a danger’. 
At the same time, the concept of power denotes a specific social link, which is 
the production of (true) knowledge. In this view, the production of truth is not 
only ‘made up’ of power relations as any other social dynamic, but is also the 
specific form of this idea of power. The non-finalized struggle between 
discursive practices, historically positioned and speaker-independent from 
which truths emerge, is a par excellence the power-dynamic the problematization 
is interested to re-construct. Yet, also to tell ‘the truth’ about ourselves entails 
the same mechanism of truth/power. We are made up, in fact, of multiple 
relationships (e.g. parent, fellow citizen, stranger, etc.) all at once. As Foucault 
states, “If I tell the truth about myself, as I am now doing, it is in part that I am 
constituted as a subject across a number of power relations which are exerted over me and 
which I exert over others160”. This overall theorization presupposes two concepts 
inseparable to power: freedom and resistance. Power, in fact, operates only 
upon free subjects, where freedom means the ability to choose from a range of 
possibilities or ways of behavior161. In the same way, resistance is part of the 
power relations, confirming their relational character, reaffirming their 
boundaries, as well as producing a redefinition of power relations. The political 
consequences of this perspective are far-reaching. It is not possible to resist to 
power relations as such, because this would mean to destroy any social relation. 
Instead, it is possible to denounce the specific and current assemblages of truth 
as specific configurations of power in given fields, and to transform these 
configurations by addressing, reformulating, and elaborating them through 
further exercises of power and new productions of truth162.  
 
1.4.4. Targeting ‘the present’ 
Writing a problematization of the RJ means writing a history in the present, in 
a field of power relations and political struggles which underscore forms of 
knowledge163. Here the present is conceived not a homogeneous totality 
displayed in true discourses and organized in a progressive and unitary line. 
The present is a tangle of shifting problems each with their specific, local, 
contextual and partial histories164. The problematization, by tracing these 
histories, aims at making visible the taken-for-granted structures of this 
present, presenting them to be neither universal nor coherent, but indeed 
rooted in “lowly origins and ignoble births165”. This attitude to question the present, 
in a historical/critical perspective, might not be a sufficient condition for the 
intellectual liberation from the myth of the present which ‘has always been’, 
but it may work at least as a contributory factor of it166. To problematize the RJ 
then, is not merely to describe its past, to find out its ‘real’ history, to unveil its 
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noble truths as trivial lies, but indeed to “diagnose” its present, to produce 
hypotheses “about the relationship between concepts in their historical sites167”. In order 
to address the processes which constitute the taken-for-granted present of the 
RJ, there is not space for teleological attempts of interpretation, causal 
explanations nor is acceptable an analysis in terms of ‘material roots’, where 
the present becomes a simple reflection of something more real behind its 
surface168. We must suspend the contemporary norms of validity and 
‘authoritative’ meanings of the RJ in order to reveal its multiple conditions of 
formation169. The goal then is not to ‘discover’ the truth but rather the 
generation of critique, carrying out an “epistemic project which is no longer exclusively 
epistemic, but rather primarily critical or political in concern170”. The objective is to 
disturb formerly secure foundations of knowledge and understanding, not in 
order to substitute an alternative and more secure foundation, but to “produce 
an awareness of the complexity, contingency, and, fragility of historical forms171”. To re-
construct the social, political, cultural embeddeness of the RJ’s as a form of 
knowledge, locating its present in the history, makes possible to match the 
‘epistemological’ analysis with the ‘critical’ inquiry pursued within the 
problematization. In this way it is possible to provide a counter-memory that 
will help recreate the historical conditions of the present of the RJ. 
Problematization in this study plays the role of framework for undertaking 
concrete historical studies of the conditions that made intelligible/possible the 
emergence of the RJ as sets of authoritative discursive practices. It is the 
attempt to devise an account of the contribution of local, partial and contextual 
discourses to the emergence of the RJ as ‘new’ repertoire of images, 
metaphors, storylines, procedures to think and manage human relations. It 
provides knowledge of the circumstances of how specific views and 
understandings of the RJ have become ‘powerful’, setting the boundaries for 
legitimately ‘discussing’ and ‘doing’ RJ. In this way, by means of 
problematization, emerges a space where present practices, legitimate 
techniques and regimes of truths on the RJ are suspended, the conditions of 
their existence re-constructed, and their hidden assumptions challenged172.  
 
1.4.5. Reversal, discontinuity and specificity  
In order to problematize the RJ, I follow three basic foucauldian principles: 
reversal, discontinuity and specificity173. More than methodological tenets, these 
principles are cautionary guidelines. They define a research conduct which 
privileges (and in turn constructs) specific objects of analysis, such as ‘low 
narratives’ or neglected factors whose identification might contribute to 
understand the series of phenomena under analysis. The first guideline is the 
principle of reversal. Reversal is a heuristical move which denotes the upturn of 
assumptions of origin (as Ursprung). The ‘authoritative’ sources which seem to 
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play an obvious role in the production of discourse must be understood as 
factors which limit and ‘rarefy’ discourse174. The works of the ‘founding 
fathers’ of the RJ, widely considered by the authoritative literature the origin of 
the RJ as well as the ‘first’ restorative experiments set up in Canada for 
instance, are here traditional sources which impose the individual voices of 
authors as the footing of the RJ, obscuring the process of selections of those 
voices as authoritative, and separating them, in an artificial way, from the 
political field more widely. The counter-term offered by the problematization, 
is the idea of discourse as event in opposition to the idea of discourse as 
production of individual voices175. Thinking in terms of event (or eventualization) 
means to perform “[a] breach of self-evidence […] rediscovering the connections, 
encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on which […] count […] as 
being self-evident, universal and necessary176”. The analysis presented in the next 
pages aims at working out the RJ as an event, which implies its translation into 
a historically rooted discursive formation, to be drawn up and discussed. In 
this way, thinking the RJ as event enables us to look through the myth of 
creation, and to re-construct the multiple origins and the different rationalities 
underlying the successful production of the authoritative discourses on the RJ. 
The second principle is of discontinuity, i.e. the heuristical doubt regarding 
progress, continuity and evolution, as explanatory concepts177. As Hook states, 
embracing the discontinuity-view implies that “rather than assume a shared likeness 
then, or suppose that each component of the analysis will be of the same type, we must be 
prepared to search for similar functions across a variety of different forms (language, practices, 
material reality, institutions, and subjectivity). Similarly, rather than following linear 
successions of development, we must map parallels of regularity”. In this perspective, the 
authoritative discourses on the RJ work in discontinuous and often 
contradictory ways. If we are to re-construct their discursive formation, then 
we need to draw up and articulate several and diverse discourses, discharging 
any cause-effect pattern of analysis entailing the necessary continuity between 
and within them. Lastly, the principle of specificity is meant to replace the over-
generalizing forms of analysis which would resolve specific discursive forms 
into “a play of pre-existing significations178”. In a way, this principle ‘backs up’ the 
entire project of devising the surfaces of emergences of the RJ as historically 
articulated discourses which make intelligible/possible its authoritative 
versions. The refusal of a “pre-discursive providence which disposes the world in our 
favor179” implies to consider truth-claims as discursive products, whose life-
course is to be historically traced back. Reversal, discontinuity and specificity 
are the pillars of the problematization of the authoritative discourses on the RJ. 
By deploying them, it is hopefully possible to free us from the ‘mental cramp’ 
of thinking the present of the RJ as a natural, essential, and continuous set of 
narratives, as such legitimized as the product of a progressive history. 
 
1.4.6. Boundaries of the problematization 
The theoretical framework of this study presents some limitations, many of 
which derive from the archaeological/genealogical precursors of 
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problematization, while others stem from my specific way of problematizing 
the RJ. David Garland argues that there are potentially serious limitations to 
the use of Foucault’s historical methods180. The main problem, Garland claims, 
is that the foucauldian perspective is often (and paradoxically) accepted as 
offering a grand theory; that is, it is often accepted “in a manner which tends to 
displace other interpretive accounts, rather than supplement them or add a new dimension to 
their explanations181”. Notably, Garland acknowledges that Foucault’s work was 
not intended by him to be read as a ‘grand theory’ or to offer a totalizing or 
complete analysis of any of his chosen subjects182. In the same vein, I do not 
propose to construct a ‘grand theory’ of the RJ, or to tell the complete story of 
its coming into being. Rather, the research aims to be aware of its own 
perspectivity and partiality183. As already stated, the aim pursued by these pages 
is not to merely replace existing accounts of the birth, meaning and application 
of the RJ with another, opposing a different truth-account. That is, this 
research does not seek to propose counterarguments that are symmetrical but 
opposed to existing authoritative accounts. The goal is to make understandable 
the processes which underlie and feed on the ‘authority’ of some discourses on 
the RJ, the ways the truths on the RJ are contingently produced, the historical 
conditions of their emergence. Ironically, such an effort might end up “as 
problematic as the authoritative versions [of history] it contest[s]184”. This is because a 
foucauldian-inspired study, as any performance of scholarly knowledge, 
normally produces power effects whose the researcher might not be aware of; 
moreover it is necessarily incomplete because does not search for causes or 
origins but for conditions of emergence, which give rise to myriad more 
problems to be diagnosed and interpreted. This work is also inherently 
subjective. Like all research, this study has been influenced by the subjectivity 
of its author. Of course, the application of any theoretical framework to a 
particular research problem necessarily highlights only part of the picture. This 
study is thus limited in the sense that it considers the RJ from a singular 
theoretical angle. The undertaking of research such as this, is thus an inherently 
subjective, shifting and incomplete enterprise. Finally, the research is limited by 
the particular interpretation of Foucault’s methodological approach that I, as 
the researcher, have made. While some authors warn that they have not 
‘correctly’ interpreted Foucault, I am of the belief that this would be both 
impossible and undesirable185. As already indicated, Foucault himself invited 
researchers to use his works as tool boxes186, instruments for possible uses in 
specific contexts. I therefore do not claim any correctness or completeness, but 
just to be transparent about my understanding and application of this 
framework. My aim here is to yield some critical insights about the RJ. There 
are a number of reasons why Foucault has been chosen to address the research 
problem of this thesis. Firstly, while the RJ has been considered from a variety 
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of theoretical frameworks, a foucauldian interpretation of the RJ has been so 
far only partially developed187. In fact, the field of the RJ has seldom been 
considered using the theoretical frameworks advanced by Foucault. In this 
sense, the aim of this thesis is to add another dimension to the conversation on 
the RJ, or to add a small piece to its theoretical map. Moreover, the literature 
on the RJ is premised on a traditional, structuralist version of historical events, 
and consequently, on a structuralist conception of power. Constructing a 
critical account of the history of the RJ therefore necessitates an analytical 
framework that contains an alternative to this structuralist conception of 
power. Additionally, as the RJ is often portrayed as representing the re-
emergence of the justice practices of various ancient cultures188, a 
methodological perspective that enables the detailed consideration of the 
discontinuities of history- as well as its continuities- seems to me much needed. 
Finally, as Rose’s work suggests, phenomena that enjoy support from diverse 
and even seemingly opposed political realms are not best explained from 
structural frameworks189. For these reasons, it is hoped that a foucauldian study 
of the RJ will be able to make a small, but significant, contribution to this field, 
by investigating how what have come to be considered the truths of the RJ 
have emerged onto the contemporary criminal justice landscape. 
 
1.5. The problematization at work 
In order to operationalize this multilayered approach I will proceed as 
follows190. First I will work toward the identification of the area of study which 
represents my ‘problem’. The focus will be placed on specific ‘truths’ of the RJ. 
These truths are encapsulated in the authoritative discourses (explanations and 
conceptualizations) on the RJ. They constitute the archive of the RJ. The second 
step is, drawing upon the archive, to re-construct the discursive formation of 
the RJ, as a network of discursive objects (and their relationships) historically 
situated, which have made possible the RJ’s truths. A meticulous scrutiny in 
the analysis of the problem’s discursive manifestations, both textual and non-
textual, is the practical way to reach this objective. The third step is the analysis 
of the political technologies and their overall paradigm, which interweave the 
discursive formation of the RJ. The last phase represents the analysis of the 
subjectivating effects of the interaction between the RJ authoritative discourses 
and human beings involved in the practices inspired by those discourses. 
Following this path it is possible drawing up of an apparatus showing the 
relationship to the ‘problem’ of the various phenomena constituting it, 
describing and interpreting the inextricable power-knowledge dimensions of 
the RJ.  
 
1.5.1. The identification of the problem: the archive of the Restorative 
Justice 
The RJ is not conceived here as unified, homogeneous field of knowledge, but 
rather as a galaxy of inconsistencies and disjunctions linked by some ways-of-
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reasoning taken for granted, values and practices seen as the markers of the 
‘true’ RJ. These common threads are embodied into what I call the ‘textbook’ 
literature on the RJ: seminal articles, well known policy reports, hegemonic 
manuals, training texts. All those documents entail the ideas of how proper the 
RJ and its practices should be performed and where; the professional identities 
instilled in its agents and practitioners; the regulations about what constitutes a 
good RJ ‘practice’, the step by step directions about how to paint a clear 
picture of a messy world. The ‘systematization’ of such a complex and 
‘discontinuous’ material, the identification of its main strands and inner 
relationships191, is the archive of the RJ, whose reconstruction is the first goal of 
my research. The researcher’s compilation of the archive is always partial and 
fragmentary. As Foucault himself acknowledges, it is “obvious that the archive of a 
society, culture, or a civilization cannot be described exhaustively192”. The goal in fact, is 
not to provide a complete or thoroughly representative archive, but to identify 
and question the main recurrent perspectives which, according to the 
‘authorities’ of a specific field, are dominant or truthful. For Foucault, “the most 
important philosophical projects have to do with understanding how and why we hold some 
things true, how and why we deem some things knowledge, and how and why we consider 
some procedures rational and others not193”. The ‘perspectivity’ of the archive is then 
unavoidable. This makes the archive, as a research tool and the research 
product, intrinsically problematic but nevertheless useful. Its usefulness resides 
in its use as a deliberate local, partial and contextual point of view which aims 
at stimulating critical accounts on what is taken for granted in a given field of 
knowledge. Many techniques were employed throughout this research to guide 
and limit the selection of ‘documents’ from the archive. I aimed to ground this 
process in a thorough knowledge of the literature on the RJ. I read widely on 
the topic, and confirmed the centrality of my reading materials against 
bibliographies as they appeared194. In my perspective, as already said, the ‘basis’ 
of the archive of the RJ is represented by the ‘textbook’ literature. Its 
normative structure in fact, ‘naturally’ catalyzes and circularly contributes to 
shape the truths on the RJ. Problematization is intrinsically reliant upon already 
existing, traditional versions of the phenomenon under analysis. In this sense, 
the researcher does not use an entirely separate corpus of documents to the 
conventional historian; instead, it is in the use of these texts that the two 
approaches vary. Foucault acknowledges this when he contrasts conventional 
history with his new approach: “The document […] is no longer for history an inert 
material through which it tries to reconstitute what men have done or said, the events of which 
only the trace remains; history is now trying to define within the documentary material itself 
unities, totalities, series, relations195”. The problematization of the RJ takes as its 
starting point precisely that which is taken to be unproblematic, natural and 
seemingly indisputable about this field. Here is not in question whether one or 
many versions of the RJ exist. Here the point is to identify the authoritative 
discourses on the RJ, tracing back their history in order to understand the 
conditions of their ‘privileged’ position in the multifaceted field of the RJ. In 
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applying this approach, I asked the following questions196: what is taken-for-
granted, left implicit or pre-assumed? What is formulaically repeated, left 
undefined, but used as though having a fixed and widely accepted meaning? 
What is considered so obvious that it does not need to be articulated, and what 
is so marginalized or silenced that it is nearly absent from the archive?  
 
1.5.2. Re-constructing the discursive formation 
I utilize a concept of discursive formation only partially drawn upon the 
original foucauldian one. In the Archaeology of knowledge, as we know, a 
discursive formation is a particular ordering of things (objects), things said 
(types of statement), ideas (concepts) and groupings (thematic choices), 
following particular rules of formation, dictating what can and cannot be said, 
whom or what has the ability to speak, what is determined/identified to exist 
or not exist, and what can or cannot change within its boundaries. This stance 
implies that discourses are understood as systems of statements which bring 
into existence the very objects they purport to describe and explain, including 
their institutional and social conditions of possibility197. This idea is crucial for 
the present analysis. Nevertheless I will not focus on rules but on discursive 
objects which emerge from the articulation of specific discourses 
conceptualized as surface of emergence of the RJ. I will therefore focus on the 
procedure of production as well as exclusion of discursive objects (concepts 
and strategies) which represent the backbone of the RJ as discursive formation. 
I am mainly concerned with the historicization of the discursive formation 
which shapes the true and taken-for-granted versions of the RJ.  
 
1.5.3. The political rationality of the Restorative Justice: macro and micro 
levels 
From a governmentality perspective, I try to problematize the political 
rationality embodied by the RJ. This operation implies the analysis of the 
discursive formation of the RJ as integrated with specific political technologies, 
operative at macro and micro levels, which encompass its historical emergence. 
These governmental technologies define a specific overall political framework, 
to be re-constructed and described. Following Nikolas Rose I will term it 
ethopolitics. In this perspective whilst the state remains a key actor in 
determining the framework within which acceptable social relations are 
negotiated, non-state influences and the neo-liberal emphasis upon the 
individual as entrepreneur mean that. The processes of securitization, 
refeudalization of governance, psy-individualization of citizens, will be 
identified as the main political technologies of the ethopolitical paradigm. The 
last step of the problematization of the RJ consists in integrating the analysis of 
the RJ discursive formation and its ethos-political embeddeness, examining the 
subjectivation processes based on the RJ authoritative discourses and 
channeled through the restorative ‘practices’ (understood as ‘procedural’ 
authoritative discourses on the RJ). The subjectivation processes are nothing 
but the micro-level of ethopolitical technologies, their application at the 
‘singular’ level of specific procedures (the RJ ‘practices’) involving specific 
individuals (‘victim’, ‘offender’, ‘community’). This means to analyze how the 
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subjectivity of the RJ’s stakeholders is constructed within the discursive 
formation of the RJ and how individuals actually are affected by these 
processes of subjectivation. These questions request a shift in focus and an 
analysis at a lower level of abstraction. I will start indeed from the ‘archival’ 
identification of the authoritative conceptualizations of ‘victim’, ‘offender’ and 
‘community’ in the RJ accounts. This investigation includes a discursive 
analysis which focuses on the surfaces of emergence of this dimension of 
archive, operationalizing the key concepts of the foucauldian analysis. I will be 
focusing on Victim-Offender Mediation as a ‘procedural’ authoritative 
discourse on the RJ, able to enrich and vehicle the subject positions of ‘victim’, 
‘offender’ and ‘community’, emerging from the archive of the RJ. Lastly, I will 
re-construct the idea of the ‘restorative subject’ as a specific example of the 
effects of ethopolitical technologies on individuals.  
 
1.5.4. The Restorative Justice Apparatus 
Once isolated the archive, articulated the relative discursive formation, analyzed 
the political rationality embedded in such a formation and described the 
subjectivating effects of the discursive formation ‘operationalized’ through 
restorative ‘practices’, it is finally possible to profile the RJ as a dispositif or 
apparatus198. The concept of apparatus plays the role of a sort of “grid of 
interpretation199”, a ‘re-writing’ of existing meaning and the ‘imposition’ of new 
meanings between a range of heterogeneous elements (e.g. concepts, objects 
and institutions). The apparatus is always inscribed in a play of power and 
linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal 
degree, condition it. This is what the apparatus consists in: strategies of 
relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge etc. Its 
function is to enable the researcher to account for the emergence of practices 
and institutions, and to place these elements in a broader and critical 
perspective200. Through the concept of apparatus it is possible to think how 
discourses partly form social relations, identities and social objects, emphasizing 
their materiality and positivity, which cannot be reduced to more primary 
processes, such as economic production, social institutions or political 
behaviour. We can thus capture the performative and practical aspects of 
speaking, writing and communicating about the RJ and connects them to 
questions of power-knowledge and subjectivity. Moreover there is always “an 
urgent need201” to which the functioning of the apparatus responds, which in our 
case is the creation a neo-liberal post-social inclusive justice. Being inscribed in 
a play of power the apparatus also relates to certain types of knowledge that 
derive from it, but also condition it. The apparatus appears then as a powerful 
conceptual tool, apt to cut reality in a peculiar way202. New and rather different 
elements, associations and relations can be seen through it. The new problems 
and connections that come into view, precisely because of the level of detail at 
which they are described, seem to become more amenable to action and 
transformation.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ARCHIVE OF THE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
 
“[The archive] It is no longer a monument for future memory, but a document for possible 
use203”  
 
2.0. Introductory remarks  
The archive of the RJ consists of the systematization of the authoritative 1) 
explanations on the emergence of the RJ; 2) conceptualizations of its core 
characteristics; and 3) procedural discourses on the RJ. The authoritative 
discourses regularly feature any historical, theoretical and practical account on 
the RJ, overlapping, conflicting or integrating each other (within and between), 
composing a milestone for scholars, practitioners, advocates and opponents of 
RJ. Such discourses are drawn upon the ‘textbook’ literature on the RJ, i.e. the 
scholarly, advocacy and operational writings published since the late 70s, 
generally considered by the proponents204 of the RJ (and opponents), the 
“sacred texts205” for the worldwide spreading of RJ’s theories and practices. In 
the selection of the archival material, I rely then on what is considered 
‘normative’ by the proponents of the RJ, targeting (and trying to de-familiarize) 
the more or less definite image of the RJ they have contributed to build up 
over the last thirty years. This perspective is partially akin to the famous 
account of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions206 given by Thomas Kuhn, 
especially regarding the role of scientific textbooks to reconstruct the 
contemporary state of scientific theory. For Kuhn they must be valued insofar 
as they give us a window on the ‘normal science’ of a period207. Nevertheless, 
as subsequent scholarship has shown, what Kuhn dubbed ‘normal science’ has 
not always been as consensual as he implied208. Often, different paradigms 
within the periods of ‘normal science’ might co-exist, with an intense 
competition between and even within them. Accordingly, different and 
conflicting ‘textbook’ versions of a given scholarly field might be present at the 
same moment. Even though these versions do not exhaust that field, they offer 
an interesting glance over it, given to their normativity and tension toward the 
completeness and the coherence. Therefore, the ‘textbook’ literature on the RJ 
can be conceived as the crystallization of different attempts to ‘normalize’ 
some ‘revolutionary’ practices characterized by their ‘borderline’ positions in 
the context of the well-known strategies of dealing with the crime and its 
aftermath. This has not produced one ‘normal science’ of the RJ, but a number 
of competing ‘authoritative discourses’. 
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2.1. Authoritative Explanations 
The authoritative explanations are the discourses which, usually following a 
cause/effect patterns, pose and address the questions ‘why RJ?’. They concern 
historical investigations of the factors, contexts, phenomena which have led to 
the emergence of the RJ in contemporary western democracy. Such discourses 
are far from being ‘pacifically’ cohabiting under the common rubric of 
‘explanations of the RJ’; they look as conflicting, overlapping, contradicting 
each other. On the other side, as we will see, a common trait among them is 
that they structure the emergence of the RJ in functionalist terms. The RJ is an 
‘answer’ to different (and often conflicting) ‘needs’, such as those expressed by 
the crisis of the criminal justice, the rising of awareness of the crime victims’ 
movement and the claim to be involved in dealing with crimes advanced by the 
so-called ‘community’. 
 
2.1.1. The breakdown of contemporary criminal justice system(s) 
The first authoritative explanation to be analyzed, is that the RJ represents a 
response to the shortcomings (or even to the overall failure) of criminal justice 
systems in Western contemporary countries. As the British RJ activist Tony 
Marshall emphasizes “[RJ] is a practice that contains the seeds for solving a new problem 
– the inadequacy of the criminal justice system itself, as it lurches from crisis to crisis, based 
on a primitive philosophy of naked revenge209”. In the same way, one of the 
‘forefathers’ of the RJ movement, Howard Zehr, claims that “We know that the 
system we call “criminal justice” does not work. […]We have known that for many years, 
and have tried many reforms, and they have not worked either210”. Zehr is echoed by 
Robert Cario, well-known advocate of the RJ in France, who states: “The crisis 
of the Penal State is evident. The state has troubles to maintain the jealous monopoly of the 
repression. Based on the protection of people and aiming at ensuring the rule of law through a 
due process of law which guarantees the respect of individual liberties. Unfortunately the penal 
machinery has not yet defined neither the crime nor the punishment or the victim211”. The 
breakdown of the criminal justice system seems a tragic, objective fact. Among 
proponents of the RJ we see a widespread agreement that current systems of 
criminal justice are, on a theoretical level, inacceptable, and, from an empirical 
point of view, ineffectual. Common criticisms include the system’s inability to 
prevent crime, rehabilitate offenders and assist victims. Nevertheless, 
alternative or more moderate views are present in the ‘textbook’ literature. 
Gerry Johnstone for instance, claims that the RJ advocates “present us with a one-
sided picture of the values that underpin conventional criminal justice212” and argues that 
despite its shortcomings, the contemporary approach to criminal justice does 
perform some essential functions with reasonable success. In much of the RJ 
literature, however, it is taken for granted that the emergence of the RJ is a 
natural consequence of the failure of criminal justice system213.  
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2.1.1.1. The failure of law and of the criminal justice 
Before criticizing the criminal justice systems, proponents of the RJ have 
sharply contested the concept of ‘legal system’ as such. A crucial argument in 
favor of this point of view is the skepticism about the ‘legal perspective’ and its 
modus operandi214. The emphasis is repeatedly put on the alleged senselessness of 
holding people accountable to abstract legal categories, disconnected with 
reality. A paradigmatic example of this attitude is found in the following 
description of the law by one of the theoretical ‘founders’ of the movement, 
Nils Christie: “Training in law is a training in simplifications. It is a trained incapacity to 
look at all values in a situation, and instead to select only the legally relevant ones, that is, 
those defined by the high priests within the system to be the relevant ones215”. A 
corresponding passage is found, for instance, in Zehr: “Crime is a result of a legal 
system which makes arbitrary distinctions between various harms and conflicts. It is an 
artificial construct which throws into one basket a variety of unrelated behaviors and 
experiences. It separates them from other harms and violations and thereby obscures the real 
meaning of the experience216” In other words, the objection is that the law is an 
artificial and overly abstract classification system which is fundamentally 
incapable of capturing infinitely complex and multi-facetted human behavior. 
Christie and Zehr seem then believe that a free negotiation between the 
immediate stakeholders would be better at taking into account the essentials in 
any given case. Starting from the criticism to the legal system as a way of 
categorizing human deeds, the proponents of the RJ have then focused their 
attention on the specific case of the criminal justice. Zehr puts this matter in a 
quite straightforward way: “Let’s start with what we know. We know that the system 
we call ‘criminal justice’ does not work. Certainly, at least, it does not work for victims. 
Victims experience crime as deeply traumatic, as a violation of the self217”. At the same 
time it is not working for the offenders either: “It is not preventing offenders from 
committing crimes, as we know well from recidivism figures. And it is not healing them. On 
the contrary, the experience of punishment and of imprisonment is deeply damaging, often 
encouraging rather than discouraging criminal behavior. Nor is the justice holding offenders 
accountable. Judges often talk about accountability but what they usually mean is that when 
you do something wrong you must take your punishment218”. Essentially, it seems that 
the problem with the criminal justice system is both how it is administered 
(through the court process) and its outputs (punishment or acquittal). 
Additionally, the criticisms are focused both on how criminal justice is ideally 
meant to ‘work’ and on ‘how it actually works’. As far as the court process is 
concerned, Roger Graef notices: “It comes as a surprise to many victims that they 
appear in court only if they are needed as witnesses, not in their own right. There they are 
sometimes subjected to grueling cross-examination, which feels to them like ‘re-victimization’ -
living through the crime all over again. They are allowed to speak only about legally defined 
‘facts’- not about what the crime meant to them. Although court cases are conducted in the 
name of the victim and the community, they seem to operate mostly according to the 
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requirements of the courts219”. In this perspective, the result is that many victims 
feel marginalized, and distant from ‘their’ process. Criticisms highlight the little 
sense of “closure, forgiveness, or encouragement for victims to get on with their lives by 
putting the damage caused by the crime behind them220”. For offenders, the proponents 
of the RJ claim that the court process does the opposite of what is intended221. 
It can help to distance them from what happened. Although the spotlight is on 
the person in the dock, the offender takes little part in the proceedings. 
Observing passively at how their lives are discussed in complicated language by 
unfamiliar experts, offenders often cannot understand what is going on222. It is 
their lawyer’s job to argue on their behalf and get them off, whether they are 
guilty or innocent223. Randy Barnett, considered one of the ‘forefathers’ of the 
RJ224, in the 1977 argued that the criminal justice paradigm should be rejected 
because the lacking of effectiveness, measured by failure in achieving its 
declared goals: deterrence, retribution and rehabilitations225. He suggested a 
new paradigm of dealing with crimes based on the principle of the restitution. 
Barnett’s radical proposal to discharge the criminal justice paradigm of justice 
has helped shape the idea of the RJ as a paradigm, beside the specific idea of 
restitution. Christie in his famous article “Conflicts as property” elaborated a 
criticism regarding the criminal justice which represents a ‘landmark’ of the RJ 
literature226. The matter is that the criminal justice holds the structural ‘task’ of 
‘stealing conflicts’ (legally defined as crimes) from their rightful owners, the 
victim and the offender (or plaintiff and defendant)227. The stolen conflicts are 
reshaped and managed by the criminal justice professionals accordingly criteria 
of rationality absolutely alien to the interests of conflicts’ owners. A strong 
dissatisfaction and damage for a peaceful social ‘growth’ of the community are 
the natural consequences of this process228. The conflict, in fact, is thought by 
Christie as a precious property that should be returned to the rightful holders 
in order to make possible a more socially ‘participatory’ management of it. 
Mary Achilles and Zehr take a slightly different stance. In their view, the basic 
problem of the criminal justice system is that it is entirely set up as an 
offender-centered system229. Once a criminal event moves beyond investigation 
to arrest and prosecution, cases are defined and processed around offender 
identities and issues, totally ignoring the victim’s needs230. Martin Wright, well 
known British RJ advocate, talks of the criminal procedure as process where 
the means are “overshadowed by the end231”. He argues that the delays in bringing 
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cases before the courts are followed by the speed of routinization with which 
the people-processing machine then operates232. Both the problems are 
aggravated by the volume of the work confronting the courts. Court 
proceedings are busy and mechanical technocratic events did not touch the 
lives of defendants233. It has become a commonplace to observe that courts 
proceedings are based essentially on win/lose, guilty/not guilty principles234. 
Another shortcoming of the traditional criminal justice system frequently cited 
by the proponents of the RJ, as a reason for its emergence, is the inconsistency 
in sentencing235. A number of proponents of the RJ criticize the existing 
criminal justice system on the grounds that sentencing outcomes appear 
haphazard. Zehr236, for example, claims that a lack of uniformity in sentencing 
has been highlighted by studies in which a number of judges are given 
particular cases to consider, and asked what their sentence would be. “The range 
in outcomes”, Zehr claims, “is breathtaking237”. In a similar fashion, judge Fred 
McElrea claims that: “It is […] inherently unfair to criticize family group conference 
procedures on the grounds that sometimes they impose outcomes more onerous than the court 
would have imposed […] what is overlooked is that sentencing is not an exact science and 
there can be considerable disparity between the sentences imposed by different judges in similar 
cases; we do not therefore say that judges should not be involved in sentencing238”.  
 
2.1.1.2. Criticisms against the punishment  
The criticism regarding the idea and the implementation of the punishment, 
carried out by the proponents of the RJ, appears even sharper than the attack 
against the structural features of the criminal justice system. A key feature of 
the restorative way of thinking about crime and justice is the rejection of 
responses to crime which consider imposition of pain on offenders239. In 
contrast, the RJ is portrayed as a more constructive and humane approach 
aimed at reparations of harms and broken social bonds, rather than involving 
deliberate infliction of pain240. At the same time, it is impossible to identify a 
common perspective regarding the limits and deficiencies of the punishment or 
the relationship between this and the RJ. According to Jolien Willemsen, the 
premise of the debate on punishment in the scholarly literature on the RJ, is 
that there is a strong lack of clarity among the proponents of the RJ about 
what is meant by the term ‘punishment’241. Wright for instance, has argued that 
the punishment must be considered any infliction of pain on the offender 
legally convicted of a legally defined offence, looking at the intentions of the 
legal authorities which administer this process242. Kathleen Daly, on the other 
hand, would define punishment as anything that is unpleasant: a burden or 
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imposition on the offender243. Paul McCold244 has claimed that accepting any 
form of coercion as being potentially restorative would completely shift the RJ 
back to being retribution. Starting from this point we can observe a really 
complex discussion on the punishment among the proponents of the RJ, 
characterized often by the intertwining of descriptive and normative 
perspectives as well as theoretical misunderstandings. In order to simplify this 
tangle of arguments, a main distinction can be drawn. It stands between the 
theoretical stances (criticism against how the punishment is conceived, 
regardless its factual implementation) and empirical ones (how punishment is 
carried out, i.e. its material effects). The first ‘chapter’ of this debate is how the 
proponents (especially the scholars of the RJ) have critically approached the 
different theoretical justifications of punishment, indicating the RJ as a way to 
overcome the shortcomings of these conceptualizations. Lode Walgrave, one 
of the leading scholars and advocates of the RJ in the “maximalist perspective245”, 
has claimed the necessity to question all the main, historically-rooted 
theoretical justifications of the punishment. As far as the consequentialist-
utilitarian justification is concerned246, he argues that this stance is totally 
betrayed by the concrete ways to punish people. In the prison system, in fact, 
there is not any utilitarian aim, but only infliction of a blind pain. Walgrave 
argues also against the idea of punitive sanction as a symbolization of what is 
unacceptable in a given society247. In this case the shortcoming is the 
impossibility of proportionality and the chimera of consistency. It is impossible 
to equalize the harm done and the pain inflicted, then is totally neglected the 
fact that the same kind of punishment has different effects on different 
people248. To combine the utilitarian argument with the symbolic one does not 
make it immune from the Walgrave’s criticism249. In this case the problem is 
that the offender remains the focus of the punishment, pushed toward self-
defensive positions, causing an additional damage to the neglected victim. In 
fact, the offender is stimulated to deny the responsibility, minimizing the 
acknowledgement of the act and its impact on the victim250. Conventional 
justifications of punitive sanctions, according to Walgrave’s perspective, show 
structural limits such as their side-effects (provoking superficial compliance or 
stimulating anti-social behavior) or collateral damages (the unfair and 
unproductive impact on the offender’s family). The Walgrave’s conclusion is 
that punitive sanctions are unacceptable and ineffective251.  
Some proponents have also focused on the relationship between the RJ and 
the rehabilitative justification of punishment252. Many of them have contrasted 
the idea of treatment/rehabilitative model as such denying any possibility of 
combination between the philosophy which underlies this model and the RJ253. 
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Rehabilitation is criticized on the grounds that it takes a one-dimensional, 
offender-driven approach, ignoring needs of victims and denying them 
meaningful participation in the justice process. It views offenders as victims of 
an underlying psychiatric disorder who are not responsible for their criminal 
behavior and fails to hold them accountable. Being administered by 
professionals who “do not see themselves as being in business of moral evaluation254”, the 
treatment model shields offenders from social condemnation of their 
offending behavior. According to the proponents of the RJ, this prevents 
offenders from realizing the wrongfulness of their criminal activities and 
undermines the informal social mechanisms of crime control255. Nevertheless it 
is possible to detect the presence of some scholars who understand the RJ and 
the rehabilitation as compatible, seeing the possibility for the offender to take 
part to a rehabilitation program as one of the most appreciable RJ’s 
outcome256. John Braithwaite, for instance, argues that the RJ is often 
rehabilitative, although does not have the rehabilitation as its primary purpose. 
It is rehabilitative precisely because it does not directly set out to change 
people and thus avoids the risk of psychological reactance on the part of the 
offender. Yet, when it directly pursues the RJ’s objectives, rehabilitation is a 
likely ‘spin-off’257. Other have also expressed skepticism towards an approach 
drawing a sharp distinction between RJ and offender rehabilitation, being 
clearly present in the RJ some rehabilitation elements258 . Johnstone has 
criticized the image elaborated by the proponents of the RJ regarding the 
rehabilitation as only medical-orientated, whereas socio-therapeutic option is 
available in the rehabilitation perspective since long time259. According to Jerry 
Johnstone, when we respond to a harmful act as a crime we bring into play a 
set of interdependent assumption about how we should regard and handle it260. 
In this context, the most important assumption are these: the focus of official 
attention is squarely upon the harmful act and the perpetrator of it; this act is 
construed as a transgression of society’s fundamental laws-the perpetrator has 
done something which society forbids people to do because it deems it 
harmful and/or immoral; the state initiates exclusively legal action on behalf of 
society, only this can dismiss it; if the legal action is successful the offender is 
punished; there is considerable social stigma attached to being convicted and 
punished for a criminal offence261. Consistently with this perspective, Gordon 
Bazemore, taking a stance opposite to Walgrave, argues for a fully restorative 
model of rehabilitation rooted in a specific relational context262.  
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2.1.1.3. The prisons’ failure  
From the ‘empirical’ point of view, the main ‘punctum dolens’ of contemporary 
criminal justice systems, is the implementation of punishments, i.e. how the 
prison’s system actually works. To Zehr, the reasons for the ineffectiveness of 
prison come as no surprise. In Changing Lenses, Zehr describes a case in which 
the judge, while sentencing a young offender to 20 to 85 years in prison, told 
the offender, “I trust that [in prison] you will forget the patterns of behavior which led to 
this violent offense263”. As Zehr mentions, prison life teaches inmates the exact 
opposite. It teaches them to be obedient, but does not give them the tools to 
become self-governing and to take charge of their life in legitimate ways264. It is 
structured to dehumanize the inmates, denying them a sense of self-worth and 
self-respect and, in turn, the ability to respect others265. As Zvi Gabbay 
remarks, while one might disagree with Zehr on different aspects of the 
incarceration experience, few people would argue that prison is an educational 
institution that prepares its inmates for the normative life they will be expected 
to live outside its walls. Since prison is, in many cases, perceived as the only 
appropriate way to punish offenses for almost every type of crime, it is 
surprising, according to Gabbay, how little energy is invested in preparations 
for ‘the day after’, the time in which the incarcerated offender will reenter 
society266. This stance finds quite remarkable echo among the proponents of 
the RJ. The idea that no attention is given to the question of what happens 
once the sentence is over has been often stressed in the ‘textbook’ literature. 
On the other side, in this authoritative writings, there is room for criticizing the 
fact that restorative ‘practices’ represent alternatives to incarceration. Tony 
Dittenhoffer and Richard Ericson’s empirical report267 on two Victim-
Offender Reconciliation programs in Canada found, for example, that although 
providing an alternative to incarceration was the principal aim of at least one of 
these programs, this aim was not being reached. In fact, Dittenhoffer and 
Ericson found that the programs were increasing rather than decreasing the net 
of social control, and that in a number of instances, meetings between victims 
and offenders resulted in a sentence of imprisonment for the offender. While 
there are usually upper limits placed on the amount and type of punishment 
that restorative procedures can result in, terms of imprisonment can be 
imposed by participants in some restorative procedures268, perhaps most often 
in circle sentencing, where offences of a more serious or personal nature can 
be considered269. New Zealand’s court-referred RJ pilot project for adults also 
permits this outcome, with 13.7% of offenders being sentenced to 
imprisonment as a result of a restorative procedure270. Furthermore, RJ 
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programs can also be ‘applied’ to some offenders in addition to a goal term271. 
While the failings of the prison make a persuasive backdrop to arguments for 
the implementation of the RJ programs, in practice, such restorative measures 
seem have largely escaped application to the types of offences that might have 
resulted in their utilization as an alternative to prison272. In this perspective, 
therefore, the offending population for whom the RJ is rationalized, and the 
offending population upon whom the RJ is practiced, appear to be quite 
separate.  
 
2.1.2. The victimhood’s renaissance 
Another typical explanation for the emergence of the RJ, shared by a fair 
number of proponents, is that the RJ has emerged due to the development of a 
new crime victims’ awareness translated in a worldwide victims’ movement273. 
In this frame, the RJ has been as one of the new ways of dealing with crime 
victims’ needs (as precondition of victims’ rights) starting from the 80s. This 
interpretation is usually complementary to the failure of criminal justice, 
offering a solid ground on which the victims’ movement has built up strong 
political claims and reform’s arguments. Probably, the connection between 
these two explanations is that the crime victims’ claims are shaped first of all as 
a criticism regarding the criminal law and its application. Gay Clarke and Iyla 
Davies, for example, argue that “the increasing use of victim offender mediation 
programs in Australia and throughout the world can be seen as […] a shift in focus in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s to the rights of victims and the study of victimology274”. 
Likewise, Zehr states that “the theory and practice of restorative justice have emerged 
from and been profoundly shaped by an effort to take [the] needs of victims seriously275”. On 
the same line, as Antony Pemberton et al. claim, there seems to be little doubt 
that the RJ is in “the interest of victims of crime276”. In academic textbooks the two 
are often paired and legislation concerning the RJ emphasizes the position of 
victims of crime277. Assisting crime victims in their recovery is considered to be 
a core element of any RJ intervention278. Walgrave, echoing this perspective, 
argues that the RJ can be represented as a victim-centered approach to 
justice279. This is because the RJ does not marginalize the victim from the 
justice process, avoiding, at the same time, to offer retribution on the victim’s 
behalf. Instead, the RJ is able to recognize the victim as a central stakeholder 
within the restorative process, and thus seeks to provide victims with a 
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prominent role in shaping the justice process and in deciding upon a just 
resolution to the conflict280.  
 
2.1.2.1. From the dispossession of victims to the rising of victims’ movement in 
criminal justice 
The story of the decline of the role of victims in Western criminal justice 
systems is a familiar one for the RJ literature. Often, indeed, both the RJ 
scholarly contributions and policy-oriented interventions, assume as starting 
point the historical process of victim’s ‘role dispossession’ in the criminal 
justice. This claim is more or less organized as follows. A thousand years ago, 
victims’ rights to compensation for wrongdoing were codified in written laws, 
though the implementation of these rights often depended on the threat of the 
kinship feud281. Originally, criminal cases were prosecuted by private 
individuals, often by means of ‘blood feuds282’. Remedies focused on 
compensating individual victims rather than achieving public goals of 
deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation. Over time, however, the law gradually 
changed; the criminal action became state property283. Only with the rise of the 
modern state, the responsibility for the investigation, prosecution and 
disposition of personal crime ceased to be the victim’s duty and become a 
matter for the Crown or the state284. The erosion of victim’s rights over the 
centuries led eventually to their removal from any meaningful role in the justice 
system in common law countries285. “The victim had become another witness286”, is 
emphatically argued in the ‘textbook’ literature. Victims were so 
comprehensively forgotten that it was not until the middle of the twentieth 
century that any academic or practical interest in them was revived. Indeed, it 
was the mid-seventies before researchers, justice policy makers and the broader 
community began to express concern about their own role, or rather its 
absence, in the criminal justice system287. In the RJ literature, this 
transformation is explained drawing upon studies which emphasize a variety of 
anthropological, sociological, political, and philosophical reasons. In 
Wetekamp’s view, for example, although we tend now to think of the criminal 
law as inherently public, in the early days of Western legal systems, private 
individuals prosecuted criminals and meted out punishment288. The criminal 
law was primarily concerned with victims’ compensation or revenge. Criminal 
law became a matter of public interest with the close of the Anglo-Saxon 
period in English history and the rise of feudalism. In the Middle Ages, the 
system of ‘composition’ combined public punishment with private damages so 
that crime victims and their families could collect satisfaction from 
wrongdoers. Increasingly, however, intentionally harmful acts were considered 
offenses against the ‘peace rather than individual victims, and a structured 
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court system developed to redress these public wrongs289. As the state 
established a monopoly on punishment, the rights of crime victims were 
gradually severed from the criminal law. The system of the ‘blood feud’ and 
revenge as the principal remedy for wrongdoing became obsolete290. The rising 
awareness of crime victims and their efforts put into the creation of a 
worldwide movement able to lobby the victims’ needs, is considered by the RJ 
literature a stunning innovation in the criminal justice in the 1960s291. This 
phenomenon is usually assumed as the fundamental step toward the worldwide 
edification of the RJ theory and practice. Looking more analytically at this 
process, different have been the conceptualizations of its historical 
development, and political or legal achievements. According to Johanna 
Shapland et al., the victims’ movement has developed into four main stages: 
“victim aid and assistance; victim experiences with the criminal justice system, State 
compensation, and reparation by the offender292”. In the more nuanced perspective of 
Marlene Young and John Stein, even if focused only on the USA case, it is 
possible to identify five stages: the development of a field called ‘victimology’; 
the introduction of state victim compensation programs; the rise of the 
women’s movement; the rise of crime that was accompanied by a parallel 
dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system and the growth of victim 
activism293. These different steps are considered in the ‘textbook’ literature, 
crucial for the emergence of the RJ.  
 
2.1.2.2. The identity of victims  
The ‘victims’ are often represented by the RJ literature as a cohesive, united 
ensemble of people. Zehr portrays victims as a homogenous and essential 
category, based on what he sees as the needs of the ‘essential’ crime victim294. 
According to Zehr’s claims, crime victims do experience “nearly universal295” 
reactions to victimization, irrespective of the seriousness of the offence. Zehr’s 
focus on victims of crimes is also evident in his discussion of offenders. He 
claims that “offenders often lack a certain moral sense, defined as a preoccupation with their 
own needs and an [in]ability to empathize with others […]. This preoccupation with self 
actually is based in a weak self-image, perhaps in self-hate296”. Victims are further 
described as an “unacknowledged group, a group that was not a self-conscious community 
and that lacked a collective presence297”. Nevertheless does exist in the RJ literature a 
more nuanced perspective on the identity of the victims who, organizing 
themselves as a movement, have raised the question of how to address their 
needs in the criminal justice system. Young, for instance, has criticized the 
mainstream RJ literature for using too homogenous conceptions of victims, 
followed by generalized, sweeping statements about the beneficial effects of 
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the RJ for all victims298. Similarly, Chris Cunneen provocatively asks: “Does the 
‘ideal’ victim or offender of RJ ever exist and, if not, what are implications for the restorative 
practices?299”. According to him, in the RJ’s framework, ‘victim’ (as well as 
‘offender’) is understood as too much uncomplicated and homogeneous 
category of the self. There are no complexities: a person is either an offender 
or a victim, and these universal categories appear to subsume all other possible 
identities. He goes on wondering “can we assume that everyone subjectively experiences 
these categories in identical or, at least, similar ways, irrespective of their gender, class, race, 
ethnicity, sexual preference, religion or age?300”. In Cunneen’s perspective, victims and 
offenders are legal subjects who do not exist in a natural state separated from 
the social characteristics through which individuals live their lives. To be a 
citizen, to be a victim, to be a criminal takes on meaning only in the context of 
social relations between people and within the broader institutions of society. 
Perhaps, it could be argued, the RJ allows us an opportunity to explore these 
social relations and their impact on crime and victimization301. However, given 
that most RJ processes are already firmly embedded within state practice, the 
identities of victim and offender and the script which is expected to be 
followed is already well established. There does not appear to be much 
opportunity to challenge these identities. Indeed, we must accept the label of 
ourselves as either an offender or as a victim before we are allowed to enter 
into established RJ processes. If we refuse, for example, to self-identify as an 
offender, we are precluded from engaging in the script of the RJ. Like the 
criminal law more generally, the RJ narratives have tended to construct 
subjectivity as a binary field of either offender or victim, with little attention to 
the profound difficulties that underpin these classification. As Cunneen states, 
in oppressed or marginalized communities many victims may also be 
offender302. 
 
2.1.2.3. What do victims want from justice? 
The number of studies on the victims’ claims towards the criminal justice 
system, elaborated or used by the proponents of the RJ, is simply enormous. 
Some of these have already emerged from the previous sections. Andrew 
Woolford, for instance, in his meta-analysis of the RJ literature, identifies the 
following victims’ needs: acknowledgement that the victim is blameless for the 
harm he/she suffered; restitution of stolen items; monetary compensation; 
symbolic atonement in the form of apology; sense of safety and closure; an 
opportunity for the victim to voice his/her suffering; continuing support303. 
Achilles and Zehr isolate other basic needs such as safety, restitution, answers 
to questions, truth-telling and empowerment304. To simplify the complex 
landscape of studies on victims’ needs/claims, I draw upon the analytical 
scheme elaborated by Heather Strang and Lawrence Sherman, which reduces 
the victims’ needs to five main meta-areas which synthetize the ‘authoritative’ 
positions within the RJ literature. The first crime victims’ need, they have 
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detected, is to be informed305. They refer that victims repeatedly consider one of 
the greatest sources of frustration to them the difficulty in finding out from 
criminal justice authorities about developments in their cases. Additionally, 
Shapland et al. further observe that the victim is regarded as ‘supernumerary’ 
insofar as is not a prosecution witness306. Achilles and Zehr, in their analysis on 
the conditions of an efficient RJ system, have strongly supported the idea that 
to be informed is a basic victims’ need. According to them, victims hold the 
need to understand their role in the criminal justice process (also the RJ ones), 
including potential benefits and risks to themselves and offenders307. They 
want to have as much information as possible about their case, the offense and 
the offender308. A second fundamental need is the participation309. A major 
complaint of victims is that they are not encouraged to feel part of justice 
proceedings in their case. It appears that participation in the processing of their 
cases assists victims both in their emotional recovery and in reducing the sense 
of alienation that results from believing they have no control and no status310. 
Furthermore, as Achilles and Zehr state, victims and victim advocates want to 
be represented on governing bodies and initial planning committees311. Their 
inclusion in the process of development highlights the programs’ commitment 
to crime victims and the sensitivities that need to be addressed so as not to re-
victimize. This important view can assist in enhancing the quality of a program 
and a sense of ownership in the program from the victims’ perspective. It also 
sends a strong message of inclusion to the victim services community. Since a 
core element of victim trauma is disempowerment, there should be as few 
limits on participation as possible312. Another basic claim of the crime victims 
highlighted by Strang and Sherman is the necessity of emotional restoration 
and apology313. Beyond the calculable material harm victims of crime may 
experience, there are emotional and psychological dimensions to the loss that 
have routinely been ignored by the justice system and that need redressing if 
the experience of victimization is ever to be satisfactorily resolved314. While 
courts and lawyers make reference to pain and suffering experienced by 
victims, and in some cases financial settlements are arrived at in civil or 
criminal courts to compensate for this, victims themselves say that emotional 
harm is healed, as opposed to compensated for, only by an act of emotional 
repair315. The ‘evidence’ suggests that victims see emotional reconciliation to be 
far more important than material or financial reparation316. From the victim’s 
perspective, traditional criminal justice fails precisely because it treats all similar 
offences in similar ways, regardless of the differential impact of the offence on 
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different victims. Attempts to create consistency for offenders may produce 
gross inconsistencies for victims, with costs of crime distributed unequally in 
ways that are far more emotional and powerful than is generally assumed317. In 
this context, the offer and acceptance of a sincere apology is considered always 
vital to the successful resolution of the offence and the restoration of the 
participants. But discussion of apology is redundant if victims’ welfare is 
considered only within the dominant adversarial paradigm of the court system. 
There is little point in asking victims whether they want an apology when no 
opportunity exists for a direct exchange between them and their offenders. As 
Achilles and Zehr clearly emphasize, victims need a ‘safe place’, meaning to say 
a physical and emotional space which allows them to recover from the 
victimization318. Whether working with crime victims in the immediate 
aftermath of an incident or years later, all the interventions must first and 
foremost recognize victim’s safety and security needs, both physical and 
emotional, an opportunity to identify and articulate their personal needs 319. 
This stance is also stressed by Daniel Van Ness and Karen Strong, who 
identify the safety as the most immediate need for victims of crime, intended as 
both physical and emotional320. Heather Strang has also emphasized that the 
need for a symbolic statement about the legitimacy of the victims’ status and 
acknowledgement of the emotional harm experienced is an aspect of 
victimization which has only recently been given attention. Indeed is reported 
evidence to suggest that victims may often see emotional restoration as far 
more important than material or financial reparation321. The material reparation 
then remains a basic victims’ need, along with the often neglected symbolic 
and emotional reparation322. When victims experience material harm, they 
usually want material reparation, and, absent any other available remedy; they 
will often take money for nonmaterial harm as well. Whether that reparation 
should come from the state or from the person who caused the harm is an 
interesting question. Lastly Strang and Sherman identify in the compliance with 
the general principles of fairness and respect another fundamental victims’ 
need323 Although it is often assumed that victims’ sense of satisfaction with the 
justice system is related only to sentencing outcome, the evidence shows that the 
main factor influencing satisfaction with the sentence is the perception of 
fairness with the sentencing process. Furthermore, it appears that victims do not 
usually seek a decisive role in the outcome of their cases. They only wish to be 
consulted throughout the criminal justice process. Some scholars fear that 
consultation with victims would lend bias or inequity to decisions as to guilt or 
sentencing. But victims rarely seek a role in the adjudication of their cases. 
Rather, they seek the chance to present their view on the case to someone, and 
not necessarily a key decision-maker. The chance to be heard at all is usually 
the crucial aspect for victims in achieving a sense of satisfaction with the justice 
system.  
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2.1.2.4. Restorative Justice and Crime Victims: fair and effective answers 
As already discussed, the limited opportunity for victims to participate in the 
legal system is a shortcoming frequently cited by the proponents of the RJ. 
Zehr calls this the “ultimate tragedy”: “those who have most directly suffered are not to be 
part of the resolution of the offense. In fact […] victims are not even part of our 
understanding of the problem324”. Indeed, to this claim is widely accorded the status 
of an indisputable ‘truth’ in the ‘textbook’ literature. Even the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council’s recommendations in regards to ‘mediation’ 
processes in criminal justice are premised on “the need to enhance active personal 
participation in criminal proceedings of the victim [and] the legitimate interest of victims to 
have a stronger voice in dealing with the consequences of their victimization325”. According 
to Burt Galaway and Barbara Hudson, one of the main tasks of the RJ is to 
facilitate active participation by victims, offenders, and their communities in 
order to find solutions to the conflict326. Actively engaging victims in the 
process of doing justice and returning to them conflicts ‘stolen’ from them by 
professionals has become one of the key aspirations of the proponents of the 
RJ. Krista Pelikan and Thomas Trenczek claim that active participation is a 
core element of the RJ, a necessary condition in order to produce 
comprehensive solutions to the offence’s aftermath327. Integral to this idea of 
justice which aims at empowering especially victims, reducing the hegemonic 
intervention of professionals, is the idea that the RJ must be a community-
based form of justice. Barnett’s proposal for ‘a new paradigm’ of restitutional 
justice, as already discussed, represents a pioneering representation of how the 
RJ addresses victims’ needs of restitution. He defines crime as an offense of 
one person against another (rather than against the state), and justice as a 
“culpable offender making good the loss” caused, and says that he is “against 
punishment328”. In its place he proposes “pure restitution” (rather than ‘punitive 
restitution’, which is forced compensation or imposed fines). The goal is 
“reparations paid to the victim329”, which would be ordered, when an offender is 
“sentenced to make restitution to the victim330”. In Barnett’s analysis, reparations (he 
uses the plural) and restitution refer to the same thing: financial payments. He 
considers a variety of ways of “repaying the victim331” and addresses potential 
objections of his proposal. Marian Liebmann332, RJ advocate in UK and author 
of a well-known textbook, identifies as the primary principled goal of the RJ 
the necessity to give to the victim the opportunity to have a more central role 
in the judicial process. She goes on claiming as another fundamental goal of 
the RJ is not punishment but making good the harm done by offending –for 
the victim, the community and the offender. She concludes stating that in the 
RJ“[…] Putting the victim rather than the state at the centre of the judicial process is a 
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paradigm shift of real significance333”. Lastly, Daly and Stubbs, working on a wide 
literature, find that the potential benefits of the RJ most frequently considered 
are those related to the victim, such as the “victim voice and participation, and the 
victim validation and offender responsibility334”.  
 
2.1.2.5. Critical issues: victims, gender and race in the Restorative Justice’s settings 
The role of victims, their claims and needs, and how the RJ aims at addressing 
them, might appear fairly uncontroversial in the ‘textbook’ literature. However, 
must be acknowledged the presence of criticisms against this perspective, 
coming especially from feminist and race scholars and advocates, who have 
emphasized the lack of understanding of power relations embedded in 
responses to crimes against women and racial minorities (including the RJ)335.  
The starting point for feminist arguments is that domestic violence is a special 
type of crime and that the priority of any sort of intervention must be to 
ensure physical protection for victims, usually women and children336. The RJ 
needs, it is argued, to deconstruct generalized notions of crime and recognize 
the special nature of domestic violence: not an isolated act involving two 
individuals who are unknown to each other, but rather a gendered strategy of 
control that includes various types of coercive tactics, and may be part of 
patterned cycle of behavior which includes contrition and apology337. 
Moreover, some of the potential benefits of the RJ are considered not 
applicable in domestic and family violence cases; for instance, victims may not 
benefit from meeting with and learning about the offender but may personally 
targeted by the offender338. Daly and Stubbs also refer how claims that the RJ is 
derived from Indigenous practices and or is particularly appropriate for 
Indigenous communities have been challenged for denying diversity among 
Indigenous peoples339 and for re-engaging a white-centres view of the world340. 
Critics also say that the RJ imposed on Indigenous communities, is neo-
colonialist, not community driven, and is an adjunct burden rather than 
alternative to conventional criminal justice341. Circle sentencing is one form of 
the RJ (and Indigenous justice practice) that has been used widely in Canada 
and adopted more recently in Australia. In Canada, women’s experiences with 
sentencing circles are mixed. Concerns have been raised that the subordination 
of women in some Canadian First Nations communities means that they do 
not enter the circle on an equal basis342 and that women have sometimes been 
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excluded, silenced, or harmed because power relations were not recognized, or 
gendered violence not taken seriously. Whether in the context of circles or 
conventional criminal justice, Sherene Razack argues that “culture, community, and 
colonialization can be used to compete with and ultimately prevail over gender-based 
harm343”. Thus, ‘cultural’ arguments (such as that sexual violence occurs 
because the community is coming to terms with the effects of colonialization) 
may be accepted while “women’s realities at the intersection of racism and sexism344” are 
ignored. In the Australian context, Melissa Lucashenko345 shows the difficult 
situation in which Indigenous women are placed: “Black women have been torn 
between the self-evident oppression they share with Indigenous men- oppression that fits 
uneasily […] into the frameworks of White feminism- and the unacceptability of those men’s 
violent, sexist behaviors toward their families346”. How, then, Daly and Stubbs 
wonder, do these race and gender politics relate to the RJ? First, they say, there 
is considerable debate, and no one position. For instance, in Australia, there is 
support for the RJ principles by many Indigenous people and organizations347. 
However, the use of the RJ to divert men, who have been involved in family 
violence, from the criminal justice system is accepted by some communities348, 
but resisted by others. Indigenous communities vary culturally, politically, and 
in their access to resources. Second, violence is experienced differently in 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities. Thus, if RJ-like responses are 
introduced, they will require significant reconceptualization of what is, 
ultimately, a white justice model. The RJ cannot be prescribed, nor adopted as 
formula349. Rather it needs to be explored and transformed with due regard to 
the Indigenous principle of self-determination, with reference to existing 
Indigenous initiatives, and with explicit recognition of Indigenous women’s 
interests. Third, Indigenous and non-Indigenous women may differ in their 
conceptualization of, and responses to, the RJ. Finally, race and gender politics 
have a particular signature, depending on the country and context examined350. 
The criticisms against the capability of the RJ to satisfy crime victims are not 
only theoretical ones. In their empirical evaluation of ‘family group 
conferencing’ in New Zealand, for example, Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison 
Morris found that victims attended less than half of the ‘conferences’ 
conducted351. More significantly, one third of victims who did not attend even 
claimed that they were not invited to attend ‘their’ conference352. For many of 
these victims, participation in a ‘family group conference’ was impossible due 
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to the ‘conference’ being held at an unsuitable time and/or location353. More 
recent research has indicated that low levels of victim participation have also 
occurred in Britain. Tim Newburn et al. found that following the introduction 
of ‘youth offender panels’ into Britain’s juvenile justice system, victims 
attended less than 7% of panels354, and Carolyn Hoyle reports that only 14% of 
victims attended Thames Valley’s ‘restorative sessions’. Similarly, the South 
Australian RJ scheme for juveniles is reported to have less than 50% victim 
attendance355. While this apparent lack of concern for victims could quite 
possibly be the result of fiscal and/or temporal pressures on conference 
organizers, it also indicates that victims were not considered to be an integral 
component of a Family Group conference. Rather, it appears that the 
attendance of the offender, and the offender’s family and supporters, was held 
in much higher regard.  
 
2.1.3. Community’s needs 
Along with the failing of the ‘formal’ criminal justice system and the re-
discovering of crime victims’ centrality in criminal justice, it is possible to 
detect at least another explanans regarding the historical emergence of the RJ 
theory and practices, deeply rooted in the ‘textbook’ literature. This is the 
‘need’ of the community to be recognized as a fundamental stakeholder in 
dealing with crime and its aftermath, its key role in ensuring safety and peace to 
victims and to foster binding social behavior to offenders, the necessity to be 
part of the criminal justice system and to escape from the position of a 
neglected actor. As Albert Dzur and Susan Olson have emphasized, crime, for 
the proponents of the RJ, means more than violation of the laws of the state 
and more even than harm to victims356. Echoing Christie, crime is widely 
conceived by the proponents of the RJ, as a dysfunctional way of saying 
something, and punishment, is an equally dysfunctional way of answering357. In 
this picture, the idea that the community has a stake in an offense- that apart 
from direct victims, a larger social network might also be an affected party- 
becomes a ‘landmark’ of the RJ. Considering the only abstract, highly 
formalized ways in which the community is incorporated to mainstream 
criminal justice practice358, the proponents call for more public participation in 
the criminal justice process so that the harm to community is more clearly 
brought to the attention of the offender359. Rather than the general claim that 
‘communal harm’ needs to be addressed, then, the best reasons for public 
participation are more precise reasons that link community participation to a 
better functioning criminal justice system or some other benefit to the 
community360. As usual, the ‘textbook’ literature is not so ‘peaceful’ as it might 
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appear: even talking of community, different and deeply conflicting stances can 
be easily detected. 
 
2.1.3.1. The meaning(s) of ‘community’  
As Wright and Orlane Foucault have noticed, the proponents of the RJ usually 
speak of victims, offenders and the community as “a neat triangle on a flip 
chart361”. The same claim is advanced by McCold, who acknowledges the 
existence of general agreement, in theory, that community is as central to the 
RJ as are the victim and the offender362. Nevertheless the concept of 
‘community’ in the RJ literature is not something unanimously shared, being 
present different definitions of it363. As Wright states: “the community is everyone: 
the shopkeeper, the doctor or nurse – even the bureaucrat from the Ministry of Education or 
Justice is a member of the community when he or she comes home”. Yet, for the most 
part, community remains a concept vaguely defined. Van Ness and Strong, for 
instance, elaborate their idea of community in the RJ, by distinguishing 
between the role of the community and role of government: “in promoting justice, 
the government is responsible for preserving order, and the community is responsible for 
establishing peace364”. Similarly, McCold and Benjamin Wachtel propose a ‘non-
geographic’ perspective on community which can be used to focus and define 
what community justice initiatives should look like and what they should be 
trying to achieve365. Community is described by them as a feeling, a perception 
of personal connectedness both to other individual human beings and to a group. 
Building community, then, involves building connections between human 
beings. Where is absent any perception of connectedness among a group of 
people, there is not any community, they argue366. Marshall suggests that the RJ 
seeks to reduce crime by strengthening bonds of interdependency while 
holding offenders accountable367. He defines the RJ as a process whereby all 
the parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve 
collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications 
for the future. Parties with a stake in an offence include, of course, the victim 
and the offender, but they also comprise the families of each, and any other 
members of their respective communities who may be affected, or who may be 
able to contribute to prevention of a recurrence368. The RJ programs are 
supposed to empower the victim and offender as well as the personal 
communities to exercise informal social support and control of the process. 
Not only are the micro-communities important in the restoration process, but 
they are the means through which healing and reintegration is possible. In the 
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same way Rob White stresses that the community is nothing but an endless 
process to be conceived as an essential part of transforming the conditions that 
give rise to criminality and criminalization369. In this view, crime is not 
reducible to the individual. It is a social phenomenon. Concentrating solely on 
the individual offender, or specific incidents of harm, belies the necessity for 
widespread changes in particular milieus. An important task of crime 
prevention, and in dealing with offenders (especially young ones), is, in this 
perspective, to use the opportunity of intervention in order to rebuild 
communities, and as part of this to foster the ideas of solidarity and co-
operation. Victims, likewise, need access to such relationships, with similar 
objectives. This is especially so given that victims are generally members of the 
same neighborhood or community. One way to approach this is through 
greater democratization of decision making at the neighborhood level, 
including the incorporation of people, like young offenders, directly into the 
process370. Building social alliances is also crucial to connecting people across 
the community, as well as in forging pro-active campaigns on issues such as 
economic redevelopment, anti-racism and unwanted intrusions by the state. 
The enhancement of community resources is thought a crucial aspect of any 
anticrime and social justice strategy371. In this regard, in addition to political 
campaigns for greater assistance in the redevelopment of local neighborhoods, 
creative thinking has to go into how best to use existing community resources 
in the here and now372. The point of intervention would be to facilitate 
harmonious community relations, rather than constantly to remind those 
present that rules and laws might be transgressed. Lack of adequate resources, 
a lack of youth-friendly amenities, constant harassment from authority figures, 
fear of becoming a victim and exclusion from decision-making processes 
constitute a recipe for resentment, frustration, alienation and retaliation373.  
 
2.1.3.2. The community’s needs  
As Dzur suggests374, the best way to identify the common ‘needs’ of the 
community in the RJ literature, is to look at the ‘authoritative’ works of Zehr, 
Braithwaite, Philip Pettit and Christie. As Dzur has emphasized, Zehr grounds 
the RJ on the fact that for a real experience of justice, the communication 
between victim and offender cannot be dominated by the state or by criminal 
justice professionals. State officials are not the best candidates for hearing and 
validating the victim’s truth and the offender’s remorse. Indeed, Zehr sees the 
predominance of officials and professionals in the criminal justice system as 
hindering the satisfaction of victims’ needs. At every turn, he writes, “as the 
initial harm turns into a crime and runs through the procedural rules needed to adjudicate it, 
it becomes more and more abstracted, more and more alienated from the actual experience of 
victim and offender375”. The loss of autonomy experienced by victims during crime 
is paralleled in their second victimization by the state: “Instead of returning power 
to them by allowing them to participate in the justice process, the legal system compounds the 
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injury by again denying power376”. This abstract and alienating experience of justice 
for victims has a negative effect on them because it frustrates the sort of 
communicative action that would fulfill victims’ needs for information and 
emotional expression. Professionalization and abstract ‘proceduralism’ also 
hinder the reintegration of offenders into law-abiding society, according to 
Zehr. As with victims, offenders are largely bystanders in the criminal justices. 
Critical decisions about accountability and responsibility for their actions are 
made by others: how they will explain, defend, excuse, or admit their actions is 
determined by defense counsel, and the consequences for their actions are 
determined by prosecutor, judge, and jury. Because the process is adversarial 
and non-participatory, it does little to challenge any stereotypes or 
rationalizations offenders have built up about their victims and about society in 
response to their crimes, encouraging them to focus on their own legal 
situations and how to minimize penalties377. In Zehr’s perspective restorative 
intervention are not only a matter of victim and offender. The community in 
fact, is also a crime stakeholder, necessarily represented by mediators. Indeed, 
also the victim and the offender ‘are’ the community; the mediators however, 
represent the broader community, indirectly touched by the crime. Mediators 
are ideally community volunteers trained to give some structure to the dialogue 
between victim and offender but without dominating the proceedings with 
their own perspectives378. They are the alternative to the legal professionals, 
they represent the extended community in dealing with the crime and its 
aftermath. Braithwaite and Pettit offer another interesting perspective on the 
needs and role of community in dealing with crimes. They view punishment as 
an inferior response to crime because it threatens what they call “dominion379”. 
Dominion, puts simply, is freedom conceived as a social and political value: 
“the condition of citizenship in a free society, a condition under which each is properly 
safeguarded by the law against the predations of others380”. Crimes can threaten 
dominion in three ways: they can compromise and interfere with the victim’s 
freedom; they can condition victims and reduce the “extent of undominated choice” 
they enjoy; finally crimes can reduce the larger community’s freedom by 
conveying the idea that citizens “are not protected against arbitrary interference of the 
sort represented by the crime381”. Nonetheless, state responses to such threats to 
freedom must not themselves become threats to dominion: “Domination is the 
main evil against which the state sets itself, after all” something that “argues in favor of 
fines and community service and against prison, since domination is all too likely, if not 
logically inevitable, under prison regimes382”. Punitive responses to crime threaten 
freedom in a number of ways. Clearly, they threaten the freedom of convicted 
offenders who must serve prison time, because it removes them from the 
mainstream labor market directly through prison time and indirectly through 
the stigmatization of the conviction. Lastly, punitive responses to crime 
present high opportunity costs for society with other ways to use public 
resources. For these reasons, Braithwaite and Pettit think that the default 
response to harmful acts ought to be mercy and non-intervention, with 
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punishment and intervention requiring serious justification383. Like Zehr, 
Braithwaite and Pettit think that the right response to harmful acts is a 
decentralized and de-professionalized process that engages the victim and 
offender in dialogue. They see such a process as being better at addressing the 
three threats to dominion posed by many crimes-the initial assertion of 
domination over the victim, the future effects of the crime that condition the 
victim’s choices, and the effects of the larger community. The first step is for 
offenders to recognize the wrongfulness of their acts. The best way to do this, 
for Braithwaite and Pettit, is not by attaching coercive sanctions to certain acts, 
but by communicating social norms through education and dialogue. Proper 
socialization into norms like fairness and non-violence is the main reason most 
people do not commit criminal offenses384. At the same time, presumably, prior 
socialization has failed to some extent in the case of offenders. So the way out 
is to remind them of the social norms they have violated, to engage in a 
dialogue of reprobation and “moral reasoning385”. In such a dialogue, ideally 
involving the victim and supporters of both victim and offender, the offender 
admits it was wrong to threaten the victim’s dominion and recognizes the 
victim’s right to live without such threats386. The second step is for offenders 
to repair the damaged one. Offenders can offer recompense in the form of 
restitution to victim or victim’s family, or, if that is impossible, in the form of 
community service. In either case the goal is to lift both victims and offenders 
out of a state of mutual loss. Third, offenders owe the community reassurance 
that they will not reoffend. This will be more or less difficult depending on the 
severity of the offense. To gain such reassurance from offenders, as well as to 
achieve recognition and recompense from them, the community has a role to 
play both in communicating reprobative sentiments and in offering avenues for 
reintegrating into the norm-abiding life of society. Braithwaite and Pettit’s 
favored RJ forum is the family-group conference. As with Zehr’s victim-
offender mediation, family group conferences deal only with cases where 
“defendants’ decline to deny their guilt387”. They are clear that the dialogue that is 
fostered in conferences is to be organic to the parties themselves and not to be 
dominated by mainstream concepts of criminal justice. Conference 
communication directed by lay participants can be authentic in a way that 
traditional court discourse is not388. Christie, as already said, is considered one 
of the leading personalities in the RJ movement, namely because of the role 
Christie attributes to the community in dealing with antisocial behaviors389. 
Basically, Christie’s rejection of punishment follows a simple moral logic: even 
though an action caused harm or pain, this is no reason to respond in kind. If 
we are against harm and pain we are against it whether it is caused by the crime 
or caused by the response to the crime390. Alternatives to punishment, such as 
apology or restitution, are preferable simply because they break out of the 
circle of pain infliction. Non-punitive alternatives are preferable, too, because 
of how limited pain infliction is at deterring future offenses, educating 
offenders, and compensating victims. We are, in fact, reluctant about pain 
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infliction, choosing to mete it out carefully and in doses of time rather than 
physical suffering. This squeamishness, Christie believes, is a signal that non-
punitive solutions may correspond better, all things considered, with our 
considered moral beliefs than punishment. Rigid notions of crime and 
punishment permeate mainstream criminal justice, yet there are other values 
that might govern: “Our criminal policies should reflect the totality of the basic values of 
the system. It is an affront to my values, and I think to many people’s values, to construct a 
system where crimes are perceived as so important that they decide, in absolute priority to all 
other values, what ought to happen to the perpetrator of a particular crime391”. The 
contrast of value pluralism held in the polity with the value monism reflected 
in the criminal justice system, provides Christie a good response to the 
conventionalist who sees non-punitive alternatives as being inadequate for 
dealing with the natural feelings of resentment harbored by victims of harmful 
acts. Christie can reply that a more civilized approach channels these natural 
feelings of resentment into dialogue rather than through the more primitive 
response of pain infliction. Crime control policy, like all policy, should reflect 
our considered judgments and the balance of our values, not our unreflective 
preferences for revenge. Far from being a natural response to harmful acts, 
formal crime control measures like imprisonment are the product of social 
distances that open up in modern urban life392. In this perspective the RJ 
procedures are valuable because they return the responsibility for conflict 
resolution to communities. In mainstream procedures, victims play no role 
other than witness in the proceedings, since their interest in responding to their 
harm is taken up and represented by a prosecutor393. They have no chance to 
speak with offenders and come to understand more about the reasons for their 
harmful acts394. As for offenders, by being so thoroughly represented, they 
have no way of resolving the harm they have caused395. The larger community 
is also a passive rather than active subject of criminal justice action. It is merely 
a client of professionals and state officials. The overall effect is a loss in 
opportunities for “norm-clarification396”. It is a loss of pedagogical possibilities. It 
is a loss of opportunities for a continuous discussion of what represents the 
law of the land397. Norm-clarification means coming to know just why we do 
what we do in the criminal justice domain, it means reflecting on what 
consequences ought to follow what sorts of norm violation, it means taking 
responsibility for what the state officials and professional agents do who work 
on our behalf. “Pedagogical possibilities398” implies that we all have a lot to learn 
about each other, about those who deviate from social expectations, and about 
our formal and informal mechanisms of social control. Christie is arguing for a 
more democratic criminal justice process, where citizens have more influence 
over the criminal prosecution and sentencing and where criminal justice treats 
offenders as citizens, not as deviants or others or abstractions. This perspective 
seems inspiring the National Mediation Service Act enacted by the Norwegian 
parliament in 1991. At the Section 3 in fact, it provides: “Mediators shall be 
appointed for each municipality. The mediators are appointed by a representative designated 
by the Municipal Council/Municipal Councils, a representative of the police and the head of 
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the National Mediation Service office”. Each Norwegian municipality establishes its 
own mediation service, drawing mediators upon the lay people of the same 
community, seemingly implementing Christie’s viewpoint. 
 
2.1.3.3. Critical issues: the dark side of the community’s involvement 
The role and the meaning of the ‘community’ in the ‘textbook’ literature are 
not only various and sometimes conflicting, but also often conceived as 
extremely controversial399. George Pavlich400, for instance, notes that within the 
RJ discourses the absolute existence of ‘community’ is assumed. Community 
appears as the “spontaneous and voluntary collective domains that constitute the 
foundations of civil society401”. Community is not a natural set of relations between 
individuals, nor a natural social process lying at the foundation of civil society. 
Communities are always constructed on the broad terrain of history and 
politics. Radical critiques provide a multilayered understanding of the 
problematic relationship between community and state. Basic to this 
understanding is a concern that the notion of community presents a 
harmonious view of social and political relations, which masks conflict, power, 
difference, inequality and potentially exploitative social and economic relations. 
The ‘postmodernist’ understanding of the RJ has questioned the implicit 
consensual notions of civil society and community. Pavlich402 argues that 
‘community’ is also fundamentally about exclusion. “The promise of community’s free 
and un-coerced collective association is offset by a tendency to shore up limits, fortify a given 
identity, and rely on exclusion to secure self-preservation403”. Another point of departure 
in radical critique is to question the claim that the RJ provides an avenue for 
the community to take back from the state the ownership of the problem of 
crime404. From feminist perspectives the problem has been that the state has 
never adequately criminalized acts of violence against women. To the extent 
that we can discuss community in this context, we may well find that 
community reflects the patriarchal relations which facilitate the acceptance of 
violence against women. Rather than providing a barrier and safeguard against 
offending, it may provide social and cultural legitimation for violence. From a 
postcolonial perspective, colonial policies were directly responsible for the 
destruction and reconstruction of community in the interests of the colonizer. 
Many contemporary Indigenous communities were created directly as a result 
of colonial government policies of forced relocations. Further, contemporary 
racial and ethnic minority communities within first world metropolis are 
specifically created under conditions determined by neo- and post-colonial 
relations which influence the nature of immigration and post-immigration 
experiences405. History and contemporary politics have shaped both 
Indigenous and post-war immigrant communities. What then does 
                                                             
399 Cunneen, C. (2008). Understanding Restorative Justice Through the Lens of Critical Criminology. 
University of New South Wales, Faculty of Law Research Series, Year 2008 Paper 20. 
Retrieved 12 October 2012 from http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps08/art20, p. 295 
400 Pavlich G. (2005). Governing Paradoxes of Restorative Justice. London: GlassHouse Press. 
401 Ibidem, p. 97. 
402 Ibidem. 
403 Pavlich, G. (2001). The force of community. In J. Braithwaite, H. Strang (Eds.), Restorative 
justice and civil society (pp. 56-68). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 3. 
404 Cunneen, C. (2008). Understanding Restorative Justice Through the Lens of Critical Criminology, cit., 
p. 296. 
405 Cunneen, C. Stubbs, J. (2002). Migration, Political Economy and Violence Against Women: 
The Post Immigration Experience of Filipino Women in Australia. In J. D. Freilich, G. 
Newman, S. G. Shoham, M. Addad (Eds.), Migration, Culture Conflict and Crime (pp. 159-187). 
Dartmouth: Ashgate. 
63 
 
‘community’ mean for minority people in these situations and how does it 
impact on relations with the police, the criminal justice system and the state 
more generally? Neo-Marxist and governmentality critiques of neo-liberalism 
also identify the current tendencies towards the responsibilization of 
individuals, families and communities and the preference towards ‘governing at 
a distance’. Pavlich406 notes that the ‘community’ of the RJ is essentially 
constituted by the state which designs, creates, funds and staffs the RJ project. 
It provides authority and legitimacy to the ‘community’ that then participates in 
the RJ project. Such a community is not independent of state agency407. 
As Braithwaite notes, another important target of criticism against the RJ is its 
potential to widen the net of social control408. This criticism is echoed by 
Kenneth Polk409. As Polk notices, in particular, young people may become 
subject to conferencing procedures for behavior which would have previously 
been regarded as too trivial to warrant official intervention410. As Walgrave puts 
it, the restorative model is a move from ‘he state of power and the welfare state 
to “the empowering state411”. He goes on claiming that on the present limited 
evidence, the RJ more often narrows than widens nets of formal state control; 
but it does tend to widen nets of community control. Whether the nets that are 
widened are state or community nets, an assumption that net widening is a bad 
thing seems wrong.  
 
2.1.4. ‘It has always been Restorative Justice’: traditional and indigenous justice  
The claims of reforming the criminal justice system, giving centrality to victims 
and involving the broader community in dealing with crimes, are usually 
combined in the ‘textbook’ literature. The result is a complex multi-faceted 
account of the RJ’s emergence in the late modernity. In this section I will take 
into account another very common explanation. In this perspective, the 
emergence of the RJ can be conceptualized as the resurgence of a pre-modern 
way of dealing with conflicts412. This claim, so often repeated, has reached the 
status of a “myth413” in the RJ literature. A possible ‘evidence’ of this 
phenomenon is that even the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 
2002 has declared that the RJ “often draws upon traditional and indigenous forms of 
justice414”. Braithwaite has plainly synthetized that “restorative justice has been the 
dominant model of criminal justice throughout most of human history for all of the world’s 
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peoples415”. On the other hand, we detect the presence in the RJ literature of 
some sharp criticisms regarding the abovementioned perspective416. Some 
scholars, in fact, rather than seeing the RJ as the ‘primary’ criminal justice, 
describe it as a relatively recent approach to the crime and its aftermath, which 
began in the 1970s in North America417. Under this narrative, the RJ is seen as 
a novel and innovative system418, which has come to influence justice systems 
globally over the last three decades419. One thing must be noticed before 
analyzing this new topic. The ‘never-ending’ explanation of the RJ’s history, is 
potentially conflicting with the previous ones. That’s a potential conflict 
insofar as the preceding accounts conceive the RJ as the ‘answer’ to late-
modern issues, such as the failure of criminal justice or the community’s needs 
and the crime victims’ satisfaction. On the other hand, this conflict is avoided 
when the claim that the RJ is not a product of the late-modernity is used as a 
normative justification (the RJ is acceptable because just ‘revives’ ancient 
traditions) and not as a causal/descriptive explanation of the RJ’s emergence. 
In the next pages the topic of the RJ’s ‘ancient’ roots will be considered 
basically in its descriptive dimension.  
 
2.1.4.1. The continuity of the Restorative Justice 
According to a wide number of the proponents, the RJ is neither new nor 
novel. It is, indeed, an archetype of justice nearly as old as human society 
itself420. In this perspective, the RJ has been the dominant model of criminal 
justice throughout most of human history for all of the world’s peoples. It is 
the most ancient and prevalent approach in the world to resolve harm and 
conflict421. In “The History of Restorative Justice”, Elmar Weitekamp explains 
that in early societies nomadic tribes responded to inter-clan transgressions 
through a form of RJ called “restitution negotiations422”. Proponents of the second 
narrative also commonly refer to legal codes from ancient societies to support 
their claims about the prevalence of the RJ in historical societies423. In Restoring 
Justice, Van Ness and Strong cite several ancient Babylonian codes, including 
the Code of Hammurabi (C. 1700 B.C.E.), as ‘ancestors’ of the RJ legal 
provisions, insofar as they prescribed restitution for property offenses424. These 
scholars also cite European sources for historical support. The Roman Law of 
Twelve Tables (449 B.C.E.), for instance, required thieves to pay restitution for 
stolen property and included restitution as an explicit alternative punishment to 
certain physical offenses425. Early Germanic tribal laws allowed restitution for a 
broad range of crimes including homicide, and the Laws of Ethelbert, a 
seventh century collection of English laws, contained detailed compensation 
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plans based on the physical harm caused to the victim426. Even Anglo-Saxon 
law was based on the RJ principles427. Examples include circle sentencing in 
Canada and the Navajo Peacemaker Court in the United States. In New 
Zealand, Maori practices provided the foundation for the family group 
conferencing model428. The RJ is not a new concept429. The principles of the RJ 
are thought consistent with those of many indigenous traditions, including the 
Native American, Hawaiian, Canadian First Nation, and Maori cultures. These 
principles are also consistent with values emphasized by nearly all of the world 
religions430. This is the case of the family group conferences adapted from 
Maori traditions in New Zealand, for example, the sentencing circles from 
aboriginal communities in the Canada, the Navajo peacemaking courts, etc.431 
According to this narrative, the dominant paradigm shifted from a focus on 
restitution and restoring community peace to the retributive-based system in a 
specific moment of the western history: October 14th, 1066, the date of the 
Norman invasion of England432. After the Norman invasion of England, 
William the Conqueror and his successors found the legal system to be an 
effective tool for exerting influence over the authority of the church and for 
replacing local systems of conflict resolution433. English monarchs began to 
define crime as a disruption of the King’s peace, and they fined offenders to 
benefit the King financially and politically434. Under this system, a new model 
emerged where crime was viewed as a violation against the King and the state 
rather than against the victim435. The government and the offender became the 
primary parties to the conflict with the victim playing a secondary role. Rather 
than seeking to restore the victim, the system focused on maintaining the 
authority of the state over the transgressor by inflicting punishment which 
would make the offender and others like him/her, fearful and law-abiding436. 
Restitution and its focus on the past harm to the victim were abandoned in 
favor of fines, corporal punishment, and the death sentence as the dominant 
responses to wrongdoing. This model shaped the common law, as well as the 
American criminal justice system, and continues to influence them today.437 
Zehr argues that the RJ “owes a great deal to […] a variety of cultural and religious 
traditions […]. The precedents and roots of restorative justice […] are as old as human 
history438”.  
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2.1.4.2. Other histories 
The ‘continuistic’ history of the RJ, however, has engendered criticism for its 
all-encompassing assertions439. Some critics argue that ‘continuistic’ scholars 
have mythologized ancient problem-solving systems and historical legal codes 
in an attempt to create a golden age of criminal justice in which restoration 
reigned440. These critics claim that the second narrative is vastly oversimplified. 
In each example in which the RJ scholars cite the RJ ‘practices’, they illuminate 
the ways that those practices existed alongside brutal and inhumane retributive 
justice methods441. In “Myth in Restorative Justice”, Douglas Sylvester reviews 
Weitekamp’s claims about the prevalence of restitution in pre-state societies by 
examining Weitekamp’s own anthropological sources442. According to Daly 
such “efforts to write histories of restorative justice, where a pre-modern past is romantically 
(and selectively) invoked to justify a current practice, are not only in error, but also 
unwittingly ethnocentric443”. What concerns Daly is that the specific histories and 
practices of justice in ancient societies are grossly conceived as a unified justice 
form444. She claims that efforts to write histories of RJ, where a pre-modern 
past is romantically (and selectively) invoked, just justify a current justice 
practice, are not only in error, but also unwittingly reinscribe an ethnocentrism 
their authors wish to avoid. As Harry Blagg synthetically points out, the RJ 
literature has accomplished an ‘orientalist appropriation’ of traditional 
(especially indigenous) justice practices, in order to strengthen its positions445.  
 
2.2. Authoritative conceptualizations  
Along with the historical explanations, the archive includes the authoritative 
‘conceptualizations’ of the RJ. This expression refers to both the attempts to 
theoretically develop the RJ as a more or less complete theory and the 
endeavors to justify it as a valuable or effective set of principles and practices. 
These various positions intertwine with the historical explanations of the RJ, 
creating a tangle tentatively ‘unraveled’ by the archive.  
 
2.2.1. RJ, punishment and criminal justice 
The first authoritative theoretical conceptualization of the RJ is given by the 
identification of similarities and differences of the RJ respect to the ‘criminal 
justice’ at large or the penal punishment in particular446. This complex of 
positions intersects the historical explanations of the RJ’s emergence as an 
answer to the failure of the contemporary Western criminal justice systems. 
Particularly, early proponents defined the RJ as an alternative to criminal justice. 
The dichotomy RJ/criminal justice has become a sort of standard approach in 
the ‘textbook’ literature. This basically means that the main features of the RJ 
have been inferred ex-negativo from the criminal justice’s ‘common’ 
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characteristics. Nevertheless, in more recent years, criticisms have been arising 
against this perspective, deemed as a misrepresentation of more complex 
relationships between the RJ and the criminal justice447. To be noticed that the 
concept of ‘criminal justice’ held by the proponents of the RJ is quite elusive 
and magmatic. Broadly speaking, in the ‘textbook’ literature, that expression 
refers to the widespread institutional system of dealing with crimes in Western 
modern/contemporary states which entails public prosecution, adjudication 
(focusing on offender’s liability), punishment with 
retributive/rehabilitative/deterrent goals and Kantian/utilitaristic justifications. 
Additionally, the proponents of the RJ often use the expression ‘criminal 
justice’ as synonym of ‘criminal law’, creating sometimes ambiguities leading to 
possible misunderstandings. Likewise for the authoritative explanations, 
inconsistencies, paradoxes as well as intersections are present between and 
even within the ‘conceptual’ discourses. However, the construction of the 
‘criminal justice’ as backdrop against which cast the theoretical features of the 
RJ, plays the role of recurrent element.  
 
2.2.1.1. Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice 
In the ‘textbook’ literature we can detect at least two main (and conflicting) 
conceptualizations of the relationships between the RJ and the criminal 
justice448. According to the first, the RJ is a complete, consistent and 
independent criminal justice paradigm that has the potential to stand alone, and 
which should replace the current one449. On the other hand, supporters of the 
opposite perspective argue that the RJ can only exist if supported by the 
criminal justice system. This contrast has accompanied the RJ since its early 
days. During the 1970s, scholars labeled as the ‘first generations’ of the RJ 
proponents, such as Gilbert Cantor450 and Ab Thorvaldson451, as well as the 
already known Christie, Barnett, and Zehr portrayed the relationship between 
the then emerging RJ approach and the existing criminal justice system as 
being ‘polar opposites’ in almost every aspect. On the other hand, as Theo 
Gavrielides stresses452, more recently, advocates began to talk about the need to 
combine the RJ values and practices with existing traditions of criminal 
practice and philosophy453. Basically the ‘first generation’ claimed the necessity 
to think and accordingly to locate the RJ outside the criminal justice system, 
keeping only loose links to it454. Cantor, for instance, argued in favor of a total 
substitution of civil law for criminal law processes with a view to ‘civilizing’ the 
treatment of offenders. Christie, as already seen, spoke of conflicts being stolen 
from the parties by the state and to be given back to the rightful owners 
outside the criminal justice system. Zehr saw (and keeps seeing) crime through 
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the lenses of a new paradigm. Barnett argued for the total replacement of 
criminal justice in favor of the restitutional paradigm. These scholars inspired 
(or directly argued for) RJ programs operating by way of diversion of cases 
from the criminal justice system, preserving the purity of the restorative ideals. 
The incorporation of the RJ into the state of justice system, on the contrary, is 
considered undesirable because it would dilute the purity of the RJ ideals by 
bringing judicial coercion into the RJ paradigm. To be true to its values, the RJ 
should remain informal and voluntary, according to the advocates who draw 
upon the ‘first generation’ of RJ scholars. McCold455, more recently, has 
claimed the necessity to develop the RJ according to three normative stages. 
During the first it would operate by diversion and operated by NGOs. In the 
second the operational role would be transferred to the criminal justice system. 
The RJ would lastly, permeate the criminal justice system, as a third stage. 
Other proponents such as Walgrave456 and Dignan457 argue for both the 
diversion and the integration in the criminal justice system. They maintain that 
the RJ should be made an integral part of it and the system should be 
maximally, radically and systematically reformed in accordance with restorative 
values. These proponents are critical of placing the RJ outside the system and 
limiting it to informal voluntary practices, predicting that this would provide a 
recipe for marginalization and a missed opportunity to bring about broad and 
far-reaching reforms in the criminal justice system. However, despite the 
abovementioned differences, there seems to be at least one main commonality 
between the ‘first generation’ of RJ scholars and more recent proponents of 
the integration model. Both in fact, seem presuppose an ‘operational’ link 
between the RJ and the criminal justice. The criminal justice system should 
provide a legal framework, funding and referrals for the RJ programs and even 
a back-up in situations where the RJ is either impossible or undesirable458. The 
system should also supply judicial oversight and legal safeguards. Nevertheless 
in the last decade a new perspective has grown up against this perspective. A 
new radical view regarding the link between the RJ and the criminal justice has 
been elaborated. The basic claim is that that practicing RJ under the auspices of 
this system, pushes the RJ towards the criminal justice’s moral compass. 
Pavlich, for instance, argues that the RJ is parasitic to criminal justice legal 
definition of crime, failing in offering a new moral framework459. Dennis 
Sullivan and Larry Tift contend that criminal law, as a product of a particular 
political economy, is designed to preserve existing power relations. It cuts the 
world into dichotomic categories such as culpable and non-culpable, right and 
wrong, worthy and non-worthy victims etc. which help to maintain a specific 
social order. The legal system is intended to deal mainly with interpersonal 
violence, and social-structural injustices usually do not even deserve the 
designation of crime460. The RJ accepting the authority of criminal justice 
serves to perpetuate the existing social arrangement by focusing on 
interpersonal dimensions of crime and deflecting attention away from the 
deeper roots of crimes as found in class, race, gender-based another social-
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structural conflicts461. Other traditional concepts rejected by critics who are 
skeptical of the RJ’s reliance on the criminal justice system are ‘victim’ and 
‘offender’. Tifft and Sullivan argue that that distinction of fix identities is itself 
harming, deconstructive and non-integrative: to be offender means to be 
controlled, marginalized constrained whereas be a victim means to be 
disempowered462. In the same way Pavlich claims that to label a person as 
victim is always a ‘second victimization’ whereas as an offender implies a non-
natural and unidirectional attribution of responsibility463. 
 
2.2.1.2. Restorative Justice and Punishment  
Regarding the relationships between the RJ and the punishment, as Gavrielides 
notices, the views might be ‘didactically’ divided into two main positions464. 
According to the first, the RJ measures cannot, in any way, be punitive465. The 
second contends that the RJ is not “alternative to punishment”, but an “alternative 
punishment” 466. The argument of the first group is that restorative measures’ 
primary purpose is to be constructive467. Therefore, they are not inflicted “for their 
own sake’ rather than for a higher purpose468”. The second group argues that “this 
purported distinction is misleading because it relies for its effect on the confusion of two distinct 
elements in the concept of intention. One element relates to the motives for doing something; 
the other refers to the fact that the act in question is being performed deliberately or 
willfully469”. Daly, for instance, takes the RJ to be punishment, because it leads 
to obligations for the offender470. On the other hand, McCold rejects the idea 
of including coercive judicial sanctions in the restorative process, as they might 
shift the RJ back to being punitive471. He claims that accepting any form of 
coercion as being potentially restorative would completely move the RJ back to 
being a theory of retributivism472. McCold totally discards coerciveness in the 
RJ and opts for a ‘purist’ model of the RJ. In this perspective the potentialities 
of the RJ are limited to forms of voluntary and informal conflict resolution. 
Any conflict that cannot be treated consensually would be referred back to the 
traditional system of criminal justice. Marshall claims that coercive processes in 
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the RJ must be considered and applied using the ‘tools’ of the criminal justice 
system473. On the other hand, Braithwaite believes that if a restorative process 
fails, it should be tried “again and again474”. Braithwaite’s approach to 
punishment is based upon the principle of parsimony: punishment should be 
limited to enable the offender to retain as much ‘dominion’ as possible. This 
approach is considered as comprising a core element of the republican theory 
of justice. Walgrave conceives punishment as characterized by deprivation, the 
intentional infliction of pain, hard treatment, and correspondence to the 
wrong. What makes the difference (likewise for Wright) is the intention of 
inflicting pain as a distinctive feature of the punishment475. Walgrave argues 
that coerced restorative measures are always better than rehabilitative 
sanctions. Because of material reasons (the victim and the community benefit 
for sure of the restoration), as well as because of the reintegration of the 
offender, the destruction of stereotypes about the offender and because 
retributive punishment has no instrumental or moral value476. Zehr and 
Christie both acknowledge the possibility of a place for punishment in the RJ. 
Christie has argued that if pain-intended as a pain-is used, it should at least not 
be used with an ulterior purpose: rehabilitation or social control. Zehr seems to 
follow this position, saying that if punishment cannot be eliminated as such by 
the restorative approach, it should not be normative. The role of punishment 
in the RJ therefore should be limited to the aim of reducing the general level of 
pain in a context of restoration takes place477. Lucia Zedner identifies three 
conditions that must be fulfilled to make compatible the RJ with punishment 
(punitive quality, recognition of social wrong; response to culpability), to which 
she adds other three fundamental principles that must be respected in order to 
make acceptable in the criminal justice system the reparation (fairness, 
consistency, proportionality)478. Daly argues that we should embrace the 
concept of punishment as the main activity of the state’s response to crime479, 
that the RJ is punishment and that it should be. The RJ is an alternative 
punishment and not an alternative to it. She considers the punishment 
necessary to vindicate victim’s worth480 and that offender can atone only by 
willingly submitting himself/herself to punishment, not degrading or 
humiliating481. Lastly, Antony Duff argues that we response to crime should 
aim for ‘restoration’, for ‘restorative’ justice: but the kind of restoration that 
criminal wrongdoing makes necessary is properly achieved through a process 
of retributive punishment482. Offenders should be punished for their crimes, 
but this punishment should aim at achieving restoration. In Duff’s perspective, 
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both restorative and retributive theorists “are wrong483” insofar as they suppose 
we must choose between restoration and retribution as our primary aim. 
Restoration requires the re-instatement of the status quo ante. We can restore 
security, trust, goods etc. the problem is that the victim, beside these kinds of 
losses, was also wronged, attacked484. A relationship has been damaged, that 
between victim, offender and community. These relationships damaged by the 
wrongdoer must be restored. Duff states that we are not just dealing an 
empirical breakdown in a relationship, because a normative relationship has been 
damaged. To restore this kind of damage accordingly, we need to find a 
normatively adequate way to restore it, a recognition of the wrong as a wrong, 
an understanding of the wrong which leads to repentance shaped as an 
apology, not only in verbal way485. 
 
2.2.1.3. Procedural criticisms  
Many criminal justice activists have expressed disquiet over aspects of the RJ 
from a procedural point of view. Often these criticisms are aimed at specific RJ 
‘practices’ and might be broadly characterized as critiques based on liberal 
arguments centered on the rule of law and equality before the law. They 
include concerns over abuse of due process; absence of procedural rights and 
protections; excessive, disproportionate or inconsistent outcomes and so 
forth486. These concerns mainly refer to the potential undermining of 
defendant’s rights at the investigatory, adjudicatory and sentencing stages of 
the criminal justice system. At the investigatory stage, the lack of independent 
legal advice, pressures to admit an offence to obtain the presumed benefit of 
diversion and the avoidance of a criminal record, and the lack of testing of the 
legality of police searches, questioning and evidence gathering may 
compromise outcomes. Furthermore, the pressure to admit an offence means 
that issues relating to mens rea (the defendant’s mental fault) and legal defenses 
are not considered by the court. A related concern is that the outcome from a 
RJ program may be more punitive than might be expected if the normal 
sentencing principles of consistency, proportionality and frugality were applied. 
There is also potential to ignore the basic human rights principles relating to 
children and young people: upholding the primacy of the best interests of the 
child and rehabilitation when sentencing and making other decisions affecting 
children and young people. As Braithwaite remarks487, robust critiques of the 
limitations of various RJ processes (especially Family Group Conferencing- 
FCG) in terms of protection of rights have been provided by various 
authors488. They argue that there can be little doubt that courts provide 
superior formal guarantees of procedural fairness than conferences. At the 
investigatory stage, Katie Warner wonders: “Will police malpractice be less visible in 
a system which uses FGCs? One of the ways in which police investigatory powers are 
scrutinized is by oversight by the courts. If the police act unlawfully or unfairly in the 
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investigation of a case, the judge or magistrate hearing the case may refuse to admit the 
evidence so obtained or may criticize the police officer concerned. Allegations of failure to 
require parental attendance during questioning, of refusal to grant access to a lawyer, of 
unauthorized searches and excessive force could become hidden in cases dealt with by 
FGCs489”. Warner is moreover concerned that the RJ ‘practices’ might be used 
as an inducement to admit guilt: its proffering can induce admissions. Warner 
and Van Ness are both concerned about double jeopardy when consensus 
cannot be reached at a conference and the matter therefore goes to court, 
though Warner concedes it is not true double jeopardy. Van Ness’s work 
affirms the hypothesis that RJ processes can trample on rights, where rights 
will be better or worse protected after the introduction of a restorative justice 
program is a contextual matter.  
To conclude, it is worthwhile to notice, a propos of the procedural risks of the 
RJ ‘practices’, that the Recommendation (99) 19 concerning mediation in penal 
matters enacted by the Council of Europe, explicitly recognizes the necessary 
safeguard of procedural standards in the RJ ‘practices’:  
 
“In order to enable victims and offenders to take part in mediation, 
members States should take all necessary steps to ensure that their 
rights are protected and that they are fully aware of their rights. 
Mediation requires the free and informed consent of both victims and 
offenders, and should never be used if there is a risk that mediation may 
disadvantage one of the parties. Due consideration should be given not 
only to the potential benefits but also to the potential risks of mediation 
for both parties and in particular for the victim490”. 
 
2.2.2. Conflict, harm and crime 
One of the main issues regarding the theoretical conceptualization of the RJ is 
the “trigger event491”, i.e. what makes possible and/or necessary the activation of 
the restorative interventions. In a different perspective, we can also 
conceptualize the trigger event as the ‘object’ of the RJ, the target of its 
practices and then a re-formulation of the concept of ‘crime’. As Woolford has 
emphasized, basically three are in the RJ literature the possible (alternative) 
concepts of ‘trigger events’: the conflict between victim, offender and the 
community; the harm caused by the offender; the normative violation (or the 
wrong) committed by the offender and suffered by the victim. In the literature 
is quite shared the idea that the harm, rather than the crime, is the trigger event 
of a RJ intervention492. In other words, the RJ responds specifically to 
interpersonal harms-that is, it addresses harms caused through interaction 
between two or more individuals493. Others, in a different vein, argue that 
crime is a form of conflict ‘legally categorized’ and therefore they place the RJ 
under the broad rubric of conflict resolution494. In the RJ literature there is also 
space for another interpretation, according to which the RJ is concerned with 
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normative violations495. Norms are groups-established behavioral codes that guide 
the activities of individual belonging to the group. Any RJ intervention must, in 
this view, focus on these violations, aiming at restoring the balance altered by 
the wrong committed by the offender.  
 
2.2.2.1. From crimes to conflicts 
Christie, as already discussed, argued that conflicts are good for us, they 
strengthen us and we have much to learn from tem. In contrast, in criminal 
proceedings the conflict is transformed from a matter between the specific 
parties to a conflict between one of the parties and the state. In this way, in 
western societies, conflicts have been taken away from the parties directly 
involved. He concludes that this is a problem because conflicts are very 
valuable resources for us as individuals and as communities. Christie explains 
that the notion of ‘conflicts as property’ does not refer to material 
compensation; it refers rather to ownership of the conflict itself, intended as 
valuable source of social capital496. Christie then identifies the effects of the 
victim’s losing ‘ownership’ in the course of criminal proceedings, and he 
proposes a remedy for this loss in a new court model for dealing with conflicts. 
This court model is victim-centered and lay-oriented. Christie argues that the 
goal of this model is easily to give back the conflict to the rightful “owners” 
(victim, defendant and their neighborhood). In sum, Christie puts forward two 
related points. First, the state’s representatives (i.e. legal professionals) “are 
particularly good at stealing conflicts497” between individuals. Second, these conflicts 
should be seen “as property” because they have great value. If they are treated in 
social arena, conflicts offer a chance to nurture the social capital, providing 
“opportunities for norm clarification498” and helping protagonists to meet and get to 
know each other. These interactions and “personalized encounters499” bring victims 
more fully into the criminal process and invite reflection by an offender about 
“how he can make good again500”. Even if the Christie’s work is considered a 
milestone in the RJ literature, the Norwegian criminologist was not at the time 
concerned directly with the RJ, but more broadly with the necessity of criminal 
justice’s reform, in a way of ‘civilization’ of it. Various proponents directly 
involved in the RJ advocacy and studies, have drawn upon Christie’s argument. 
Van Ness and Strong, for instance, in many occasions have argued that the 
conflict is the RJ’s trigger event501. They state that the crime is primarily a 
conflict between individuals, which results in disadvantage to the victims as to 
the community and the perpetrator. Therefore the penal system’s superior goal 
should be to reconcile the parties and at the same time restore the damages 
taken place. This process should not be dominated by official authorities502and 
aiming indeed at enhancing the direct stakeholders (the victims, the 
perpetrators and the local community). On the same page is Walgrave503. He 
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claims that decriminalization of wrongdoing by a restorative ‘reaction’ does not 
belittle transgression of norm, but partly redefines it. He thinks that the 
offence, defined by concepts of guilt and amends is reconsidered primarily as a 
‘conflict’, a ‘problem’ requiring the most valuable social solution possible504.  
 
2.2.2.2. The ‘Harmization’ of crime  
Another authoritative stance on the nature of the ‘trigger event’ is the 
conceptualization of it as the harm caused by the offence. Bazemore and 
Umbreit emphasize how fundamentally, restorative approach are distinguished 
from retributive and rehabilitative ones by its focus on sanctions that address 
the harm caused to victims and communities505. Wright goes on, arguing that 
the traditional association between crime and punishment is not as clear as it 
seems506. The real point about crimes is not that they are punishable but they 
are harmful. Many harmful acts are not defined as criminal, while some not-
very-harmful ones are. The list of crimes varies at different times and places; 
requiring reparation can be a response at least as valid as inflicting 
punishment507. This stance is embraced by the par. 11 Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council COM (2011) 275 establishing 
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime 
which states: “Such services [mediation and other RJ ‘practices’] should therefore 
have as a primary consideration the interests and needs of the victim, repairing the harm to 
the victim and avoiding further harm”. In the same way, the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, in the preamble of the Resolution 2002/12, 
Basic principles on the use of restorative justice programs in criminal matters, 
explicitly recognizes “[…] that those initiatives [RJ ‘practices’] often draw upon 
traditional and indigenous forms of justice which view crime as fundamentally harmful to 
people”. As David Karp sharply synthetizes, basically in the RJ literature the 
concept of harm is defined by two variables508: material versus 
personal/relational and private versus public. First, material harm includes lost 
or damaged property or monetary losses. Personal/relational harm includes 
physical and emotional harm to crime victims, such as physical injury, anxiety, 
anger, or depression. A second variable distinguishes harm done to private 
citizens, business, or organizations from harm done to communities in the 
form of material damage to public spaces and places etc. Graef is emblematic 
in his inventory of the primary RJ’s issues509: “What harm was caused? What was its 
wider emotional context and impact? Why was the harm done? Restorative justice works to 
heal the damage to individuals caused by conflict and crime. In many situations, this damage 
occurs to both victims and offenders, and often also affects those who are involved with or 
depend on them – who are ignored by conventional legal processes. This can be a wide circle of 
family, friends and employees”. Achilles and Zehr claim that the first RJ’s aim is the 
redefinition of crime as a violation which creates obligations provides much-
needed recognition to crime victims by the community and by the justice 
system as the individual harmed and thus as a central stakeholder in a justice 
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process510. The idea that violations create obligations identifies the victim as the 
person to whom the offender is first and foremost accountable for the specific 
harm done. In this perspective, since the RJ focuses on the reparation of 
harms, it provides opportunities for a greater and more meaningful victim’s 
participation, also expressed by possibilities of directly discussing the harms 
suffered and the needs to be addressed the offender and the community. 
Starting from the identification of the harms, the RJ emphasizes the 
importance of providing immediate direct assistance to all victims in the 
aftermath of crime511. Elsewhere, Zehr is even more straightforward512. He 
highlights how the RJ views crime, first of all, as harm done to people and 
communities. In his opinion, our legal system, with focuses on rules and laws, 
often loses sight of this reality; consequently, it makes victims, at best, a 
secondary concern of justice. A harm focus, however, implies a central concern 
for victims’ needs and roles. The RJ ‘begins’ with a concern for victims and 
how to meet their needs, for repairing the harm as much as possible, both 
concretely and symbolically. A focus on harm also implies an emphasis on 
offender accountability and responsibility. In a similar vein, Strang argues that 
the need for a symbolic statement about the legitimacy of victims’ status and 
an acknowledgment of the emotional harm experienced is an aspect of 
victimization which has only recently been given attention513.  
 
2.2.2.3. Crimes and wrongs 
A third way to conceptualize the ‘trigger event’ of a RJ intervention is the idea 
of ‘wrong’ committed by the offender. Hoyle514 drawing from Paddy Hillyard’s 
et al. book515, argues that criminalized acts are not only harmful but immoral, in 
that they are perpetrated by those who intended to harm, or at least are 
reckless to the probable consequences of their actions. In other words we have 
to consider ‘wrongs’ as well as ‘harms’. While the RJ aims at holding offenders 
accountable for their behavior, it allows for consideration of the wider 
responsibilities of others in their community and the state. It does not seek to 
apportion blame to the offender’s family or friends, but puts the offence in the 
context of relative deprivation, dysfunctional relationships, poor educational or 
health services, or failures of those authorities which should identify or 
respond effectively to evident criminogenic factors. Duff in particular516, argues 
that our response to crime should aim for ‘restoration’. He states that we can 
restore security, trust, goods etc. but the problem is that the victim, beside 
these kinds of losses, was also wronged, attacked517. A relationship has been 
damaged, that between victim, offender and community. These relationships 
damaged by the wrongdoer must be restored. Crucially Duff emphasizes that 
in these cases, we are not just dealing with an empirical breakdown in a 
                                                             
510 Achilles, M., Zehr, H. (2001). Restorative justice for crime victims: the promise, the challenge, cit., p. 
88 
511 Ibidem, p. 90. 
512 Zehr, H. (1997). Restorative justice: The concept movement sweeping criminal justice field 
focuses on harm and responsibility. Corrections Today, 68-70, p. 68. 
513 See Strang, H. (2001). Justice for Victims of Young Offenders: The Centrality of Emotional 
Harm and Restoration, cit. 
514 Hoyle, C. (2010). The case for Restorative Justice. In C. Cunneen, C. Hoyle (Eds.), 
Debating Restorative Justice (pp. 1-100), cit., p. 12. 
515 Hillyard, P., Pantazis, C., Tombs, S., Gordon, D. (2004). Beyond criminology: Taking harm 
seriously. London: Pluto Press. 
516 Duff, R.A. (2003). Restoration and Retribution, cit., p. 384. 
517 Ibidem. 
76 
 
relationship, because a normative connection has been damaged518. To restore 
this kind of damage accordingly, we need to find a normatively adequate way 
to restore it, as he states: “we need a recognition of the wrong as a wrong, an 
understanding of the wrong which leads to repentance shaped as an apology, not only in verbal 
way519”. He goes on claiming that what needs to be restored is then the 
offender’s normative relationship with his victim as a fellow citizen and with 
his fellow citizens more generally. Accordingly a restorative ‘practice’ should 
focus not only on the harm but on the wrong that was done. It should bring 
the offender to recognize the wrong, to be censured, to make reparation in a 
burdensome way for the offender520, the offender must “suffer the burden to make 
moral reparation of the wrong committed521”. In sum, for Duff, criminal wrongs upset 
normative relationships in our societies. Our shared values of “mutual trust, 
concern and respect” are disrupted and challenged by the acts of the wrongdoer, 
and justice is an opportunity to recommit to these values522. The severity of the 
breach of the normative order may also demand some other burdensome 
efforts on the part of the wrongdoer, such as participation in community work. 
The RJ is then conceived as a space of moral censure in which the facilitator 
must take pains to communicate to the wrongdoer the dangerous nature of 
his/her violation and to encourage remorse from this individual. 
 
2.2.3. Restoration(s)  
The meaning(s) of ‘restoration’ is another crucial theoretical issue in the 
‘textbook’ literature. I will not discuss the numberless practical ways of 
applying the more or less vague idea of ‘restoration’. Rather, I will dwell only 
on the concepts of restitution and reparation, as analyzed and interpreted by 
the RJ ‘textbook’ literature. The notion of restoration, in fact, may be defined 
by activities regarding material or personal and private or communal harms, 
loss, wrongs etc.523, shaped usually as restitutive and/or reparative actions.  
 
2.2.3.1. Restitution  
As Sylvester remarks524, the study of the restitution in the criminal justice 
context was kick-started by Stephen Schafer’s Compensation and Restitution to 
Victims of Crime, published in 1970. Although foremost a comparative review of 
restitution-based approaches in countries throughout the world, Schafer’s work 
included an initial foray into explaining restitution’s historical lineage. Even if 
largely concerned with the decline of restitution in the western democracies, 
Schafer’s main thesis is that restitution “for a long period was almost inseparably 
attached to the institution of punishment525”. In support of this thesis, Schafer spends 
most of his time reviewing the use of restitution in the European Middle 
Ages526, arguing that prior to this period, evidence of restitution’s use in 
criminal processes is unclear and anecdotal527. Herbert Edelhertz’s Restitutive 
Justice in 1975 was another landmark in the development of restitution’s 
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history528. Edelhertz’s work also focused on a comparative review of 
‘restitutionary’ processes around the globe529. Like Schafer, Edelhertz began his 
work with a review of restitution’s origins. Edelhertz openly acknowledged the 
importance of linking an analysis of “the potential utility of restitution and 
compensation programs […] with the recognition that such programs have long historical 
(and pre-historical) antecedents530”. Another fundamental contribution to the study 
of restitution, highly considered in the RJ literature, is represented by Albert 
Eglash “creative restitution’s theory531”. He worked out the idea of “creative 
restitution” in dealing with crimes, a perspective based on the idea that offender, 
even is self-determined, must be guided toward the restitution, and related 
constructive acts for a victim or community. Creative restitution requires that a 
situation must be left better than before an offense was committed532. Eglash 
also assumed that restitution should be “lifelong” and a “form of psychological 
exercise533”, able to encourage human growth and “ease stigma534”. As Wright 
asserts535, in USA a relevant role in the dissemination of the restitution theory 
was played by the evaluative work of Hudson536. Her survey regarding 
restitution activities carried by community services programs in USA, spread 
the awareness of restitution programs’ availability in USA, casting at the same 
time, a critical look on their effective implementation537. The works, already 
mentioned, of Cantor, Barnett and Thorvaldson, helped a deeper penetration 
of restitution in USA. Cantor538 argued for the civilization of offender’s 
treatment, considering social vulnerability as the main cause for crime. 
Civilization entails restitution and compensation through manageable 
installments upon parties’ agreement. The last traditional reference point for 
the restitution theory is given by Barnett. He tried to analyze the breakdown of 
our system of criminal justice in terms of what Thomas Kuhn would describe 
as a crisis of an old paradigm-punishment539. The Barnett’s proposal was to 
overcome the crisis by the adoption of a new paradigm of criminal justice-
restitution which in a way deletes the boundary between criminal law and tort 
law540. Thorvaldson, lastly, argued for the autonomous status of the reparation 
in the sentencing, criticizing at the same time, that when ‘rehabilitators’ accept 
reparative measures, they concede that offenders should be held accountable, 
conceding that suffering is not the only currency for repayment541. 
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2.2.3.2. Reparation  
Within the RJ theory it is largely shared that doing justice involves the act(s) of 
reparation542. Although, it is possible to say that the idea of reparation is basically 
a ‘must’ in the RJ literature, we must acknowledge that this concept is shaped, 
worked out and applied in many different ways. It overlaps, then, with other 
related concepts, including restitution, compensation, atonement, damages and 
remedies543. Often the term is used in reference to making amends or paying 
damages. In all these senses, reparation is a mechanism for redress. At the 
same time, except for some views544, it is not conceived as a synonymous with 
restitution, still less does it suggest a straightforward importation of civil law 
into criminal law545. Reparation seems connote a wider set of aims. It involves 
more than making good the damage done to property, body or psyche. 
According to Gwynn Davis, reparation “should not be seen as residing solely in the 
offer of restitution; adequate reparation must also include some attempt to make amends for 
the victim’s loss of the presumption of security in his or her rights546”. Basically, in the 
‘textbook’ literature we can find at least two different concepts of reparation: 
material and symbolical/emotional547. According to Susan Sharpe548, material 
reparation often takes the form of restitution or compensation. Restitution is 
made by returning or replacing property, by monetary payment, or by 
performing direct services for the victim549. Compensation usually has a 
narrower meaning, referring to a financial payment that makes up for property 
that cannot be returned or repaired, or that acknowledges a fundamental loss. 
Material reparation, especially through compensation, is probably the most 
obvious concrete form of reparation. Monetary compensation recognizes the 
fact that the crime deprives its victim of the means to pursue life choices: it 
seeks to recognize that deprivation and to restore access either to those means 
which have been denied or to comparable alternative means550. Reparation in 
the literature discourse is not limited to material harm that can be repaired 
through economic compensation of loss experienced by victims551. It also 
includes psychological and relational injuries. Crimes, as the proponents of the 
RJ argue, take away personal power, disrupt social bonds, and the peaceful 
communal equilibrium. Zehr claims that both victim and offender need to be 
healed following the offence552. Forgiveness is what empowers and liberates 
victim, making them survivors553. The offender experiences the same starting a 
new life554. As important as material reparation can be enabling a victim to 
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recover from the effects of a crime, symbolic reparation can be ever more 
significant555. As Strang says: “victims’ studies show that what victims want most is not 
a material reparation but a symbolic one, expressed by apology or a sincere remorse556”. This 
particular form of reparation has apology and forgiveness as core sequence557. 
Apology is largely considered in the RJ literature, as the primary form of 
symbolic reparation, even if expressed in different ways558. It is a condition to 
generate repair of bond between victim and offender, after this link has been 
severed by the offender’s deeds559. As Bottoms synthetizes, when victim and 
offender are part of the same moral/social community, a genuine apology 
offers the best hope for repairing the social/moral breach and making the 
resumption of previous set of relationships possible560. In sum, symbolic 
reparations are thought as ‘tools’ to make things safe again or preserve their 
value; to express a moral statement to the community about the right and 
wrong561; to give recognition to the victim562; to locate responsibility and help 
victims to regain their equilibrium lost after a crime.  
 
2.2.3.3. Conceptual issues 
Different are the conceptual problems related to the reparation, above all 
whether it should be burdensome or not and its proportionateness. Barnett 
argues for the non-punitivity or reparation563 whereas Daly564 and Duff565 think 
the opposite. Wright and Guy Masters argue against any form of 
proportionality while Walgrave support the opposite stance566. Braithwaite 
suggests, as part of an ‘immodest’ theory of RJ that restoration might include a 
wide variety of positive processes and outcomes that exist outside micro-level 
responses to isolated, incidental harms567. First it may involve restoring 
offenders by creating social support, integrative opportunities, and 
competencies. Second it may involve rebuilding communities by renewing 
respect for and commitment to the criminal justice system; by fostering new 
social ties among community members; by enriching the deliberative 
democratic process; and by focusing attention on community problems so that 
broader institutional weaknesses, such as in school or families, can be 
addressed. Karp lastly, distinguishes between a ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ restoration568. 
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The thin version of restoration can be defined as any positive act directed 
toward a crime victim and/or the affected community. In this version, criminal 
harm is offset by prosocial behavior. Yet restoration is not necessarily linked to 
the offence. The thick version of restoration is defined as a positive act 
directed at the victim and/or the affected community that is linked specifically 
to the identified harm of crime. Under this model, what specifically has been 
damaged must be repaired. This damage may be material, interpersonal, or 
communal. Any restoration that is insufficient to the task or tangential to the 
specified harm falls short of achieving this justice ideal. Therefore, 
identification of harm is crucial to assessment, as is the effectiveness of the 
strategy in repairing the damage569. At the end of this overview, it is necessary 
to shortly mention that in the ‘textbook’ literature there is also room for 
criticisms against the ‘necessity’ of reparation. Pavlich, for instance, argues that 
it is based on a medical perspective about the healthy and unhealthy 
relationships570. David Dyck asserts that it is based on the “ideology of 
harmony571”, a dangerous and mythical ideal which pushes toward the 
annihilation of conflicts. 
 
2.2.4. A relational justice: the ‘warm side’ of the Restorative Justice 
The relevance of concepts such as ‘shame’, ‘love’, ‘relationships’, ‘healing’ and 
‘forgiveness’, in the ‘textbook’ literature, is something which deserves analytical 
attention. This ‘warm side’, indeed, is one of the most striking features of both 
scholarly and practice-oriented writings on the RJ572. Jim Consedine, for 
instance, stresses how “Fairness, truth honesty compassion, respect for people are the 
basic tenets of an acceptable morality that flows from justice and seeks to protect and enhance 
the common good573”. Eleanor Judah and Michael Bryant argue that “Restorative 
Justice is holistic, inclusive and affirming of the dignity and worth of every human being574”. 
Eric Wonche adds that “The values of Restorative Justice begin with respect, seek 
reconciliation and are based on love575”. In the same vein, Zehr and Toews 
emphasize that “Restorative values can be distilled to two key underlying values- humility 
and respect. Furthermore, we should approach our work with wonder576”. The ‘relational’ 
dimension of the RJ, seems then a recurrent quality of this way of thinking and 
doing justice, a specificity which cannot be overlooked.  
 
2.2.4.1. Relationships-building 
The idea that the crime damages relationships between parties and the 
community is often conceived as a ‘truth’ in the ‘textbook’ literature on the 
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RJ577. In the restorative interventions therefore, attention is often placed on 
relationships building so that victim and offender can (re)gain their sense of 
identity as people with a rightful place in the community578. For victims this 
means feeling safe from harm at the hands of this or another offender and a 
sense of belonging to a family and community579. For the offender it means to 
be supported, acknowledged and welcomed back to the community580. Daly 
and Stubbs identify the ‘relationship repair’ as a main goal of any RJ 
intervention581. The RJ process can address violence between those who want 
to continue the relationship, it can create opportunities for relationships to be 
repaired. As Kay Pranis emphasizes, the importance placed on relationships 
within a restorative framework often means more that the single relationship 
between a victim and an offender, including as well the larger web of 
relationships in which we live582. Accordingly, in this perspective, the harms 
considered in a restorative approach comprise greater social damages as well as 
individual harms. Crimes seem to be embedded in a community context both 
in terms of harms and responsibilities. In Pranis’ view, there is a fundamental 
human need to be in good relationships with others, assuming an 
interconnected and interdependent universe: “Every part of existence is connected to 
every other part and impacts every other part583”. The concepts of interconnection and 
interdependence, as driving values embodies in the RJ, are connected to the 
idea of mutual responsibility. As Sullivan and Tifft emblematically assert: “We 
must abolish the self and instead understand ourselves as inextricably connected to and 
identifiable with other beings and the external world584”. Individuals are thought to be 
responsible for their impact on others and on the larger whole of which they 
are part. Communities are responsible for the good of the whole, which 
includes the well-being of each member. Because all parts of the community 
are interdependent “harm to one is harm to all – good for one is good for all585”. Mutual 
responsibility between the individual and the community is not just a passive 
responsibility to do no harm but an active responsibility to support and nurture 
the well-being of the other in his or her unique individual needs. Consequently, 
the mutual responsibility at the core of the RJ does not entail the suppression 
of individuality to serve the group but, rather, attends to individual needs while 
taking into account the impact on the collective. It seeks to meet the needs of 
both individual and the group in a way that serves both, or that at least 
achieves balance between them586. In the same vein, Lois Presser and Patricia 
Van Voorhis argue that the RJ places relationships in a broad context, 
emphasizing new relationships between community’s members as much as 
family ties587. Relationships are at the same time considered concretely, 
encompassing the here and now, ‘in-session’ relationship between victim and 
offender, between the victim and his or her neighbor or friend, and between 
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the offender and his or her neighbor or friend. This perspective is shared by 
Jennifer Llewellyn, who stresses the importance of relationships as a common 
thread in the RJ principles and practice588. She claims that the RJ is indeed, a 
“relational theory of justice589”. That is to say, it is about more than doing justice in 
a different way–it is a different way of understanding what ‘doing justice’ is all 
about. As a relational theory of justice, the RJ is rooted in a relational 
understanding of human beings and the world. It starts from the fundamental 
assumption that human beings are inherently relational. In this perspective, 
human beings live in relationships with one another, but, a relational theory 
claims that we could not do otherwise. We are, on this account, formed in and 
through relationship with others. Relationship is central to who we are and 
who we become. This is not to say that we are just the sum of our relationships 
or wholly determined by them. We still make choices for ourselves and are 
responsible for those choices. But a relational approach reveals the extent to 
which our choices are made possible by and realized with the help of others. 
Our choices also affect others590. This relational understanding of human 
beings challenges the prevailing story of who we are, how we are connected, 
and what we need and deserve from one another591. As Michael Schluter 
claims, applying the relational thinking to the criminal justice determines a 
radical departure592. First of all it requires thinking of crimes as relationships’ 
breakdowns, even when the offender does not know personally the victim they 
are fellow citizens. Crime is only secondary an offence against the state. The 
relational damage of a crime occurs at level of the individuals immediately 
concerned- the offender and the victim. However, other relationships are also 
affected, including the offender’s relationship with his or her family, that of the 
victim with his/her family, and that of the offender’s family with the local 
community593. 
 
2.2.4.2. Empowerment and personal transformation  
The concept of empowerment is frequently described by the ‘textbook’ literature 
as a crucial element of any restorative intervention. As Sawin and Zehr state594, 
there has been considerably more debate in the field over the term 
‘empowerment’. Robert Bush and Joseph Folger write: “In simplest terms, 
empowerment means the restoration to individuals of a sense of their own value and strength 
and their own’s capacity to handle life’s problems595”. This definition emerges from the 
field of mediation and some connotations may not fully apply in the RJ 
settings596. On the other hand, many proponents of the RJ, do relate with this 
definition. Morris and Maxwell start their analysis of empowerment in the RJ’s 
context, saying that to speak of the empowerment of offenders in conventional 
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criminal justice systems is a contradiction in terms597. Offender do not 
participate much in court proceedings, they watch the trial passively and 
uninvolved. The intention has been help parties to make their own decisions 
by themselves, even in the criminal matters. The RJ also addresses a further 
concern which arises from the practice in traditional criminal justice systems: 
the absence of any direct contact between the victim and the offender. By 
bringing offenders and victims together, the RJ enables offenders to 
understand the consequences of their actions from the perspective of the 
victim, to accept responsibility for them and to actively make a commitment to 
some reparation. Thus, young people can feel a part of the proceedings. As far 
as the victim is concerned, we already discussed the RJ criticism regarding how 
traditional the criminal justice system has given only a marginal role to 
victims598. The main argument used in favor victims’ representations about 
how offenders should be dealt with, is that they possess the information 
required to reach a just outcome. To do otherwise, it is argued, retains an 
imbalance in favor of offenders, for those making decisions about offenders 
can be influenced by information about their situation, for example, the impact 
of a particular outcome on them or their families. A thorough analysis of the 
concept of empowerment is offered by Charles Barton599. He states that the RJ 
philosophy assumes that decisions on crimes are best made by the principal 
parties (victim and offender) themselves, and preferably in dialogue with one 
another in the presence of their respective communities of care and support 
(typically family and friends). In this attribution of centrality to the parties lies 
according to Barton, the basic element of the empowerment in the RJ600. Thus, 
the fundamental difference between ‘conventional’ criminal justice and the RJ 
can be most usefully articulated by reference to the concept of empowerment. 
That is, empowerment of the key stakeholders in the responses of the criminal 
justice system to wrongful and criminal acts so that the matter is resolved in 
ways that are meaningful and right for them. This is a complex idea. For one 
thing, empowerment of this sort cannot be total empowerment where anything 
goes. Rather, it must be circumscribed, or bounded601. The relevant restorative 
processes and outcomes must be consistent with society’s shared and most 
important standards, norms, and values, not to mention the law. For another, 
the RJ philosophy emphasizes individual and community healing and the 
creation and re-establishment of social harmony and peace through the 
criminal justice response to the offence. Thus, the ‘restorative’ empowerment 
of the primary stakeholders in the resolution of the dispute is, not only 
bounded, but also directed602. Closely linked to the concept of empowerment 
in the RJ literature, is the idea of personal transformation as a goal of a RJ 
intervention. Van Ness and Strong indicate as the hallmark of the RJ the 
“ongoing transformation603”: “transformation of perspective, structures and people. It begins 
with transformation of ourselves, reconciliation to seek, forgiveness to ask, and healing to 
receive604”. We look not only for justice ‘out there’, but must turn the lens 
ourselves as well-on our daily patterns of life and on our treatment of and 
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attitudes toward others. The RJ is an invitation to renewal in communities and 
individuals as well as procedures and programs. The transformative potential 
of the RJ encounters, according to their supporters, allows them to help the 
parties achieve personal growth605. Umbreit argues that the humanistic 
approach focus on helping the parties reach the inner resolution through 
mediate dialogue606. This begins with the empowerment of the parties and a 
process of mutual recognition of the other’s humanity: “through recognition the 
parties voluntarily choose to become more open, attentive, and responsive to the situation of 
another, thereby expanding, and their perspective to include an appreciation for another’s 
situation607”.  
 
2.2.4.3. Healing, Reconciliation and Love 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council, in the preamble of the 
Resolution 2002/12, “Basic principles on the use of restorative justice 
programs in criminal matters”, explicitly emphasizes “that restorative justice is an 
evolving response to crime that respects the dignity and equality of each person, builds 
understanding, and promotes social harmony through the healing of victims, offenders and 
communities”. Concepts such as healing and harmony are new in the criminal 
justice, whereas they appear crucial in the RJ theory and practice. As Annalise 
Acorn argues608, the RJ tries to mediate and harmonize the two presumptively 
conflicting realms of love and justice, offering vision of justice as “tough love609”. 
Acorn goes on saying that the RJ also places an extraordinary amount of faith 
in the idea that compassion itself, when extended toward and effected between 
victims and wrongdoers, will have an overwhelming and magically 
transformative power in the direction of justice610. It requires we build better, 
more respectful, more mutual relationships than those that existed prior to the 
wrong. It reaches toward an idealized state of right-relationships, as its model 
of the just. The justice to be restored is the experience of relationships of 
mutuality, equality and respect in community, as fundamental trait of the RJ 
model611. Moreover the aspiration of the proponents of the RJ, to transform 
justice by reconciling it with love is often explicitly expressed in religious 
terms612. For example, Zehr speaks of the aspiration of the RJ to emulate 
biblical justice, because RJ “grows out of love. Such justice is in fact an act of love which 
seeks to make things right. Love and justice are not opposites, nor are they in conflict. 
Instead, love provides for a justice which seeks first to make right613”. He argues that “love 
must govern relationships within your own community. The boundaries of love are expanded 
over the course of biblical history, until Jesus urges us to love not just our own kind but also 
our enemies and to practice forgiveness614”. Van Ness and Strong similarly maintain 
that the RJ “speaks to our own brokenness: ‘I have loved you with an everlasting love; I 
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have drawn you with loving-kindness. I will build you up again and you will be rebuilt’615”. 
Christopher Marshall contends that “justice in relational and liberationist terms, 
justice as the existence of right-relationships, where there is no exploitation, and all parties 
exercise appropriate power616”. Braithwaite describes the restorative encounter as a 
“ritual of love617” and the RJ as “justice administered with love618”. He also stresses 
that “the literature on Restorative Justice Conferences shows that love is central to 
understanding what makes them succeed. The attitude item with the highest loading on the 
reintegration factor in a factor analysis of offender attitudes toward the conference was ‘during 
the conference did people suggest they loved you regardless of what you did?’ […] In short, the 
feeling by offenders that they were in receipt of unconditional love seems a crucial ingredient for 
the success of circles619”. Pranis explicitly claims that “Justice is healing620”. Injustices 
cause harm- to the person who experiences the injustice, to the community 
and to the person who commits the injustice. Justice is “a state of healthy balance, 
[which] requires healing of all those parties. Healing needs are guided by the values of 
respect, maintaining individual human dignity, non-domination621”. Only when all 
parties feel “equal, respected, valued in their individual uniqueness, able to exercise 
constructive control in their lives and able to take responsibility for their actions, then justice 
is achieved622”. These beliefs are thought as not shared by mainstream of justice 
in Western countries. Consequently, the RJ represents much more than simply 
a different or more effective set of techniques. Zehr and Mika provide a list of 
principles to clarify what constitutes RJ, where the idea of love and healing are 
crucial623. They explain that the impetus for their study came from fears that 
“some of the programs defined as restorative do not appear to contain some of the essential 
elements originally associated with Restorative Justice624”. They fear that “retributive and 
punitive programs are simply being repackaged as Restorative Justice initiatives, a reflex of 
the growing popularity of the concept, and/or the availability of financial recourses625”. Their 
list is composed of three major headings: crime is fundamentally a violation of 
people and interpersonal relationships; violations create obligations and 
liabilities; the RJ seeks to heal and put right the wrongs626. Under each of these 
headings, a number of secondary and tertiary points specified and elaborated 
on the general themes providing elements, which, according to their opinion, 
can address the critical components of one vision of the RJ ‘practice’. In a 
similar way, McCold in “Restorative Justice: Variations on a theme”, identifies 
four principles characterizing the RJ’s mindset, which confirm its ‘spiritual’ 
vocation: moralization, healing, empowerment, transformation627.  
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2.2.4.4. Forgiveness  
The relationship between forgiveness and RJ is another ‘hot spot’ of the 
‘textbook’ literature. Consedine contends that in many respects forgiveness 
remains central to any lasting restorative process, personal or collective, though 
its importance is often underrated and unspoken628. On the surface it 
sometimes seems an unfair thing to attempt given the pain caused by an 
injustice. Consedine states that “practising forgiveness is a foundation stone for healthy 
living629”, the step we need to take to be free of the ongoing negative effects of 
past injustice. It has transformative qualities not found elsewhere. To decide to 
forgive is to create a different future from one controlled by events from the 
past. It doesn’t mean forgetting the past. It means remembering the past in a 
different way, leaving one free to develop the future. One becomes re-
empowered to choose a future not controlled by events from the past. 
Potentially one of the key parts of a RJ process is the opportunity created for 
forgiveness to begin. In Consendine’s perspective, forgiveness (which must 
remain a free choice) must be shaped in a way sensitive to victim’s needs, 
without excluding that offenders too can come to the point of their process 
where they too need to begin to forgive themselves and possibly others in 
order to benefit most from the process. On the other hand, Zehr explicitly 
disconnects forgiveness and reconciliation from the RJ630. He argues that 
“forgiveness or reconciliation is not a primary principle or focus of restorative justice […]. 
There should be no pressure to choose to forgive or to seek reconciliation631”. Johnstone 
argues that it would be necessary to pursue broader questions about the 
potential and limits of apology and forgiveness for reconciling conflicting 
parties and restoring relationships in particular communities632. It would seem 
important, in his perspective, to find out, for specific communities, what can 
be forgiven and what people regard as unforgivable, what makes it easy or 
difficult to apologize or forgive, whether there are degrees of forgiveness, and 
so on633. He claims that it would be mistaken, however, to see the emphasis on 
apology and forgiveness in restorative conferencing as due solely to its 
presumed efficacy as a technique for resolving conflict and restoring peace634. 
Rather, this aspect can be placed in the context of a broader historical shift in 
ideas about appropriate emotional reactions to those who do wrong and cause 
us harm635. When looked at in this context, it becomes possible to see a range 
of ethical issues which are relevant to our estimation of the acceptability and 
value of the RJ. In particular, this context might alert us to issues concerning 
the ‘dark side’ of forgiveness.  
 
2.2.4.5. Shame and empathy 
In my inventory, shame is the last ‘warm emotion’ to be considered. Shame 
indeed, both in scholarly and practical RJ writings, is conceived as fundamental 
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topic, basically due to the work of Bratithwaite636. Braithwaite argues that 
punishment should shame the wrongdoer and make him aware of his/her 
wrongdoing637. But punishment is not an end in itself: it normally aims at the 
restoration of the individual who is punished. Braithwaite, in fact, contends 
that shaming helps to reintegrate the offender into the community, rather than 
to stigmatize. Reintegrative shaming is disapproval dispensed within an 
ongoing relationship with the offender that is based on respect. It is focuses on 
the evil of the deed rather than on the offender as evil. Stigmatization, by 
contrast, is shaming where bonds of respect with the offender are not 
sustained. The result, in this case, is the production of outcasts for whom 
criminality has become a master-status attribute that informs all other identity’s 
features. Reintegrative shaming communicates disapproval of an act while 
conferring respect on the offender and reintegrating them back into their 
community of care; stigmatization is disrespectful, out-casting shaming, which 
treats the person as the problem638. This theory highlights the importance of 
understanding the effects of social disapproval and implies that emotions like 
shame and guilt are of critical importance. This approach also places 
considerable importance on social processes that involve the disapproval of 
offending. In this context, where the primary intent is to repair the harm 
caused by an offence, there is a strong emphasis on forms of disapproval that 
are reintegrative rather than stigmatizing. Braithwaite concept of ‘reintegrative 
shaming’ does not explicitly rely upon eliciting empathy for victims from 
offenders, but he does see it as a desirable consequence of successful RJ’s 
interventions639. Besides the seminal contribute of Braithwaite, who, exactly 
like Christie, elaborated his early work independently and probably ignoring the 
RJ movement and theory, other authors have worked more directly on the 
relationship between shame and the RJ. Suzanne Retzinger and Thomas 
Scheff, for instance, have in various occasions analyzed this relationship640. 
They start from the assumption that shame plays a crucial role in normal 
cooperative relationships, as well as in conflict641. Shame and embarrassment 
are normal signals of a threat to any social bond. If the other person is too 
close in some way, one feels invaded or exposed. If the other is too far, one 
feels invisible or rejected. Shame is the emotional cognate of a threatened or 
damaged bond, just as threatened bonds are the source of shame. Normal 
shame is an essential building block of relationships and of community. 
Moving from these assumptions, they argue that the goal of any restorative 
‘practice’ is to remove shame from the victim by making sure that all of the 
shame connected with the crime is accepted by the offender642. By 
acknowledging his complete responsibility for the crime, the offender not only 
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takes the first step toward rehabilitation, but also eases the suffering of the 
victim. For the shaming of the offender to be reintegrative, however, the 
facilitator must take care that it not be excessive, as already indicated. 
Humiliating the offender makes it almost impossible for him both to accept 
responsibility and to help remove shame from the victim. Recognition and 
encouragement of the core sequence of emotions is the way that an effective 
facilitator can direct the offender toward rehabilitation and help relieve the 
victim from suffering. According to Retzinger, manifestations of normal 
shame, although unpleasant, are brief, as little as a few seconds643. Shame, 
anger, and other related emotions that persist continuously for many minutes 
are pathological. Shame is a highly reflexive emotion, which can give rise to 
long-lasting feedback loops of shame. Furthermore, shame-anger loops can 
occur between, as well as within, participants. Indignation can be contagious, 
resulting in mutual and counter-indignation. Both individual and social 
emotional loops can last indefinitely. Continuous, relentless emotions (such as 
continuing embarrassment, indignation, resentment and hatred) are always 
spirals644. 
 
2.2.4.6. Warm emotions: the dark side 
All this talking about relationship-building, forgiveness and various emotions 
has attracted the critical attention of scholars, most notably the already 
mentioned Acorn. In her well-known Compulsory Compassion, Acorn attempts to 
deconstruct the ‘warm’ rhetoric of the restorative movement. Drawing from 
diverse sources, she challenges the fundamental assumptions of that rhetoric, 
such as the offenders’ capacity for significant accountability and that healing 
lies in the (re)encounter between victims and offenders in a restorative 
setting. Her skepticism emerges from several sources, including reflection on 
her own personal experience, her sense of moral intuition, discomfort with 
what she perceived as a kind of wishful-thinking ‘romanticism’ in the RJ 
perspectives, and analysis of the RJ concepts. With all of this in mind, Acorn 
seeks a critical examination of the RJ. In particular, she critically assesses the 
claim that the RJ can successfully bring together the values of love 
and compassion, on the one hand, and the requirement of justice and 
accountability, on the other hand. As Acorn emblematically writes: “Indeed, 
right-relation, explicated in terms of respect, mutuality, reciprocity, and regard, can serve 
equally well as a conception of love than of justice. In fact, restorative justice theory sees the 
notion of right-relation as mediating and harmonizing these two presumptively conflicting 
realms of love and justice. It is in this distinctive move that the case for restorative justice 
becomes tied to the age-old human hope for the convergence of love and justice645”. 
 
2.3. Authoritative procedures 
The last ‘component’ of the archive of the RJ, is represented by the tangle of 
authoritative procedural discourses. This expression denotes the accounts on 
specific processes, techniques, measures which set in motion concepts and 
strategies of the RJ. The ‘textbook’ literature is full of examples of such 
discourses usually defined as restorative ‘practices’. Even if the conceptual 
conflicts between and within these discourses seem less relevant than in the 
authoritative explanations and conceptualizations, many distinctions and even 
paradoxes are present in the configurations of the different ways of ‘doing’ RJ. 
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Nevertheless, the presence of the ‘neutral’ third party, with his knowledge from 
‘nowhere’, as necessary condition to ‘restore’ (whatever it might mean), seems 
almost pervasive. 
 
2.3.1. Victim-Offender Reconciliation Program  
According to the ‘textbook’ literature the first recognized case of Victim-
Offender Reconciliation programs (hereafter VORP) was documented in 
Canada, more precisely in Elmira, Ontario, in 1974646. It happened that two 
adolescents vandalized twenty-two properties in Elmira, creating a situation of 
pervasive panic in the small Mennonite community. The assigned probation 
officer, Mark Yantzi and a Mennonite prison support worker, Dave Worth, 
asked the judge for permission to arrange for the two teenagers an encounter 
with the people whose properties were damaged, in order to discuss possible 
ways of reparation. From Elmira, VORPs have become increasingly popular in 
Canada, and starting from the late 70s, in USA647. In few years such programs 
were reported operating in USA, Germany, England, New Zealand648. As for 
the VORP’s logic, the common basic goal is to set up a space and time for 
people involved in a crime to meet in order to address, with help of a trained 
convener, the facts and feelings regarding an offence. VORP is based on the 
idea that following a criminal offence, the “victim and the offender have a shared 
interest in righting the wrong649”. The emphasis is placed on ‘reconciliation’, 
assisting victims in the aftermath of the offence, helping offenders to change 
their lives and, more generally, “humanizing the criminal justice system650”. 
Additionally it is possible to describe a sort of ‘authoritative’ VORP procedure, 
articulated in four phases: intake, preparation, mediation, and follow-up651. 
People enter the VORP through referrals from different sources, (prosecutor, 
defense counsel, duty counsel, alternative measures, the police, the accused or 
the victim, etc.). Usually the person charged (often only after pleading guilty) is 
contacted first. This initial contact gives general information about the VORP 
program and sets up one-on-one meetings between the mediator and the 
offender, and the mediator and the victim. Separate meetings are arranged in 
order to provide an opportunity for the convener to introduce him/herself and 
to explain the sense of VORP. Both the parties are entitled to describe ‘what 
happened’, why, how etc. Each party can refuse to participate, and 
subsequently, the case will proceed to court652. If both parties agree to 
participate in the program, arrangements are made for the face-to-face 
meeting. Here parties are stimulated to talk each other in order to understand 
origins and consequences of the crime, and to find “humane and remorseful 
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individual is seen rather than the “frightening character” that victims so often picture653”. 
Not only fact but especially emotions are given importance and only 
afterwards, it is possible to negotiate a specific ‘reconciliatory’ agreement, i.e. a 
document which synthetizes the meetings’ outcomes and the reparations. The 
conveners’ task, during the process is to set up rules of ‘constructive’ 
communications, manage emotional outbursts and facilitate the agreement’s 
draft654. Once an agreement is reached, there is a period of evaluation and 
follow-up to determine if the negotiated restitution has been completed. If an 
agreement is not reached, or the negotiated settlement is not fulfilled, the case 
is referred back to court. According to the Fraser Region Community Justice 
Initiatives, “VORP seeks to effect reconciliation and understanding between victims and 
offenders and to facilitate the reaching of agreements between victims and offenders regarding 
restitution655”. The VORP process offers to people harmed/victims not only 
opportunity to directly and personally manage the ‘offence’ and its 
consequences but also “to experience a sense of closure656”, even an occasion for 
spiritual development and healing. VORP, at the same time, provides offenders 
with a chance to face their responsibilities and “to be aware of the harm suffered by 
victims, the human cost and consequences; an opportunity to acknowledge responsibility, and 
to do whatever is reasonable and possible to make amends an opportunity to take 
responsibility in a serious and honest way, often without being left with a criminal record, 
finding a fair and reasonable way to resolve the incident657”. Finally, VORP is 
considered to provide the community within which the offence takes place, an 
occasion to “develop skills which empower them to resolve present and future conflicts, 
giving community members opportunities to practice their conflict resolution and mediation 
skills as mediators in criminal and other community conflicts658”. 
 
2.3.2. Victim-Offender Mediation 
According the authoritative accounts, the idea of Victim-Offender Mediation 
(hereafter VOM) is nothing but a more ‘laic’ version of VORP. The concept of 
reconciliation, included in the VORP, was progressively abandoned in favor of 
a process which emphasized less that ‘religious’ component. Although 
numerous approaches can be considered, an ‘authoritative’ VOM’s procedure 
is followed for arranging the mediation settings and for the process of 
mediation659. VOM involves a structured encounter between the victim (or the 
person harmed) and offender (not necessarily after pleading guilty) facilitated 
by a skilled mediator660. As Van Ness and Strong report, with the assistance of 
the mediator, the victim and offender begin to “resolve the conflict and to construct 
their own approach to achieving justice in the face of their particular crime661”. Umbreit 
stresses that both are given the opportunity to express their feelings and 
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perceptions of the offence662. The meetings (individual with each party and 
then common) conclude with an attempt to reach agreement including the 
different reparative acts. Participation is usually voluntary663. As Van Ness and 
Strong state “no specific outcome is imposed by the mediator664”, being his/her role to 
“facilitate interaction between the victim and offender in which each assumes a proactive role 
in achieving an outcome that is perceived as fair by both665”. As Chupp highlights, 
“unlike the traditional criminal justice system, VOM’s involve active involvement by 
the victim and the offender, giving them the opportunity to mutually rectify the harm done to 
the victim in a process that promotes dialogue between them666”. According to Orlando, 
VOM aims at “addressing the underlying conflict of and resulting injuries to 
the victim and offender”. It emphasizes their right to participate in attempting to 
achieve justice rather than deferring the matter entirely to the criminal 
processes667. As Umbreit argues, a basic case management process in North 
America and in Europe typically involves four phases (like the VORP): case 
referral and intake, preparation for mediation, the mediation itself and any 
follow up necessary668. Often, a case is referred to VOM before the first 
hearing (so upon initiative of prosecutor/police), after a conviction or guilty 
plea in court decided by a judge, or while the convicted is already serving the 
sentence (as decided by the competent judicial authority) The mediator then 
contacts the parties to make sure that both are appropriate for mediation 
(evaluating the psychologically capability, the possibilities of a second 
victimization, etc.)669. The parties then meet to discuss the problematic 
situation experienced, to repair the damages, to define payment/monitoring 
schedules670. Both parties present their version of the events leading up to and 
the circumstances surrounding the crime671. The victim has a chance to speak 
about the personal dimensions of victimization and loss, while the offender has 
a chance to express remorse and to explain circumstances surrounding his/her 
behaviour672. Then the parties agree on the particular nature and extent of the 
harm caused by the crime in order to identify the acts necessary to repair the 
injury to the victim. The terms of the agreed reparation (e.g., restitution, in-
kind services, etc.) are reduced to writing, along with payment and monitoring 
schedules673. Following these several steps it is seemingly possible to ‘restore’ 
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the relationships between parties and community, achieving deterrence, 
healing, closure and social revitalization674.  
 
2.3.3. Restorative Conference 
The International Institute of Restorative Practices defines the restorative 
conference (RC) as “structured meeting between offenders, victims and both parties’ family 
and friends, in which they deal with the consequences of the crime or wrongdoing and decide 
how best to repair the harm675”. Terry O’Connell, Ben Wachtel, and Ted Wachtel 
describe conferencing as “a victim-sensitive, straightforward problem-solving method that 
demonstrates how citizens can resolve their own problems when provided with a constructive 
forum to do so676”. As for VORP and VOM, RCs are a structured way of creating 
space and time for dialogue between parties involved in problematic 
situations/crimes, privileging, besides the material reparations, the expressions 
of emotional states and claims otherwise neglected by the criminal proceeding. 
Offenders hear how their behavior has affected people. Offenders may choose 
to participate in a conference and begin to repair the harm they have caused by 
apologizing, making amends and agreeing to financial restitution or personal or 
community service work. Conferences hold offenders accountable while 
providing them with an opportunity to discard the “offender” label and be 
reintegrated into their community, school or workplace677. 
Participation in conferences is described as voluntary. After it is determined 
that a conference is appropriate and offenders and victims have agreed to 
attend, the conference facilitator invites others affected by the incident—the 
family and friends of victims and offenders678. A restorative conference can be 
used in lieu of traditional disciplinary or justice processes, or where that is not 
appropriate, as a supplement to those processes679. In the approach to 
restorative conferences developed by O’Connell, the conference facilitator 
sticks to a simple written script. The facilitator keeps the conference focused 
but is not an active participant. In the conference the facilitator provides an 
opportunity to each participant to speak, beginning with asking open-ended 
and affective restorative questions of the offender. The facilitator then asks victims 
and their family members and friends questions that provide an opportunity to 
tell about the incident from their perspective and how it affected them. The 
offenders’ family and friends are asked to do the same680.  
In addition, research shows that it consistently provides very high levels of 
satisfaction and sense of fairness for all participants681. However, we do not 
mean to quibble with other approaches. As long as people experience a safe 
opportunity to have a meaningful discussion that helps them address the 
emotional and other consequences of a conflict or a wrong, the process is 
understood as beneficial. 
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2.3.4. Family Group Conference or Family Group Decision Making 
Starting in New Zealand with the Children, Young Persons and Their Families 
Act in 1989, the Family Group Conference (FGC, Family Group Decision Making -
FGDM-in USA), has become one of the most diffused restorative ‘practices’682. 
FGC/FGDM brings together family support networks -relatives, neighbors 
and close family friends- to participate to a decision-making process involving 
one member of the network. As Lisa Merkel-Holguin, et al. state “this process of 
engaging and empowering families to make decisions and plans for their own family members’ 
well-being leads to better outcomes, less conflict with professionals, more informal support and 
improved family functioning683”. Likewise, Wachtel reports that “the key features of the 
New Zealand FGC/FGDM model are preparation, information giving, and private family 
time, agreeing on the plan and monitoring and review684”. What characterizes the 
FGC/FGDM, is the pivotal role played by the network of the victim and 
offender, in the decision making process. The convener of the conference 
facilitates the process of listening and clarifying the issues at stakes, focusing 
on the ‘facts’ as on the ‘emotional sides’ of the happenings. The 
family/network, after the listening phase, is left alone to draft a plan for the 
future of the victim/offender. This plan is carefully examined by the convener, 
looking at legal as well as safety and moral aspect of the draft and its 
implementation685. Professionals and family members monitor the plan’s 
progress, and often follow-up meetings are held686. In the New Zealand’s 
version, this procedure is predicated to create a system of dealing with crimes 
particularly sensitive to Maori youth’s situation687. FGC in fact, involves the 
families, including whanau (all those descended from common 
grandparents), hapu (clan) and iwi (tribe) in the debate on children’s offenses. 
The outcome of the debate is an agreement that issues around children and 
young people should be resolved in partnership between the state and families. 
The underlying intention was to involve families, to give families responsibility 
to deal constructively with their children’s offending and to restrict the power 
of professionals, in particular the power of social welfare professionals. At the 
same time, it was seen to be the state’s responsibility to provide services that 
can support families and provide for the needs of children and young people in 
ways that are culturally appropriate and accessible.  
 
2.3.5. Healing Circles 
Wachtel delineates the circle as a “versatile restorative practice that can be used 
proactively, to develop relationships and build community or reactively, to respond to 
wrongdoing, conflicts and problems688”. Circles are decision-making processes used 
for wide range of purposes: conflict resolution, healing, support, information 
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exchange, relationship development etc. Two are the circles to take into 
consideration: healing circles and sentencing circles. Healing circles (but 
probably the same concept of circle) are found in the Native American cultures 
of the United States and Canada, and are used there for many purposes689. 
Their adaptation to the criminal justice system developed in the 1980s as First 
Nations peoples of the Yukon and local justice officials attempted to build 
closer ties between the community and the formal justice system. In 1991, 
Judge Barry Stuart of the Yukon Territorial Court introduced the sentencing 
circle as a means of sharing the justice process with the community690. 
Usually the healing circle’s procedure follows three alternative formats: 
sequential, non-sequential and fishbowl-like691. In the sequential model, a person 
speaks at a time, and the opportunity to speak moves in one direction around 
the circle. Each person must wait to speak until his or her turn, and no one 
may interrupt. Optionally, a talking piece -a small object that is easily held and 
passed from person to person- may be used to facilitate this process. Only the 
person who is holding the talking piece has the right to speak692. The sequential 
circle is typically organized around subjects identified by the circle facilitator and 
maximizes opportunities for listening more than talking, as the way to reach 
relevant decisions693. The facilitator, exactly like the different figures of 
conveners so far described, “guides but does not control694”. Moreover the same 
presence of the facilitator can be discharged in favor of a ‘non-leader’ circle’s 
procedure where participants speak sequentially, in turn, moving around the 
circle as many times as necessary, until all have said what they want to say. Non-
sequential circles are often more freely structured than a sequential circle. 
Conversation may proceed from one person to another without a fixed order. 
Problem-solving circles, for example, may simply be focused around an issue 
that is to be solved but allow anyone to speak. One person in the group may 
record the group’s ideas or decisions. A sequential restorative circle may be 
used instead of a formal conference to respond to wrongdoing or a conflict or 
problem. The restorative circle is less formal because it does not typically 
specify victims and offenders and does not follow a script. However, it may 
employ some of the restorative questions from within the conferencing script695. 
The last circle’s procedural model is the ‘fishbowl696’. According to Wachtel 
consists in the combination of sequential and non-sequential elements and two 
different circles: the ‘inner’ which discusses the issue with a sequential or non-
sequential activity and the ‘external’ composed of observers who might 
indirectly benefit from the ‘inner’ discussion697. 
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2.3.6. Sentencing Circles 
According to the Native Law Centre the sentencing circle is a “method of dealing 
with members of the community that have broken the law698”. The referral’s conditions 
are the guilty plea and the assumption of responsibility by the offender. The 
sentencing circle involve a wide range of crime’s stakeholders (victim, victim 
supporters, the offender, offender supporters, judge and court personnel, 
prosecutor, defense counsel, police, and all interested community members), 
who come to speak, understand and address the offences’ causes, reasons and 
consequences, in order to find together the ways to achieve assist healing and 
to prevent future offences. As for the procedural model, sentencing circles are 
usually articulated in four phases: offenders’ application to participate in 
process; a healing circle for the victim and the offender; a sentencing circle 
aiming at drafting a sentencing plan; follow-up699. When a case is sent to the 
sentencing circle, after the offender’s guilty plea and his/her specific 
application, both the offender and the victim are prepared by information 
meetings on the circle’s sense and procedure700. Separate healing circles for the 
victim and offender follow the information meetings. The core phase of the 
circle is the sentencing meeting, aiming at determining the plan for the 
offender, drafted by agreement of all the circles’ participants. The final step is 
the tracking of the progress of the plan701. To be remarked that circles’ 
participation is voluntary and that the ‘leader’ of the process is always a trained 
‘keeper’. As with other restorative ‘practices’, circles provide a space and time 
for encounter between the victim and the offender, with a strong involvement 
of the community in the decision making process. Participants typically speak 
as they pass a ‘talking piece’ around the circle702. The goal of the process is to 
bring healing and understanding to the victim and the offender. Reinforcing 
this goal of healing is the empowerment of the community to be involved in 
deciding what is to be done in the particular case and to address underlying 
problems that may have led to the crime. As Bazemore and Umbreit 
emphasize “in reaching these goals, the circle process builds on the values of respect, honesty, 
listening, truth, sharing, and others703”.  
 
2.3.7. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are court-like RJ bodies704 
aiming at discovering and revealing past wrongdoing by a state or non-state 
actors and at resolving conflict left over from the past. They are usually set up 
by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil war, or dictatorship. 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) has been 
considered the most successful model among the varieties of TRC spreading 
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around the world during the last twenty years705, often based on the SATRC 
example706. The creation of the SATRC was meant to deal with the apartheid’s 
atrocities, granting amnesty, upon the discovery of truth as way to ‘restore’ and 
secure a peaceful transition to democracy707. Witnesses who were identified as 
victims of gross human rights violations were invited to give statements about 
their experiences at ad hoc public hearings. Perpetrators of violence could also 
give testimony and request amnesty from both civil and criminal prosecution. 
A basic form of restoration in the SATRC was the apology. This model, in 
fact, along with The Human Rights Violation Committee and The Amnesty 
Committee, included also The Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee, 
responsible for making recommendations to the government regarding the 
provision of reparations and rehabilitation to victims, offering ‘a new lens’ 
through which to view the task of dealing with the past. The SATRC received 
approximately 20,000 statements from victims and their families and 
approximately 7,000 applications for amnesty708. As of November 2000, the 
SATRC had granted 849 amnesties, but rejected 5,392 applicants. The most 
common reason for denying an application is that no political motive was 
attached to the action for which amnesty was sought. The release of the Final 
Report of the SATRC on 29 October 1998 generated a controversy and 
protest over the Commission and its activities. Debate continued through the 
end of 2000, focused mainly on the issue of providing compensation for the 
victims who came forward to tell their stories. The RJ’s basis of the SATRC 
was seen in the traditional African concept of ‘Ubuntu’, which derives from the 
Xhosa expression “Umuntu ngumuntu ngabanye bantu” (People are people through 
other people). Ubuntu conveys the view that our humanity is inextricably 
bound up in others’ humanity, stressing the priority of ‘restorative’ as opposed 
to ‘retributive’ ways of dealing with crimes and mass atrocities709. Or, as 
Desmond Tutu has described Ubuntu: “Ubuntu says I am human only because you 
are human. If I undermine your humanity I dehumanize myself. You must do what you can 
to maintain this great harmony, which is perpetually undermined by resentment, anger, desire 
for vengeance. That’s why African jurisprudence is restorative rather than retributive710”.  
 
2.4. From the archive of the Restorative Justice to the discursive 
formation 
In the previous pages I tried to chart the occurrence of three different kinds of 
authoritative discourses on the RJ, elaborated from the ‘textbook’ body of 
explanations, conceptualizations and procedures. The re-construction and 
combination of the authoritative discourses composes a pluralistic archive, 
drawing upon which it is possible to elaborate the mechanisms which govern 
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the ‘sayable and thinkable’ on the RJ, its conditions for establishing truth and 
falsehood, in a given historical moment. The archive in fact, is not simply a 
trace or record of something that happens somewhere else neither the 
expression of an individual or collective consciousness (though it does 
determine the range of possible subject positions). It is indeed a ‘dispersion’ of 
statements organized in wider authoritative discourses, which go through 
various historical transformations and appropriations, creating a tension field 
within which the true meanings of the RJ are re-produced. At the same time, 
the archive is an instrument of power and a tool of subjugation, by 
marginalizing ‘deviant’ discourses or treating them as false or illegitimate. It 
works as a system of ‘normalization’, directing in advance possible statements 
on the RJ, drawing the ‘frame’ of future and legitimate histories and theories 
on this subject as well as their applications. In the next chapter, I will articulate 
the discursive processes which make possible the archive, i.e. the discursive 
formation of the RJ as “theoretical twin711” of the archive. The task, then, is to 
understand how the discursive events constituting the archive of the RJ are 
made instead of others and the specific power relations inherent in archival 
work712. As Foucault states, the archive: “[…] is no longer a monument for future 
memory, but a document for possible use […] it functions as a procedure of objectification and 
subjection713”. As a center of production of meaning, the archive is informed by 
situated power relations, consonant with wider political rationalities, as I will 
argue in the chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AS DISCURSIVE FORMATION 
 
“The world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no pre-discursive providence which 
disposes the world in our favor714” 
 
3.0. Introductory remarks  
The general objective of this chapter is to re-construct the ‘discursive 
formation’ that governs and shapes what has been possible to think, say and 
experience about the RJ, in a given historical moment (the last thirty years ca.), 
in western societies. The discursive formation is the ‘dynamic’ side of the 
archive, implying the re-elaboration and meticulous scrutiny of the 
authoritative discourses, as well as their historical ‘set-in-motion’. From an 
analytical perspective, the discursive formation is the ‘viewpoint’ which allows 
us to see how the archive of the RJ brings into existence the very objects it 
purports to describe, justify and explain, i.e. how those objects have become 
intelligible/possible715. Due to the general idea of problematization, the 
panoply of archaeological concepts and tools is here widely re-defined. To 
begin with, I understand the internal components of a discursive formation 
(i.e. the discursive objects) not as ‘rules’ but as relatively stable configurations 
of meanings, with specific histories. We can imagine different types of 
discursive objects. I will focus only on a selection of ‘concepts’ and ‘strategies’ 
constituting the basic ‘units’ of the archive of the RJ. Their analysis follows two 
steps. First, to re-construct the ‘surfaces of emergence’ of the different 
discursive objects. This means to identify and describe the cultural constructs 
whose articulation has made intelligible/possible the objects’ emergence. The 
second step is to re-construct the surfaces’ combinations, conflicts and 
overlaps. I will look at the mechanisms that govern the relationships between 
the discursive objects, defining certain legitimate ways of speaking about the 
RJ, delimitating the sayable and the thinkable in its histories, concepts and 
practices. The combination of this two phases (as well as its result), is the 
discursive formation of the RJ, the identification and ‘dynamization’ of the 
archive’s basic units. The idea which underlies this section is that the 
emergence of the archive of the RJ depends on certain complex, relational, 
discursive conditions. There is not a ‘natural’ or ‘essential’ archive of the RJ, 
but actually a plethora of discursive objects not defined by their internal, 
conceptual nature, but by their exterior relations, triangulations or 
juxtapositions with other objects in a ‘field of exteriority’. Moreover, these 
objects do not belong exclusively to the archive of the RJ, being actually shared 
by other discourses and organizable in many, other archives.  
 
3.1. The discursive objects of the archive and their surfaces of 
emergence  
The “surfaces of emergence716” are pre-existing discourses which make 
understandable/possible the concepts (as basic elements of meanings) and 
strategies (as themes or theories formed by certain discursive organizations of 
concepts, and certain types of enunciation) which compose the basic units of 
the authoritative discourses organized in and by the archive of the RJ. The 
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surfaces of emergence constitute in fact, the epistemic/conceptual tension field 
from which has been possible to make sense of contingent and precarious 
discursive practices which in turn have ‘fed’ back that field. As already stated in 
the chapter 1, the surfaces make possible the shift from ‘non-discursive’ and 
non-intelligible practices (e.g. the Kitchner experiment) to ‘discursive’ and then 
intelligible realities (the RJ’s concepts and strategies). At this point, the 
problematization’s guidelines must be integrated by a complementary 
methodological term. In fact, each surface consists not of one isolated 
discourse but of a cluster of different narratives under a common rubric. How 
to justify such a practice of articulation717? As Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe put it, an articulation is “any practice establishing a relation among elements 
such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice718”. Through 
articulation, a discourse establishes a closure, a temporary halt to the fluctuations 
of meaning of elements. This closure is, however, never permanent719. Here, 
the rationale of the articulation is threefold. First I articulate only discourses 
characterized by basic commonalities in their discursive objects. This also 
implies a simultaneous historical emergence of the discourses articulated. 
Second, there is a political element which binds the discourses. These 
discourses are usually cultural/scientific ‘in nature’ but always political in 
‘purpose’, they are object of political struggles as well as instruments of power. 
Third, the articulation must present an analytical benefit. To be articulated 
discourses must facilitate the analysis of the archive’s basic components. 
 
3.1.1. Victimology/Crime victims’ movement  
The first surface of emergence corresponds to the articulation of the crime 
victims movement’s claims with the discipline of victimology. As John Dussich 
emphasizes, victimology is an academic scientific discipline which describes 
phenomena and causal relationships related to victimizations720. This includes 
events leading to the victimization, the victim’s experience, its aftermath and 
the actions taken by society in response to these misdeeds721. Simultaneous to 
the development of this new discipline in the criminological area, were the 
early victim programs that spread throughout the world, starting in the mid-
1970s in USA, led by the first crime victims’ movements. These were of two 
general types: grass roots efforts which directly and quickly supported all types 
of crime victims; and, prosecutor-based victim/witness programs mainly 
concerned with helping prosecutors successfully try defendants and ease the 
suffering of victims as they fulfilled their witness responsibilities. Furthermore, 
legal regulations flourished under the pressure of such movements (e.g. the 
California’s Victim Compensation program in 1965 or the institutionalization 
of the national victimization surveys in 1966)722. This dynamic evolution of 
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victimology and victim programs in the early 1970s was followed by the 
education of university students interested in understanding victimization and 
the training of practitioners wanting to facilitate victim recovery723. The 
relationships between the RJ mainstream theories and those two phenomena 
have been widely acknowledged by the proponents of the RJ. The Prison 
Fellowship International, for instance, states that “Restorative justice is a new 
movement in the fields of victimology and criminology724” and Thomas Marshall 
explicitly says: “Nevertheless, it was part of a successful movement to make the interests of 
victims more apparent and more influential, to be incorporated even into academic criminology 
as a distinct sub-discipline of ‘victimology’725”. As Pemberton et al. notice: “Restorative 
justice and victims are often mentioned in the same sentence, chapter or book726”. Moreover, 
this perspective has been espoused by pieces of legislation such as the 
preambles to the UN draft declaration on the RJ or the EU Framework 
decision on the position of victims within the criminal procedure. The issue at 
stake here is to elaborate the connection between the RJ and the 
victimology/victims’ movements, developing a thorough analysis of archive’s 
structure in light of that discursive articulation. 
 
3.1.1.1. Victimology and crime victims’ movements 
It is widely accepted in literature, that the concept of a science to study victims 
and the word ‘victimology’ has its origin with the early writings of Beniamin 
Mendelsohn. His article “A New Branch of Bio-Psycho-Social Science, 
Victimology” is considered a groundbreaking work in the field727. Furthermore, 
the first systematic treatment of victims of crime appeared in 1948 in Hans 
Von Hentig’s book The Criminal and His Victim, where was suggested a new 
dynamic and dyadic approach to crime aiming an taking equally into account 
the criminal and the victim728. The publication of Schafer’s work, The Victim 
and His Criminal729, was the first to emerge in America which gave support to a 
course fully dedicated to victimology. From these pioneering works, 
victimology has become a wide and tangled field of study and research. As Rob 
Mawby and Sandra Walklate730 states, within this extensive academic landscape, 
might be identified some primary ‘types’ of victimological research. They 
differentiated between three main strands: positive victimology, radical 
victimology, and critical victimology731. Another attempt of simplifying the 
many strands in victimological reflection was made by Jan Van Dijk732. He 
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suggested the distinction between rehabilitation, feminist and insurance, as the 
most recurrent ideological perspectives in victimology733. Simultaneous to the 
first scientific attempts to ‘ground’ the academic field of victimology, it is 
possible to notice the development of early victim programs spreading 
throughout the USA in the mid-1970s (mainly grass roots efforts supporting 
specific victims and prosecutor based victim/witness programs734). As Dussich 
argues, the much higher public profile accorded to victims starting from the 
70s, was the result of a long-lasting process to which various factors have 
contributed735. First, the interests of victims were initially championed by penal 
reformers. The most notable example is Margery Fry736, who campaigned to 
promote the idea of victim compensation as something to which they should 
be entitled both from the state and also, by way of reparation, from their 
offender. This kind of work helped at the penal policy level, to shape some of 
the first victim-focused reforms of the criminal justice system, using as a 
starting point the reconceptualization of crime, as not (simply) a violation of 
the legal order but (also) as a violation of the rights of the individual victim. A 
second important factor in the process of increasing the visibility of victims 
relates to the role of the media during the late 1960s. A third source was a 
growing sensitization during the 1960s and 1970s towards the existence and 
needs of particular groups of ‘vulnerable’ victims: notably women who 
experienced domestic violence, sexually assaulted or raped and children who 
were the victims of abuse. The last factor relates to the introduction and 
increasingly widespread use of victim surveys on the part of both central and 
local government agencies737. Victimology and crime victims’ movement claims 
are clearly two distinct phenomena, with different theoretical and historical 
features. At the same time cannot be overlooked the wide range of 
commonalities which motivates the articulation of them under the common 
label of surface of emergence of the archive of the RJ. The mutual 
conditioning of these two phenomena has been already hinted. In short, 
victimology became the academic/scientific ‘shield’ of crime victims’ 
movement, backing up their often ‘emotional’ claims, while the victims’ 
movement became the ‘political’ way, for victimologists, to deploy on the 
ground their theories738. 
 
3.1.1.2. Discursive objects (concepts): identity of victims in the Restorative Justice 
The fundamental concept of ‘victim’ as used both by authoritative histories 
and conceptualizations of the RJ, seems mainly be understandable looking at 
the surface under analysis. By ‘victim’ I mean also some basic understandings 
of its role in the history of criminal justice. ‘Victims’ are often represented in 
the archive as a cohesive, united ensemble of people739. The idea of victim as 
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‘anthropological category’, is a typical conceptual structure of victimological 
and victims’ movement stances. In victimological works, in fact, we usually 
find descriptions of “crime victim740” as a person who has been physically, 
financially or emotionally injured and/or had their property taken or damaged 
by someone committing a crime, while “general victim741” is a person who has 
injured by an event, an organization or a natural phenomenon. In both cases 
victim is a category of people with specific socio-cultural, psychological, 
economical features. This understanding of the victim’s identity finds more 
precisely its surface in the so called positive victimology. The key characteristic of 
this strand in victimology, as David Miers reported, is the attitude to look for 
the factors, inherent in individuals, which contribute to victimization, focusing 
especially on interpersonal crimes742. The main issues are why some persons 
become victims more so than others, what are the consequences of the 
victimization and its impact on societies and legal regulations743. Even though 
the ‘positivists’ focus on the victim of crime as an object of research, “their 
concern is largely confined to offences of violence between non-strangers to which the victim is 
considered to have contributed744”. They consider the term victim as being self-
evident by the mere fact of suffering an injury by an act defined as ‘criminal 
offence’, without any consideration to the social meanings attached to the label 
of ‘victim’745. This understanding of ‘victim’ is quite widespread in the RJ 
authoritative discourses. The victim is here conceived as an individual 
characterized by ‘personal’ factors such as vulnerability/weaknesses, 
disempowered and in need of recognition. The authoritative discourses do not 
aim at deconstructing the status of ‘victim’ as a legal category, taking for 
granted its nature as an actor with unique qualities, not depending on the 
processes of criminalization. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, it does exist in the RJ authoritative discourses a set of perspectives on 
the identity of the crime victims looking at political, social and cultural factors 
which underlie the criminalization processes and the definition of the victim’s 
identity. Broadly speaking, these alternative understandings seem influenced by 
the victimological strand known as ‘critical’. According to Mawby and 
Walklate, critical victimology, as a projection of the ‘critical’ criminological 
reflection, is an attempt to examine the wider social context of victimology746. 
It involves the analysis of the policy response and service delivery to victims of 
crime. This perspective constitutes an attempt to appreciate the generative 
mechanisms which set the material conditions for becoming victim in a 
specific cultural, social, gendered and economic environment747. The efforts to 
de-construct the cohesive image of the victim in the RJ accounts, can be 
appreciated in light of the ‘import’ of critical victimology’s concepts and 
strategies within the archive of the RJ, where slowly have been reaching an 
expansive endorsement by scholars, advocates and practitioners. As it seems 
clearer at the end of this analysis, the (contested) identity of the victim in the 
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archive of the RJ appears understandable only if located within the tension 
field created by the intersection between positive victimology, crime victims’ 
movement claims and critical victimology. This academic/political surface 
makes explicable the tensions recurrent among the proponents of the RJ 
regarding ‘who is’ the victim: they refer to different traditions of criminological 
thought, only partially ‘operationalized’ by the crime victims’ movements. The 
critical victimology, in fact, does not appear historically implemented by any 
‘critical’ crime victims’ movement. This helps to realize the limited grip of the 
critical perspective regarding the victims’ identity on the application of the RJ. 
Hardly often indeed, in the statements of intentions of the organizations 
involved in RJ services it is possible to find reference to that critical 
perspective. They actually embrace the ‘positive’ stance on being victim, 
elaborating and applying techniques and form of communications informed by 
the popularization of this specific victimological strand. 
 
3.1.1.3. The victims’ needs  
The concept of victims’ needs (paralleling that of victims’ rights), is another 
‘pillar’ of archive of the RJ comprehensible from the victimology/victims’ 
movement viewpoint. This shift in orientation has aimed at changing the 
victim’s perception. It illustrates a change of focus: instead of the generally 
proclaimed victim’s rights, the focal point is now shifted to the victim’s self-
awareness and understanding of one’s individual needs748. As Sarah Ben-David 
emphatically states “the ‘old paradigm’ (primarily addressing the victim’s rights) can be 
observed as an expression of pure morality in relation to the victim, whereas the new 
paradigm (addressing the victim’s needs) demonstrates consideration and care for morality749”. 
The ‘new paradigm’ involves not only the protection of the victim’s rights and 
interests but also the provisions to meet the victim’s needs. The current 
victimological theory articulates this new paradigm both in terms of direct 
action and of academic/scientific field of interest. Form a ‘practical’ point of 
view, the ‘need-perspective’ attempts to modify the perception of 
victimization, shifting it from the individual to the institutional level and 
creating a different cultural and social understanding of crime. The victims’ 
movement played a remarkable role in promoting this shift from the ‘old’ to 
the ‘new’ perspective, acknowledged by the worldwide legal implementation of 
the recognition and protection of victims needs along with (and as a basis for) 
victims’ rights. From the 1980s, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, victim 
assistance programs have been focusing on satisfying victims’ needs, often with 
private/public partnerships. Furthermore, several legal acts have been 
embracing this shift between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ paradigm in approaching 
victims. Examples were the Recommendation (77)27 of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on the compensation of victims of crime, 
the Recommendation (85)11 concerning the position of the victim in the 
framework of criminal law and procedure, the Recommendation (87)21 
concerning assistance to victims and the prevention of victimization and the 
U.N. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power (1985). More recently the Directive 2012/29/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing 
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, 
and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, has widely 
endorsed the centrality of victims’ needs (e.g. par. 38, 46, 51). The content of 
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such legal acts is deeply informed by the victimological studies on the victims’ 
needs or by the victim movements’ claims towards the criminal justice system, 
appearing the conceptual basis for the authoritative claims of RJ regarding the 
necessity of focusing on victims’ needs. 
 
3.1.1.4. Relationships, harm and community 
The relationship victim/offender in the archive of RJ, seems partially informed 
by the surface under analysis. Victimology, in fact, is normally portrayed as the 
study of victims as caught up in “asymmetric relationships or situations750”. 
‘Asymmetry’ refers to unbalanced, exploitative, oppressive, and destructive, 
alienating situations, often entailing suffering. This asymmetry, but even more 
generally the focus on the relationships victim/offender, finds an interesting 
match especially in the authoritative conceptualizations of the RJ. Also the 
notion of ‘harm’ finds a partial emergence form the surface under analysis. In 
victimology the ‘harm’ is the trigger event of victimization. Accordingly, the 
categorizations of harm in victimological contributions are typical. Harm to a 
victim can be physical, psychological, economic, or spiritual. It can concern 
‘primary victims’, but also ‘secondary’ and ‘tertiary’ victims. We have already 
seen how the ‘harm’ is one of the typical ‘trigger event’ of restorative 
interventions. Moreover, the refined archive’s classifications of harms, 
seemingly emerge from the sharp victimological distinctions aforementioned. 
Finally, the community, as crime stakeholder, has partial conceptual ‘roots’ in 
this surface. As already said in victimology the term ‘crime victim’ generally 
refers to any person, group, or entity who has suffered injury or loss due to 
illegal activity. Victimological accounts often starts from the legal definition of 
victim as person who has suffered direct, or threatened, physical, emotional or 
pecuniary harm as a result of the commission of a crime; or in the case of a 
victim being an institutional entity, any of the same harms by an individual or 
authorized representative of another entity. Besides ‘primary’ crime victims, 
there are also ‘secondary’ crime victims who experience the harm second hand, 
such as intimate partners or significant others of rape victims or children of a 
battered woman. It may also make sense to talk about ‘tertiary’ crime victims 
who experience the harm vicariously, such as through media accounts or from 
watching television751. The concepts of ‘secondary’ or ‘tertiary’ victims appear 
as possible the ‘roots’ of the community as a fundamental stakeholder in the 
archive of the RJ. We might in fact see the insertion of community within the 
number of crime stakeholders to involve and satisfy, as discursively related to 
the victimological discourses. 
 
3.1.1.5. Discursive objects (strategies): Victims’ participation as ‘benchmark’ of 
the Restorative Justice 
The discursive strategy of constructing the fulfillment of victim needs as a 
benchmark for the criminal justice’s transformation can be considered 
surfacing the combination victimology/victims movements. For decades 
victimologists have been telling that victims want to participate in the criminal 
justice system752. However, just how victims want to participate and the 
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consequences of their participation in the criminal justice system have been 
and continue to be fervently debated753. The victimological literature usually 
distinguishes between two types of victims’ participation, namely active 
participation (where the victim has decision-making power) and passive 
participation (where victims have no power over decisions but are consulted 
and informed of the developments in their case)754. Ian Edwards, in his well-
known analysis of victim involvement in criminal proceedings, identifies four 
types participation755. The first type of participation is control. According to 
Edwards, control implies that criminal justice authorities are obliged to seek 
and apply the victim’s preference. This type of participation is essentially the 
same as active participation where the victim is the decision-maker. The 
second type is consultation. This type of participation compels criminal justice 
authorities to seek and consider victims’ preferences. Consultation coincides 
with what is also referred to as passive participation. The third type is 
information provision, in which authorities are required to seek and consider 
victim information. According to Edwards, this type of participation obliges 
victims to supply information and does not give them a possibility of choice. 
This type of participation is essentially expressed by the role of the witness in 
criminal justice: victims are obliged to testify if requested. Edward’s fourth type 
of participation is expression. Here, victims have the option of supplying 
information or expressing emotions and authorities are obliged to allow victim 
expression but they are not obliged to consider it. Victim participation of some 
kind is now a requirement of legal proceedings according to the Declaration of 
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985), 
the Council of Europe Recommendations for Victims of Crime ((85) 11), the 
Council Framework Decision of the European Union (2001/220/HA)) or the 
Directive 2012/29/EU. To use the participation as the way to introduce a new 
idea of thinking and doing justice is a basic strategy of the RJ’s accounts which 
emerges from this basic tenet of victimological studies and victims’ movements 
political claims. In the chapter 2 the ‘authoritative’ conceptualizations of 
victims’ needs, for instance, seem largely understandable if put in the context 
of the long-lasting debate, in victimological literature and among crime victims’ 
advocates, about participation as basic and encompassing goal of any victim 
sensitive theory and program. 
 
3.1.1.6. Being restored 
The strategy of describing the victim as ‘harmed subject’ to be ‘restored’ seems 
discursively ‘rooted’ in the language of the victims assistance programs devised 
by the victims’ movements and scientifically endorsed by victimologists. Many 
examples can be provided. The distinction between ‘victim assistance’ and 
‘victim recovery’756, shared by both victimology and victims’ movements, 
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appears crucial in regard. Victim assistance, support or services are described 
by the scientific literature as those activities which are applied in response to 
victimizations with the intention of relieving suffering and facilitating 
recovery757. This includes offering information, assessments, individual 
interventions, case advocacy, system advocacy, public policy and program 
development. Victim recovery is the resumption of the same or better level of 
functionality as was enjoyed prior to victimization. The victim as ‘harmed 
subject’ and in need of restoration, seems a projection of the victimological 
idea of victim as individual abused in his/her level of mental health and 
wellbeing. The recovery is the basic need of such a stereotypical victim. Recovery 
means first try to regain their previous level of functioning plus learn from the 
crime episode and exceed the previous level of functionality. To be recovered 
suggests that a person has at least regained their prior level of well-being and at 
best, has exceeded it. This state may be measured by identifying their previous 
mental condition and determining if they have at least regained that prior status 
using the criteria of758: trust in others, autonomy of self, control over personal 
situations, successful relationships, etc. The ‘victim trauma’ appears then the 
reference point of the victimological operative interventions, recurrent in the 
authoritative accounts. Trauma includes emotional and physical experiences 
that produce pain and injuries. Emotional injury is a normal response to an 
extremely abnormal event. It results from the pairing of a painful or 
frightening emotional experience with a specific memory which emerges and 
has a long-lasting effect on the life of a person. Basically, the victimological 
enterprise combined with victims’ movement claims, works out a discursive 
strategy composed by two elements: the first is the concept of victim as 
‘harmed subject’, the second is the purported necessity of treating the harm 
focusing on the assumed complex nature of it, through ‘recovery’ as basic need 
of the harmed subject. This discursive strategy is crucial for the archive of the 
RJ, which relies on the two-term structure as one of its basic conceptual tenets.  
 
3.1.1.7. Measuring victims’ satisfaction as criteria of justification 
Another pervasive discursive strategy is the purported necessity of measuring 
the satisfaction of victims, as justification for the RJ’s interventions. As Barton 
Poulson emphasizes “within the field of restorative justice, at least three voices may be 
heard: the voice of theory, the voice of practice, and the voice of research759”. In fact, 
scholars of the RJ since the late 70s have gradually elaborated more complex 
evaluative analysis regarding the practical outcomes of RJ programs around the 
world. The empirical researches which aim at measuring and evaluating RJ 
programs’ application, often see in the satisfaction of victims, variously 
operationalized, a crucial reference point, the most important variable. The 
system of measuring victims’ satisfaction is possible also thanks to specific 
scientific tools elaborated within the victimological enterprise. Particularly, 
considering official police statistics as incomplete, victimologists started a wide 
use of quantitative and qualitative surveys about crimes committed against 
more or less large groups of people. ‘Victims survey’ is a periodic data 
collection and analysis process conducted usually on behalf of a government 
entity, within the general population, to study information about crime victims 
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regardless of whether they reported their victimization to the police or not760. It 
typically uses a face-to-face or telephone interview (or sent questionnaire) and 
covers demographics, attitudes about crime and details about the victimizations 
experienced over the previous six months. Victimologists then estimate 
victimization rates and risks, investigate how criminal justice system handles 
the problem, examine societal response to problem. What is particularly 
relevant here, is that they crucially use the satisfaction of victims as a 
benchmark for evaluating as successful or not any form intervention to relieve 
victims’ conditions. Moreover, the victims’ movements ‘normative’ use of the 
surveys’ outcomes has works as one of the most widespread ways to criticize 
the results of the criminal justice as well as to justify alternatives to it. Both the 
‘descriptive’ and ‘normative’ uses of the victim surveys, help us to understand 
the general acknowledgement in the archive of the ‘victim satisfaction’ as the 
main variable in evaluating and promoting the RJ. 
 
3.1.2. Communitarianism/Abolitionism 
The second surface of emergence is given by the articulation of two different 
but synchronic discourses: the penal abolitionism and the re-birth of 
communitarian philosophy in the late 1970s. The relationships between 
abolitionism(s), communitarianism(s) and the RJ are, once again, somehow 
already emphasized by the proponents of the RJ. For instance, Pemberton has 
stressed761 that the “Restorative Justice is seen by many as a possible replacement of the 
criminal justice system. Howard Zehr’s paradigm shift and the differences between vertical 
justice and new, horizontal justice are a prime example, as well as the redefinition of crime as 
a conflict between individuals in Christie’s classic ‘Conflicts as property’”. Thorburn in 
the same vein has stated762 that “restorative justice has much more in common with the 
prison abolition movement than it does with mainstream rehabilitation accounts of criminal 
justice”. Moreover, we have already seen as some of the ‘founding fathers’ of 
the RJ, are usually linked to the abolitionism movement and theories (Christie 
above all). Additionally, there is wide acknowledgement that a version of 
communitarianism which relates directly to the practices of criminal justice, has 
directly contributed to build up the momentum of the RJ763 (this is the case of 
Braithwaite764). In the next sections I will place emphasis on the discursive 
objects (concepts and strategies) which gain epistemic/conceptual consistence 
within the articulation of abolitionism and communitarianism. 
 
3.1.2.1. Toward the deinstitutionalization and de-professionalization 
As Vincenzo Ruggiero pointed out “penal abolitionism is not merely a theory of 
decarceration, but an approach, a perspective, a methodology, and most of all a way of 
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seeing765”. Abolitionists put into question the validity of the guilt-and-
punishment frame of reference as well as hitherto well-accepted beliefs about 
the relevance of terms like ‘crime’, ‘dangerousness’, and many others766. 
Abolitionism is a critique of the reference schemes of criminal law and criminal 
justice, but also a sensitizing theory on the issues of total institutions in general 
and prisons in particular. More than a paradigm it seems an incomplete, 
competing perspective on social control in contemporary societies. A useful 
classification to understand the wide range of theories included under the 
common rubric of abolitionism, is to distinguish between a ‘restricted’ and a 
‘wider’ sense of this term767. Abolitionism in a restricted sense deals with the 
abolition of a specific aspect of the penal system (e.g. capital punishment). This 
type of abolitionism is close to decriminalization in the sense of those 
processes by which the ‘competence’ of the penal system to apply sanctions as 
a reaction to a certain form of conduct is withdrawn in respect of that specific 
comportment. We speak of abolitionism in a wider sense when not a part of 
the criminal justice system but the system as a whole is seen as a social 
problem in itself and the abolition of this total system is considered to be the 
only adequate solution to this problem. It is emphasized the importance of a 
comparison between the penal law system, the administrative and the civil law 
systems with regard to their conditions of application, ‘controllability’ and their 
immediately intended ‘products’. As I will argue, the ‘wider’ sense of 
abolitionism contributes to make understandable various crucial tenets of the 
archive of the RJ, first of all the main reasons why the criminal justice system is 
problematic as a system of social control. The ‘wider’ abolitionism critique in 
fact, is placed on the fact that the criminal justice causes unnecessary and 
unequally distributed suffering, ‘stealing’ the conflict, marginalizing people 
directly involved and resulting difficult to control. The replacement of the 
centralized state administration of penal justice by decentralized forms of 
autonomous conflict regulation, whereby those directly involved have more 
influence, follows as a natural consequence of that awareness. The ‘wider’ 
abolitionist perspective opens up space to the emergence of concepts and 
strategies of positive reform of criminal justice on which the RJ authoritative 
discourses will be based. In the same period the abolitionism(s) were starting to 
spread in academia throughout Europe, a ‘complementary’ process takes place: 
the rise of new versions of communitarianism in political and social philosophy 
and the gradual diffusion of reforms inspired by them768. Broadly speaking, 
communitarianism is a range of philosophical positions sharing the critics to 
traditional liberalism as motivating atomistic tendencies of modern liberal 
societies, emphasizing social responsibility and promoting policies meant to 
minimize the erosion of communal life in an increasingly fragmented society769. 
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Communitarians examine the ways shared conceptions of the good (values) are 
formed, transmitted, justified, and enforced. They therefore focus on 
communities and moral dialogues within them, on how values and traditions, 
are historically transmitted and enforced. The sources of social cohesion are 
often found in shared assumptions so deeply engrained in everyday life that 
they do not have to be articulated: in folkways, customs, prejudices770. 
Especially in ‘moralistic’ and ‘responsive’ communitarian perspectives, 
individuals are considered as closely involved in interdependencies which have 
special qualities of mutual help and trust. The interdependencies have symbolic 
significance in the culture of group loyalties which take precedence over 
individual interests771. Communitarianism can be taken to stand for a highly 
socialized view of people in which their moral position can be understood only 
in terms of their social relationships. Oversimplifying the articulation between 
abolitionism (in wider sense) and communitarianism (particularly the moralistic 
versions), we might say that abolitionist perspective is essentially ‘critical’ 
(providing arguments on the replacement of criminal justice as system of social 
control) while the communitarian is a ‘constructive’ (offering arguments on the 
ground of new forms of social control). Their point of connection is framing 
and constructing the ‘community’ as a subject with a crucial role in leading forms 
of social control which emphasize participation, normative integration and 
common values/beliefs/principles. The meaning(s) of ‘community’ in the 
archive of the RJ, appears then understandable if referred to the combination 
of the idea of community as alternative to the state in dealing with social 
conflicts (abolitionism) and the idea of social interdependency worked out 
within the communitarian perspectives. Community is the ‘third way’, a kind of 
‘antagonist’ to the state but also to the social atomization processes caused by 
the privatization of public spaces. In the authoritative discourses the binary 
opposition between the state (and criminal justice system as its expression), 
and a ‘virtual’ space radically different, independent and even alternative is 
considered evident and unquestionable. Even if in the authoritative discourses 
hold different conceptualizations of ‘community’, this basic conceptual 
configuration is a recurrent reference point (also for the critical works as a 
critical target). In this perspective, also the different versions of the ‘trigger 
event’ appear related to that complex discursive combination. Particularly, the 
concepts of ‘conflict’ and ‘harm’ are understandable in light of the idea of 
‘problematic situation’, an expression which replaces -in the abolitionist view- 
the identifying expressions such as offence, crime and criminal act. At the same 
time the traditional means of state interventions on social conflicts, appear to 
be an invasion of the community’s domain, an attempt of colonization, able to 
cause damages and social losses772. 
 
3.1.2.2. Discursive objects (concepts): Community as third actor 
‘Community’ is a key concept in any authoritative understanding of the RJ. Its 
surface of emergence seems to be the tension field created by the intersection 
of ‘moralistic’ communitarian claims associated with the critique to the criminal 
justice worked out by the ‘wider-sense’ abolitionism. Communitarians generally 
make several claims about the nature of persons and human identity not least 
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that persons are embedded in communities. They claim that the self is 
constituted to some extent through a community that provides shared values, 
interests or practices. A person’s individual values are formed in the social 
context of these communities and often pursued through communal 
attachments. The separate individual does not make up the basic moral unit of 
society in this scheme of things, but rather is attached to other individuals in 
community to whom he or she is somewhat dependent. The appeal of 
communitarianism is based on the purported growing perception that there has 
been an “erosion of communal life in contemporary society, and that this is associated in 
some way with a decline in standards of behaviour and relationships together with increasing 
crime and social exclusion773”. Particularly, as Amitai Etzioni states, “‘responsive’ 
communitarians stress that individuals who are well-integrated into communities are better 
able to reason and act in responsible ways than isolated individuals, but add that if social 
pressure to conform rises to high levels, it will undermine the individual self774”. 
Communitarians look at social institutions (families, schools, communities, 
community of communities) as the providers of the moral infrastructure of 
society, being their societal role to “introduce values and begin the development of the 
moral self of individuals775”. The acknowledgement of ‘community’ as an essential 
component within the formation of individual identity and as the means for 
citizens to achieve improved levels of personal well-being776, is crucial concept 
for the archive of the RJ. Particular attention must be drawn to the work, so 
far just hinted, of Etzioni in regard, as leading proponent of the ‘moralistic’ 
communitarian viewpoint777. Etzioni argues that community can be defined 
with reasonable precision. Two are its main characteristics: first, a web of 
affect-laden relationships among a group of individuals, relationships that 
often crisscross and reinforce one another (as opposed to one-one individual 
relationship); and second, a measure of commitment to a set of shared values, 
norms, and meanings, and a shared history and identity -in short, a particular 
culture. Etzioni constructs his case for communitarianism around a 
fundamental assertion that individuals should have a key role in furnishing the 
needs of their neighbors. He thus argues that individuals, once they have met 
their personal responsibilities, have an obligation to promote the wellbeing of 
relatives, friends and others in the various communities to which they 
belong778. These include all types of social groups, such as schools, 
organizations, families, neighborhoods and interest groups779. This case, for the 
application of reciprocity in care and compassion, is a common theme in 
communitarian literature, as theorists argue for a balance between individual 
rights and collective obligations and responsibilities780. In this perspective, we 
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can acknowledge that an individual may influence another person’s 
understanding of reality, but at the same time we must accept that the social 
world is conceivable only through the medium of group discourses and 
categories and that even moments of deep self-understanding are conditioned 
by communal bonds. As David Pearson states, “to earn the appellation ‘community’ 
[…] groups must be able to exert moral suasion and extract a measure of compliance from 
their members. That is, communities are necessarily, indeed, by definition, coercive as well as 
moral, threatening their members with the stick of sanctions if they stray, offering them the 
carrot of certainty and stability if they don’t781”. This idea of community as a mobile 
net of relationships morally laden, with a ‘responsive’ potential, intrinsically 
difficult to further specify, is a recurrent element in the archive of the RJ. This 
is because the community conceived by communitarian (but also abolitionist) 
approaches, precursor of the archive’s one, is not a static entity, quantitatively 
definable. ‘Community’ is the product of a shift in the conceptualization of 
social control and citizenship that involves the construction of a third ‘virtual’ 
reality between state and individuals; a subject whose identity is factiously 
drawn upon not better identifiable customs, habits, attitude of a borderless 
collectivity. The point then, is not on ‘who is the community’, as restorativists 
keep wondering, but to highlight the reference of the archive of the RJ to a 
theoretical perspective that seeks to lessen the focus on individual rights and 
increase the focus on supposedly communal needs.  
 
3.1.2.3. Trigger events: problematic situations, conflict and harm 
The concept of ‘crime’ has, to some extent, begun to be replaced within the 
archive, by terms such as ‘harm’, ‘conflict’ or ‘dispute’782. Hudson and Galaway, 
for example, assert as the first fundamental propositions of the RJ that “crime is 
primarily conflict between individuals […] only secondarily a violation against the state783”. 
Umbreit and Roberts784 have even coined the seemingly tautological term 
‘criminal conflict’, while Herman Bianchi785 simply prefers ‘wrongs’. Although 
this tendency has been criticized for a number of reasons (“harm and legal 
wrongdoing are not identical786”, “victims of rape or even burglaries do not want to be known 
as ‘disputants’”787) its influence appears to have become more pervasive. 
Problematic situations, conflicts and harms as objects of ‘restorative’ thinking 
and interventions, seemingly find their surface of emergence in the 
communitarian/abolitionist construct. Already in the 1940s Edwin 
Sutherland’s work on white-collar crime introduced a definition of crime based 
                                                                                                                                                           
Republic and the Unencumbered Self. Political Theory, 12(1), 81-96; Tam, H. (1998). 
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782 Graef, R. (2000). Why Restorative Justice? cit., p. 30; Zehr, H. (2005). Changing lenses, cit. p. 
89. 
783 Hudson, J., Galaway, B. (1996). Introduction. In: B. Galaway and J. Hudson (Eds.), 
Restorative Justice: International Perspectives (pp. 1-14), cit, p. 2. 
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786 Duff, R. A. (2003). Probation, Punishment And Restorative Justice: Should All Turism Be 
Engaged In Punishment? The Howard Journal, 42(2), 181-197, pp. 185- 186; Von Hirsch, A., 
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on concepts such as “injury to the state” and acts “socially harmful”788. In the 1970s 
radical criminologists advocated a further deepening of the criminological 
agenda to include racism, sexism and economic exploitation. In many respects 
this important debate was foreclosed by the growing hegemony of realist 
approaches. But it is a debate that remains unfinished. By the 1990s numerous 
ideas of ‘harm’ begun to circulate on the margins of criminological inquiry789. 
This idea of ‘socially harmful’ acts to be addressed with specific means is stated 
in a stronger way by abolitionism and finds its frame of meaning within 
communitarian claims of individual dependence on community. In the 
abolitionist perspective(s) the “categories of ‘crime’ are given by the criminal justice 
system rather than by victims or society in general. This makes it necessary to abandon the 
notion of ‘crime’ as a tool in the conceptual framework of criminology. Crime has no 
ontological reality. Crime is not the object but the product of criminal policy. Criminalization 
is one of the many ways of constructing social reality790”. The idea of ‘crime’ as an 
essentially coercive imposition by the state on an incommensurable diversity of 
‘problematic situations’ according to a totalizing narrative of justice, rationality, 
and citizenship, prominently features abolitionist works791. For Louk Hulsman, 
for instance, the task is then to study the problematic situations (an expression 
which replaces the identifying expression of crime) and to identify the 
contradictions at the heart of the various criminal justice systems792. In other 
words, abolitionists are interested no longer in the enduring issue of the causes 
of criminality, but rather in the possibility of identifying suitably criteria for the 
definition of communicative channels between reasoning actors involved in the 
problematic situations. This idea of defining and supporting an interpretation 
of criminality as state-dependent opposed to a socially ‘rooted’ understanding 
of problematic situations as the issue to ‘communicatively’ address, lies at the 
core of the archive of the RJ as a crucial concept. In this perspective, the 
current approach to crime control, the definition of crime and the justification 
of punishment need a reconceptualization in a broader social sense. ‘Crime’ is 
understood as a social construction, to be analyzed as a myth of everyday 
life793. As a myth, crime serves to maintain political power relations and lends 
legitimacy to the expansion of the crime control apparatus and the 
intensification of surveillance and control. It justifies inequality and relative 
deprivation794. For these reasons it is necessary to appreciate the crime as a 
social event, a socially constructed phenomenon respect to which any 
simplified reaction in the form of punishment becomes problematic. Bearing in 
mind the abolitionist critique to the concept of crime, it is possible to 
understand the authoritative idea of ‘trigger event’ in the archive. Crime, in 
these perspectives, is nothing but the legal conceptualization of broken 
relationships rooted in the community. If we are to find a solution to the 
problems of crime, the authoritative conceptualizations insist that we must 
attend to their social causes and mend the broken relationships between 
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offender, victim and their community. The central contention of abolitionism, 
‘endorsed’ by the RJ, is that events and behaviours that are criminalized only 
make up a minute part of the events and behaviours that can be so defined and 
that crime is not the object, but the product of crime control philosophies and 
institutions795.  
 
3.1.2.4. Discursive objects (strategies): The dichotomy State/Community 
One of the basic discursive strategies around which the archive of the RJ is 
built up, is the opposition of the ‘state’ and the ‘community’ as two obviously 
conceptually and empirically distinct entities. Both these collective subjects are 
considered the ‘environments’ of ways of thinking and doing justice, sharply 
opposed. Moreover, it is a widespread authoritative tenet that the state has 
been threatening the community, invading its areas of traditional action. To 
think of the dichotomy state/community as premise of the RJ’s histories, 
justifications and practices, is a discursive strategy which presents its conditions 
of intelligibility/possibility in the abolitionist/communitarian construct. To 
question the ethical caliber of a state that intentionally and systematically 
inflicts pain upon other people is a well-known abolitionist claim which can be 
‘completed’ by the communitarian understanding of the community as the 
radical alternative to the state and its apparatuses to maintain power and 
exercise social control796. Notably, Christie’s and Hulsman’s abolitionist 
perspectives contain many implicit references to Jürgen Habermas’ idea of the 
“colonization of the life-world797”. The de-colonization of criminal justice’s ‘system 
rationality’ is in fact, another target of the abolitionist critique. Though the 
tension Habermas observes between systems and life-worlds does not lead him 
directly to a rejection of the criminal justice system, he does argue against the 
degeneration of criminal justice into a state instrument of crime control in 
which the critical dimension of power is ignored. Thus, penal instrumentalism 
is another object of abolition which can be derived from Habermas. A further 
aim of abolition is related to the constitution of moral discourse. In Western, 
neo-liberal societies, values like care and empathy are delegated to the private 
sphere and are thereby excluded from public, or political, ethics. These latter 
ethics are dominated by abstract, so-called ‘masculine’ notions such as rights, 
duties and respect, which outrule more subjective, contextually determined 
‘feminine’ notions such as care and empathy798. The dominance of abstract 
approaches of rights results in a morality that is oriented towards a generalized 
other, whereas a feminist approach is oriented towards a concrete other. Thus, 
abolitionism also implies the abolition of the ‘masculine’, individualistic, neo-
liberal values upon which our penal systems are built799. The dichotomy of 
masculine/feminine ethics appears as projection of the state/community 
opposition, and as such reproduced within the archive of the RJ as opposition 
between criminal justice (state-masculine)/RJ (community-feminine). 
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3.1.2.5. Stopping the ‘loss of the social’ 
Another typical discursive strategy is to conceptualize the criminal justice as a 
system which naturally produces ‘social losses’, opposed to the re-vitalization 
of social life-worlds carried out by the RJ. In this perspective, the criminal 
justice breaks systematically human relationships in order to re-construct the 
symbolic social order altered by the crime. It produces social losses represented 
by the dispossession of community agencies of the informal social control 
traditionally performed, whereas the RJ re-constructs social bonds. This 
discursive structure which basically consists in opposing the RJ and the 
criminal justice in regard to the social effects of their means, emerges from the 
surface under analysis. As Norman Dennis and George Erdos remark800, 
communitarians commonly stress the dangerous loss of both social cohesion 
and self-control which has occurred in the past 30 years in contrast to the days 
in the 1930s when “social control was pervasive and consensual, and therefore low-key, 
good-natured and effective801”. If we specify the criminal justice as a state instrument 
in the creation of that loss, as abolitionists argue, the link between the RJ and 
this surface is clearer. In the abolitionist/communitarian perspective, the basis 
of social order is thus considered to reside in the informal control mechanisms 
of civil society, the only able to reproduce and maintain a culture of mutual 
respect, trust, and restraint802. These non-authoritarian mechanisms are the 
archetypical precursors of the RJ initiatives, portraying the as a typical way of 
doing justice in those ‘traditional’ and nostalgically yearned societies. The ‘loss 
of social’ is moreover conceptualized by abolitionist/communitarian claims as 
the dismantling of the powers of local authorities by the central state803. In a 
context of decline of the paternalistic welfare state communitarians strive to 
’imagine’ a more participatory and democratic future for local governance 
beyond the market and the state804. Community becomes the backdrop of the 
attempts to re-imagine the public sphere, often in profoundly exclusivist and 
naturalized such as in the narratives of Etzioni, Murray and Dennis. The 
critique of the social loss caused by the state apparatuses (e.g. criminal justice) 
dispossessing the community of social control tasks and means, represents in 
these perspectives the basis for a self-alleged inclusive way of thinking and 
doing justice. The RJ, according the authoritative discourses, was exactly this: 
an alternative to the welfarist and liberal perspectives in dealing with social 
conflicts.  
 
3.1.2.6. Offering ‘social alternatives’  
The last RJ’s discursive strategy emerging from the abolitionist/communitarian 
construct is to portray community as a ‘source’ of radical alternatives (respect 
to the criminal justice) for the management of problematic situations. Respect 
to the previous strategies, it is important to remark the idea of alternative 
‘means’ to crime and punishment, which community is naturally supposed to 
nurture. Crime and punishment are considered closely related to “social 
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negativity805”, i.e. expressive of destructive developments within contemporary 
society, in particular, as they affect the weakest society’s members. 
Abolitionists argue that in order to define an effective politics of penal reform, 
“crime and punishment should be seen as action and reaction, but as spiralling cycles of 
harm806”. Instead of exclusively entrusting professional specialists in drafting 
such policies, they should be worked out democratically, under conditions of 
mutuality and solidarity, to be created by social and political action. The urgent 
issue that then arises is how this might be done. On a general note, 
abolitionists admit that no single solution to the problem should be expected. 
Considering the diversity of relevant social phenomena, to devise constructive 
interventions requires the development of a multiplicity of forms of social 
regulation operating as forms of conflict resolution as much as possible 
independent to the state. Abolitionists focus their interest on ‘autonomous’ 
forms of conflict resolution and dispute settlement. Other “styles of social 
control807” must be pursued, more democratic, participatory, cost-effective, and 
constructive, i.e. based on compensation and reconciliation aims instead of 
revenge and punishment. To this end, the criminal justice system needs to be 
decentralized allowing the development of participatory processes of definition 
and management of problematic situations. Through contextualization, the 
dichotomized character of criminal justice could be replaced with a 
continuum808. In this way “participants would be urged to confront and grapple with 
complexities around notions of human ‘agency’, ‘intentionality’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘guilt’ 
rather than reducing them to manageable proportions by applying the binary logic of criminal 
law809”. The idea of participatory and decentralized forms of regulation of 
problematic situations help us to understand the recurrent claim in the archive 
of the RJ, that is necessary to invest in community-based forms of social 
control, more human and democratic, definitely represented by the RJ’s 
interventions.   
 
3.1.3. Religious groups/psychological ‘complex’ 
The third surface to be taken into account is given by the articulation of the 
discourses of the spiritual groups involved in the reform of criminal agencies 
according to reconciliatory perspectives since the 1970s and the spreading of 
the ‘Psy-ethos’ in western societies during last three decades810. This 
articulation is explained by the common goal pursued by these different 
discourses and its political uses. By conceptualizing the ‘deep dimension’ of the 
crime, this discursive articulation contributes to endorse approaches to deviant 
behaviour as moral/psychological deficiencies, opening up to forms of 
interventions closely linked to self-responsibilizing political strategies (see next 
chapter). As I will argue, especially the conceptualization of the ‘warm side’ of 
the RJ is understandable in light of the concepts and themes composing this 
surface. Whilst the spiritual groups clearly pursue that goal with religious 
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beliefs, the psy-discourses represent a laic version of the same attempts, 
deployed with relatively similar means. Many examples can be given of direct 
involvement of religious group in the reform of criminal justice. Mennonite 
Church, Quakers and Catholics have played a remarkable role in the 
affirmation of reconciliatory approaches to the crime and its aftermath. Beside 
the presence (historically rooted) of religious groups in the criminal justice 
system, we can observe a similar ‘reforming’ role played by the counseling and 
therapy experts in the last three decades. Indeed, the therapeutic language has 
informed a range of criminal justice policies that have emerged in recent years, 
particularly those designed to assist victims of crime, in a way working as the 
secularized version of the action of religious groups involved in the criminal 
justice reform. It has come to be accepted that crime victims must be offered 
opportunities to tell the story of their victimization, to express their pain, fear 
and/or anger about the offence, and to ‘be heard’. The popularization of 
concepts such as self-help, empowerment, healing, ‘being heard’ act as surface 
of emergence for many conceptualizations and justifications of the RJ. Many of 
them give often great importance to the stakeholders’ direct expression of 
emotions and feelings. The goal is to create a space and time for the 
‘confession’ of deep sentiments, stimulating constructive inner dynamics which 
allowing stakeholders to mirror emotional experiences, ‘heal’ form inside the 
personal, emotional and spiritual loss produced by the ‘crime’. At the same 
time is emphasized the relevance of ‘being heard’ as complementary need to 
the expressions of internal states. Both the concept of direct expression of 
feeling and the claim of ‘being heard’ are drawn upon the discursive reservoir 
of the religious movement and of the psycho-therapeutic ideologies. What is 
here reproduced is a kind of confessional-relationship between the 
stakeholders811, organized by the responsible of the restorative process 
(mediator, facilitator etc.). This schema is basic both in secularized and 
religious ways of dealing with conflicts. 
 
3.1.3.1. Spiritual and/or psychological: religious groups and psy-discourses in 
criminal matters 
According many authoritative explanations, the RJ is somehow related to 
religious notions, such as the ones of Christian biblical justice linked to the 
pacifist and prison abolitionist tradition of Quakers and Mennonites. The 
authoritative histories of the RJ actually start from the well-known Mennonite 
experiment in Kitchner. In order to understand the nexus of sense between the 
RJ and such groups, it might be more useful to carefully examine their 
‘discourses’ within the frame of the reform of criminal agencies in the 70s812, 
especially in USA, and their ‘secularization’ through the emergence of a wide 
range of scientific/therapeutic discourses on crime and justice, starting from 
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the 80s. This process has basically reshaped in psychological terms the ideas of 
identity, autonomy, freedom and self-fulfillment, with regard of crime and 
justice. Humans involved in crime, are understood as inhabited by a deep 
spiritual/psychological space, and they ‘must’ evaluate and act upon themselves 
in terms of this ‘popularized’ belief813. They come to speak of themselves in 
terms of a psychological language of self-description -the language of 
intelligence, personality, anxiety, neurosis, depression, trauma, extroversion and 
introversion and to judge themselves in terms of a psychological ethics814. The 
combination of spiritual group discourses and psychologization of criminal 
agencies towards their reform is here considered a crucial surface of emergence 
of many archive’s discursive objects. 
 
3.1.3.2. Discursive objects (concepts): Storytelling 
The concept of ‘storytelling’ with its apparently therapeutic effects is a 
milestone of the archive of the RJ. That victims of crime might not feel the 
need to engage in the ‘talking cures815’ is almost entirely unacknowledged in the 
RJ’s field. Like victims, however, offenders are often constructed as an 
essential group. The offender of the RJ imagination is always able to draw on 
his or her ‘innate’ and ‘human’ capacity to express emotions about the offence. 
This view is clearly stated by the Victim-Offender Mediation Association, who 
list as the first of ten underlying principles of VOM, that “human beings possess 
untapped inner resources that, under the right circumstances, can be accessed and utilized to 
address issues and resolve problems of importance to them816”. Umbreit’s guide to VOM, 
similarly lists as one of seven principles underlying that restorative ‘practice’ 
the “belief in the capacity of all people to draw on inner reservoirs of strength to overcome 
adversity817”. Constructing ‘psy’ knowledges as an ‘innate human resource’ that 
can be drawn upon in restorative processes, however, operates to render all 
offenders ‘equal’, irrespective of gender, ethnicity and/or socioeconomic 
status, as well as level of verbal ability818. By portraying the sharing of 
experiences and/or emotions as innate, natural and basic human need, these 
proponents represent the RJ as natural and universal by extension.  
 
3.1.3.3. Trauma, Healing, Closure 
The authoritative writings on the RJ often use concepts like shame and trauma 
recovery819. For instance, Braithwaite points out that the RJ ‘practices’ provide 
opportunities for victims to hold offenders accountable, tell their story to 
offenders and others, and receive new information that may have been 
missing; all of which are also considered components of successful trauma 
recovery programs820. He argues that experiences of victimization, and even 
trauma, are involved in most situations of conflict and wrongdoing. The RJ is 
supposed to acknowledge and address this sense of victimization and the 
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resulting needs, often for everyone involved, including those who have 
offended. With or without the frameworks employed by Braithwaite and 
others, such ideas have been considered fruitful resources for the proponents 
of the RH working in a variety of settings. The archive relies profoundly upon 
a range of spiritual/therapeutic discourses based on discursive objects such as 
‘holism’, ‘unity’, ‘transformation’, ‘personal growth’, ‘healing’, ‘closure’, 
‘transformation’, ‘reconciliation’ and ‘harmony’821. Proponents discuss ‘harms’, 
‘conflicts’ instead of ‘crimes’. This spiritual/psychological vocabulary of the RJ 
appears to have become so taken-for-granted that it is seldom even remarked 
upon822. Thus proponents of the RJ have embraced and promoted an approach 
to crime that is partially justified by reference to therapeutic discourses. 
Significantly, many authoritative discourses are embedded within these 
spiritual/therapeutic ideas not only in the works of those we might consider 
‘evangelical’ supporters (such as Pranis, Zehr, Van Ness and Umbreit), but in 
the works of more discerning scholars also. Many authors, for example, discuss 
the potential of the RJ to effect ‘healing’ and/or ‘closure’ for victims and 
offenders823. These spiritual/therapeutic discourses inform a great many RJ 
programs, particularly many of those that focus on serious, violent and/or 
adult offending. Many of these programs have adopted these ideas as their 
stated objectives, and list, for example, ‘healing’ and ‘closure’ as crucial benefits 
for victims and offenders who participate.  
 
3.1.3.4. Discursive objects (strategies): The existence of a deeper reality of crime 
and its impact 
The idea that the crime damages relationships between parties and the 
community is often conceived as a ‘truth’ in the authoritative discourses824. The 
‘relationships-(re)building’ is portrayed as a distinctive feature of the RJ, one of 
the main reasons for its justification and explanation. The pre-condition of the 
‘relationship-(re)building’ is the idea that ‘crime’ is the formalization of a 
dysfunctional deep and complex set of relationships, emotionally and 
spiritually laden. The peculiarity of the RJ is that conceptualizes as its main goal 
to create conditions for victim and offender to (re)gain their sense of well-
being in the relationship, and as people with a safe place in the community825. 
For victims this means feeling safe from harm at the hands of this or another 
offender and a sense of belonging to the community. For the offender it 
means to be assisted, accepted and welcomed back to the community826. As we 
have already seen, Daly and Stubbs identify the “relationship repair827” as a main 
goal of any RJ intervention. The RJ ‘practices’ can address violence between 
those who want to continue the relationship, they can create occasions for 
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relationships to be repaired. As Pranis highlights, the importance placed on 
relationships within a restorative framework often means more that the single 
relationship between a victim and an offender, including as well the larger web 
of relationships in which we live828. Accordingly, in this perspective, the harms 
considered in a restorative approach comprise larger social damages as well as 
individual harms, embedded in a community context both in terms of harms 
caused and responsibilities produced. This ideological primacy of relationships 
and relationship-(re)building in the archive of the RJ, can be understood as a 
pervasive discursive strategy which finds its ‘natural’ environment in the 
therapeutic/spiritual construct. 
 
3.1.4. Informal Justice/Alternative dispute resolution  
The last surface of emergence to analyze is given by the articulation of two 
parallel strands of theory and practice in the legal field, developed since the late 
70s, especially in Anglophone areas, and then spreading around the western 
world. The informal justice and ADR829 theories and movements play the role 
of surface of emergence of various discursive objects of the archive of the RJ. 
As widely known, they both challenge traditional understandings of the 
centrality of adjudication to the maintenance of social order in modern society. 
Broadly speaking, they express an anti-law ideology, claiming that non-‘formal’ 
and non-adversarial ways of resolving conflict are possible and even actually 
historically and socially deep-seated. As movements, Informal justice and ADR 
have urged the legal profession to move away from its exclusive focus on the 
use of courts to resolve conflicts and to consider a broader spectrum of 
problem-solving approaches. Many authoritative accounts on the RJ seem 
understandable using concepts and strategies proper of this cultural, academic 
and political construct, especially as for the relationship between the RJ and the 
‘traditional’ legal institutions is concerned. 
 
3.1.4.1. ADR and Informal justice: theories and movements 
Informal justice, intended as a cluster of socio-legal and anthropological 
theories inspiring the spread of a wide range of extra-judicial practices (such as 
arbitration panels, mediation boards, neighborhood justice centers etc.), has 
been labeled a “growth industry830” since the 70s. Concomitant to this growth is 
the large body of academic literature on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
which has been produced in the same period831. There are a variety of ways of 
conceptualizing the field of legal informalism832. Richard Abel, for example, 
defined informal justice as encompassing legal institutions which are “non-
bureaucratic in structure and relatively undifferentiated from the larger society, minimize the 
use of professionals, and eschew official law in favor of substantive and procedural norms that 
are vague, unwritten, commonsensical, flexible, ad hoc, and particularistic833”. Susan Silbey 
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and Austin Sarat834, on their part, make a threefold distinction among the 
groups advocating new forms of dispute processing, the establishment Bar and 
legal elites, the ‘access to justice’ movement, and ‘improved quality of law’ 
proponents. Christine Harrington and Sally Merry’s typology distinguishes of 
three different, albeit related, projects in community mediation which also 
captures the full range of informal justice initiatives: the delivery of dispute 
resolution services, social transformation, and personal growth835. As for the 
ADR movement, usually is considered as ‘architected’ during the decade of the 
1970s under the inspiration of Warren Burger836. To be more civilized, he 
claimed, Americans had to abandon the centrality of the adversary model. The 
harmony law model would replace ‘no-win’ solutions of the adversary process. 
Alternative dispute resolution would provide access, help resolve overcrowded 
courtrooms, and decrease American litigiousness. Relationships not root 
causes, and interpersonal conflict resolution skills, not power inequities or 
injustice, were and are the main topics of the ADR movement. Martin 
Chanock talked of “missionary justice837” to call attention to the spread of 
compromise models of dispute settlement in Africa. Laura Nader used the 
term “harmony ideology838” to refer to the use of compromise, consensus, and like 
mechanisms to control and stifle conflict. Carol Greenhouse described the 
context that nourishes the notion that lawyers should become “healers of human 
conflict839”. Informal justice and ADR basically express the same purposes 
regarding ‘how’ doing justice and ‘why’ in that way. It is possible to argue that 
ADR movement plays approximately the same role of crime victims’ 
movements respect to victimology, i.e. main common concerns but more 
practical perspective. Insofar as they articulate each other, offering an 
overlapping of perspectives, goals, and means they are here considered as 
unified surface of emergence. 
 
3.1.4.2. Discursive objects (concepts): The understanding of the adversarial 
approach  
The developments of ADR as well as informal justice initiatives are usually 
conceptualized as responses to dissatisfaction with the adversarial and formal 
nature of common law litigation840. The understanding of the 
adversarial/formal legal system held by informalists and ADR theorists and 
practitioners is a useful tool to understand specific discursive concepts of the 
RJ authoritative accounts, especially the meaning of ‘criminal justice’. In the 
informalism perspective, litigation is based on the premise that the truth of the 
dispute is found by requiring the disputants to prove their arguments through a 
pre-defined compulsory procedure, governed by complex rules on the 
examination and the evidence. This system is ‘adversarial’ because based on a 
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structural confrontation between the litigants, naturally endorsing ‘win-lose’ 
solutions. Both ADR and informal justice proponents have been criticizing the 
specialized language of litigations, the leading role of lawyers, the alienating 
bureaucracy and the costs of the litigation, as well as the win-lose outcomes841. 
The concept of ‘criminal justice’ recurrently evoked by the RJ discourses as 
what is necessary to improve/change/abolish, appears meaningful insofar as is 
casted against the backdrop of the informal/ADR understandings of the 
‘adversarial approach’ to conflicts. This ‘nexus of sense’ appears even clearer if 
we look at how informalists often portray the western concept of ‘law’ as based 
on a patriarchal paradigm, characterized by hierarchy, linear reasoning, the 
resolution of disputes through the application of abstract principles, and the 
ideal of the reasonable person842. Its fundamental aspiration is objectivity, and 
to that end it separates public from private, form from substance, and process 
from policy. A ‘feminine’ or ‘warmer’ way of dealing with conflicts (i.e. 
cooperative and voluntary, not coercive) is therefore acclaimed to counterpart 
or overcome the limits of the ‘adversarial’ perspective. It is underlined the 
necessity to reject an objectivist approach to conflict resolution, considering 
conflicts in terms of relationships and responsibility843; to enable the parties to 
exercise self-determination and remove the hierarchy and the dominance 
which characterize the judge/litigant and lawyer/client relationships. Finally, 
emotions must be recognized and incorporated into the legal process. These 
stances help to understand the characterization of many crucial issues in the 
authoritative procedural discourses on the RJ, such as the centrality of the 
participation/involvement of parties and the marginalization of specialist in 
dealing with the conflict, the role third-party intervener as expert of the 
process and not of the content etc. Broadly speaking the features of ‘doing’ RJ 
appear as constructed ex-negativo from those ones held by the adversarial 
structure and by the actors of legal process, as conceived by the informal 
justice/ADR theories.  
 
3.1.4.3. The crisis of legal system  
Another typical conceptual tenet of ADR/informal justice theories is a specific 
idea of the ‘crisis of the legal system’, whose understanding facilitates the 
comprehension of the same discursive object in the archive of the RJ. The 
expression ‘litigation explosion’ describes the contemporary perception that 
litigation is increasingly prevalent in the western world and burdensome to 
society844. In the ADR/informal justice perspective, the ‘fact’ of a litigation 
explosion, is the marker (and the cause) of the crisis of the western legal 
systems. According to this narrative, throughout the past 40 years we have 
assisted to a “widely reported volume of increasing concern and discontent with our judicial 
system, our adversary process, the pervasive role of lawyers in society, the level of performance 
and accountability of the legal profession, and the perception that lawyers’ economic self-
interests conflict with their clients’ and the public’s interest in prompt, efficient and economical 
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dispute resolution845”. Lord Woolf, in his well-known report, claimed that the UK 
legal (civil) system was so beset by problems of cost, delay and complexity that 
the cumulative effect was a “denial of access to justice846”. More specifically he 
described the civil justice system in UK as overly dependent on party-control 
(i.e. lawyer control) regarding conduct, pace and extent of litigation, designed 
along the lines of a trial by battle, closed, too heavily dependent on an ‘al-
embracing trial’, formalistic, inflexible, complex847. In a similar vein the 
American Bar Association emphatically stated: “the courts of our country are in 
crisis. The failure of state and local legislatures to provide adequate funding is effectively -at 
times quite literally- closing the doors of our justice system848”. The crisis of legal system 
as litigation explosion is one of the common starting points for 
ADR/informalism proponents to claim that society must develop ways of 
reducing adversary trials, the “anachronistic confrontation of resources in preparing and 
conducting trials849”. The goal is to readdress adversarial services into a less 
alienating and more cost-effective systems for parties directly involved850. Even 
if we must notice the presence in the ADR/informalist literature of 
disagreement regarding the dimensions (and indeed the very existence) of such 
a litigation explosion851, the crisis of the legal system as litigation explosion 
appears a theoretical pillar of this narrative as well as a crucial conceptual 
framework to understand the RJ’s idea of ‘legal system’ as something to be 
changed or replaced.  
 
3.1.4.4. Discursive objects (strategies): The necessity of harmonious and consensual 
relationships 
The discursive construction of the main goal of the RJ as the re-definition of 
harmonious relationships between parties involved in conflicts (as well as the 
same definition of ‘harmonious relationships’) is a discursive strategy emerging 
from the informal justice/ADR surface. “Harmony ideology852” has been widely 
considered the ideological core of informal justice/ADR theories and 
practices. According to this narrative, the adversary and harmony models of 
law reflect different ideals and awareness. The first engenders actions “based on 
the notion of injustice and on an understanding of power differential and recognition that 
organizing pressure on the political and economic forces that generate their disputes is 
primary853”. Fundamental issues in this perspective are those of class, race, and 
gender. The harmony model “comes together around values of consensus settlement and 
the management of social disorder through healers of human conflict854” that reduces 
“power differentials and articulates the notion that disputes are generated in relationships by 
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the failure of individuals to act as they should855”. The adversary model is practically 
concerned to improve the provision of legal services, reducing court 
congestion, trial costs, improving access to legal dispute processing. 
Furthermore, the “hope that society could be restructured through new forms of popular 
justice856” and the project of individual empowerment, in which legal 
informalism is meant to permit individuals “to take greater control over their own 
lives, enhances their personal skills in dealing with conflict, and endows them with techniques 
they can apply to other situations857” appear as basic tenets (or foundational 
principles) of the ADR/informal justice. They represent the discursive space 
within which emerges the authoritative strategy of portraying the RJ as the new 
panacea for the criminal justice, based on a constructive/harmonious 
understanding of social relationships. Moreover the authoritative procedural 
discourses on the RJ emphasize almost consistently the role of the conveners 
to re-create harmonious relationshps among parties involved, often 
conceptualizing the restorative ‘practices’ as consensus-based decision-making 
processes.  
 
3.1.4.5. Limits of Informality: State’s power 
The discursive strategies used to criticize the RJ ‘from within’, i.e. by 
proponents engaged in academic reflections and advocacy of the RJ, seem 
widely understandable if put in relation with the surface under analysis. The 
archive of the RJ, in fact, includes self-critical authoritative discourses which 
make condemnations of the RJ based on the idea that the RJ extends state 
power and supervision, borrowing judicial language, and therefore reproducing 
its dynamics are probably the most recurrent and actually reaching the state of 
‘authoritative’ criticisms. Such a tangle of criticisms seems to ‘reproduce’ the 
disagreements typical of the ADR/informal surface. The literature on the 
ADR/informal justice, in fact, shows a remarkable quantity of writings about 
the theoretical and practical limits of such a construct, at different levels. A 
good starting point in this regard, is the well-known publication in the 1982, of 
The Politics of Informal Justice by the already cited Abel. This book has to some 
extent shaped the debate about the limits of informal justice858. The basic claim 
of this work is that informal justice initiatives expand state power according to 
non-state forms, concealed by the ‘carefully cultivated’ illusion of non-
coerciveness859. Abel shows how both the expansion and contraction of legal 
informalism, both formal and informal forms of dispute processing, serve the 
interests of capital and class domination. But, since he was still attached to the 
ideal of ‘liberation’, Abel was forced to conclude that informalism does still 
“express values that deservedly elicit broad allegiance860”, and identified an underlying 
‘potential’ which might be brought to the surface and realized only if legal 
informalism is linked to broader political and social movements. “Informalism”, 
wrote Abel, “is not an end in itself, but it can be a very important means in the struggle for 
justice861”. Much of the critical scholarship inspired by Abel has examined the 
relationships between the informal/ADR construct with the existing legal 
processes and has looked at the ways informal justice initiatives maintain or 
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challenge these processes. The first wave of critical socio-legal research on 
informalism examined its social control function, i.e., the ways it promotes 
conformity to norms. This early work on informalism describes the ADRS as a 
product of the changing nature of state power and corresponding changes in 
the form of law862. Together, the state and its legal apparatus have generated 
new forms of social control863. According to the social control perspective, 
informalism represents the expansion of state power, but the form of state 
power represented by informalism is significantly different from traditional 
state social control mechanisms864. There is a certain irony, if not ambiguity, in 
this particular form of social control because it adopts the language of the 
helping professions, the language of anti-coercion and anti-punishment. The 
symbols of community participation, represented by concepts such as 
neighborhood justice and community justice, are not merely masks for state 
power but are expressions of it. This critique of informalism does not, 
however, reinstate the “myth of rights”, it identifies the “politics of rights865”. It 
keeps alive on-going debates concerning the limits of rights as a vehicle for 
social change by examining the different social ordering functions of various 
forms of dispute processing, the relationship of informalism to formalism, and 
the limitations of a law-centered view of socio-legal relations866. Within the 
critical tradition, another perspective on the spot has emerged in recent years. 
It stresses the role of human agency, as well as the constraints of social 
structure, and argues that informalism may in some instances function to resist 
state law. In this view, informalism enhances legal pluralism. The social control 
perspective is cast as having produced pessimism about informal justice, 
deregulation, and popular justice, which Maureen Cain claims results from a 
“failure to distinguish between types of informal justice in a theoretically adequate way867”. 
These scholars agree that the social control perspective on informalism has 
“overemphasized social structural influences and underplayed the degrees of autonomy that 
community justice institutions can have868”. Roger Matthews drew attention to the 
fact that the formal legal apparatus had in fact expanded, and between 1950 
and 1980 the number of lawyers had doubled; rather than a process of de-
professionalisation, an expanding array of professionals had simply been 
supplemented with another layer of para-professionals; law had become more 
rather than less complex, opaque and expensive869. The main lines of criticism 
centered on the notion of legal informalism being a ‘trojan horse’ for ever 
more cunning state penetration of social life, an ever widening net of social 
control, and Matthews identified this critique’s core concerns as: double 
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tracking, ineffectiveness, relegitimation of law and the expansion of social 
control870. The concept of double-tracking refers to the fact that instead of 
operating as an alternative to formal procedures of dispute-processing, what 
appeared to have happened is that informal justice simply augmented formal 
processes and structures. New clientele were being dealt with by the informal 
processes, so that “a central paradox of the movement towards informal justice was that it 
succeeded in formalizing the informal871”. They dealt mostly with interpersonal 
conflicts, consumer complaints, and public order offences, and the majority of 
disputants were black and female, attracting the criticism that informal 
processes seemed to be generating a ‘second-class’ set of legal procedures. For 
Yves Dezalay, this contrast between ‘high’ and ‘low’ justice is a central feature 
of law in liberal class-divided societies, and the ongoing cohabitation of the 
two forms of law an essential elements of the continuing legitimacy of law872. 
Numerous authoritative criticism present in the archive, regarding historical, 
conceptual of practical profiles of the RJ can be understood if analyzed in light 
of the critical literature on the informal justice/ADR. Particularly, the stances 
on the criminal/legal colonization of the RJ (Cunneen, Pavlich), the 
endorsement of racial and sexual ‘unbalances’ (Daly, Brigg, Blagg), the 
promotion of an ‘exclusive’ way of dealing with conflicts which reproduces the 
exclusionary mechanisms of any community (Crawford), all these critical 
remarks look like ‘reflexes’ of the informal justice/ADR construct in the 
discursive field of the RJ. 
 
3.2. From the ‘external’ conditions to the ‘internal’ relationships 
The scientific knowledge on the victims of crimes, articulated with the claims 
of the grassroots victims organizations, the abolitionist/communitarian 
construct, the psy-knowledge combined with spiritual claims and the informal 
justice/ADR theories, represent the conditions of intelligibility of the RJ, the 
nexus of sense which makes possible their understanding, not only to us but 
also to the proponents of the RJ. In fact, the contingent actions undertaken by 
proponents over the last fourty/thirty years, have become a meaningful 
configuration thanks to the aforementioned surfaces of emergence. They are 
not only a methodological tools which enable us to understand the historical 
emergence and theoretical justifications of the RJ, but the backdrop against 
which ‘borderline’ interventions and reflections in criminal justice have been 
casted, contingently composing the magmatic ‘true’ knowledge on the RJ. At 
this point, we can wonder how the discursive objects are ‘held together’, how 
they constitute a ‘unified’ discursive formation. As already discussed in the 
chapter 2, Foucault gives some indications for a discursive formation to be ‘a 
unity’. Firstly, to refer to the same object “does not enable one to individualize a 
group of statements and to establish between them a relation that is both constant and 
describable873”. Even though the discourses that constitute the discursive 
formation refer to the same object, it is not possible to derive its coherence 
through it because the object does not possess a pre-discursive identity, but 
rather is constituted by the discursive framework in which it is implicated874. 
Therefore, the object is the result of the different discourses that take it as an 
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object of study. Secondly, it is incorrect to define a group of statements by a 
definite style, or a correspondence in vocabulary or metaphor. Thus, if there is 
a unity, it is not based on a naïve idea of the resemblance of statements. 
Thirdly, a unity of a discursive formation cannot be drawn from concepts and 
their use in a specific discourse, since they are not always logically connected. 
Concepts are often heterogeneous and even incompatible with other concept 
used in a given field875. Lastly, it is a wrong hypothesis to seek the principle of 
the unity of a discursive formation in the existence of the identity and 
persistence of themes876. Foucault asserts that “it is legitimate in the first instance 
suppose that a certain thematic is capable of linking, and animating a group of discourses877”. 
The same theme may occur in different discursive formations and 
contradictory themes may be employed in the same discourse. The unity of a 
discursive formation refers then to “the historically positioned relations between 
discursive objects which ensure the interplay of their appearances and dispersions, 
transformations and erasure878”. For this reason, it does not suffice the purpose of 
this chapter (unpacking the discursive formation of the RJ), just to identify the 
discursive space within which the main explanations and justifications of the 
RJ become comprehensible. In the next pages I will then focus on the 
relationships between the discursive objects previously identified, analyzing the 
processes of delimitation, constraint, exclusion which make possible, form a 
dynamic perspective, the archive. I will look at the ‘internal structure’ of the 
archive i.e. how the authority of the authoritative discourses actually ‘works’, at 
their ‘internal’ epistemic/conceptual conditions once their ‘external’ conditions 
of intelligibility/possibility have been re-constructed. As Foucault claims “in 
every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and 
redistributed by a […] number of procedures879”. These concerns lead to his emphasis 
of the fact that discourse is both that which constrains or enables, writing, 
speaking, thinking. These processes, of formation and constraint, production 
and exclusion, are inseparable. More than this, they are both complimentary 
and constitutive of one another. The archive of the RJ exists through their 
mutual constitution880. 
 
3.2.1. Authorities of delimitation  
As Foucault said a discursive formation “[…] is made possible by a group of relations 
established between authorities of emergence, delimitation, and specification881”. 
Accordingly it is necessary to complement the analysis of the surfaces of 
emergence of the RJ with two other elements, at the same time conceptual 
constructs and methodological tools. Focusing on them is possible to grasp the 
‘internal’ functioning of the archive of the RJ. The first element is what 
Foucault calls the “authorities of delimitation882”. Who have the authority to 
delimit, designate, name, and define the RJ’s discursive objects? Who has the 
‘right to speak’ in the authoritative accounts on the RJ? These authorities are 
groups which are able to produce an expert knowledge over RJ, organizing the 
field in which the legitimacy or not of a particular account of the RJ appears 
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and is contested. The ‘authorities of delimitation’ are the subjects entitled to 
decide what is valid or invalid, true or false and legitimate or illegitimate within 
the discourse have specific conditions. They are considered legitimate as they 
speak from a certain “enunciative modality883” or subject position. This authority 
is reinforced by norms, practices and institutions which ‘certify’, for instance, 
the psychiatrist, the criminologist or the mediator, as performing actions with a 
certain (epistemic/conceptual) legitimacy. This authority in turn allows its 
possessors to create certain parameters (or “margins of tolerance884”) of normative 
behaviours. Once something or someone falls outside these legitimate margins, 
it emerges as an object to be designated and investigated and then rejected as 
being outside of the agreed perceived norms. It therefore needs to be defined 
by another group or authority. To sum up, these ‘authorities’ have the ability to 
‘delimit’, ‘designate’, ‘name’, and define human constructions such as crime, 
disability, disease etc.885. They are taken up by ‘experts’ with a certain kind of 
knowledge. Foucault asserts that these experts are not necessarily the original 
authors of everything they make statements of authority about886. Accordingly, 
it is essential to understand that it is not necessarily who produces the 
statements but the role of authorities of delimitation which is of relevant if we 
want to describe how the discursive formation of the RJ actually works. In this 
perspective, the crime victims’ movement appears one of the strongest 
authorities in the construction of the discourses on the RJ. Similarly, religious 
leaders (Quakers, Mennonites) have had a relevant role in the creation of the 
authoritative conceptualizations of the RJ. The professional psy-expertise 
involved in the criminal justice reform is another significant authority of 
delimitation. Lastly, a specific academic category represented by criminologists 
has played a role in the set-up and development of those narratives. Their 
‘institutional site’ of speaking is characterized by one main aspect: they are 
experts on the ‘nature’ of the issues at stake (crime/conflict, victim, offender, 
community, restoration). Their enunciative modality is basically the primacy 
respect to the ‘object’ of the offender. An authority which is clearly missing 
among those who have produced the expert knowledge on the RJ, is of course 
an ‘offenders’ movement’. Therefore, who discursively creates the needs of the 
offender in the RJ? The question is easily answered: crime victims’ leaders, 
criminologists, psy-experts and religious authorities. Their accounts on 
offender’s needs, views, behaviours etc., are not balanced by the presence of a 
group directly representative of the offender’s claims. The difference is 
therefore that victims’ needs are elaborated by a specific interest organization 
and then filtered by the scientific knowledge of criminologists, psy-experts and 
religious leaders whereas the offender’s perspective is entirely shaped by these 
authorities. Probably, the only counter-balance in the definition of the 
offender’s identity in the authoritative accounts on the RJ is embodied in the 
human rights movement which has slowly come to deal with the RJ initiatives. 
In this ‘subject’ it is possible to see a potential authority of delimitation able to 
create a narrative on the offender ‘qualitatively’ divergent from the victim’s 
movement perspective, first and foremost because built on a different 
preliminary understanding of the position of the offender, his/her needs and 
rights. 
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3.2.2. Grids of specification 
The knowledge that experts use as basis for their authority, is part of what 
Foucault calls the “grids of specification887”, i.e. specific structures of knowledge. 
The grids work in a circular way: they legitimize the experts’ positions and the 
statement they produce, and at the same time are ‘made true’ and reproduced 
by the experts’ work, as “a field of circular causality888”. The grids of specification 
are composed of all the knowledge -legitimate and illegitimate- encompassing a 
certain discourse. The ‘authorities of delimitation’ select from these 
frameworks what they deem legitimate knowledge, and discard or de-
legitimatize what is not. Besides specific knowledge, the grids produce also 
binary oppositions, for instance between what is ‘true’ and what ‘false’. This 
opposition is crucial to appreciate not only how the authorities of delimitation 
‘use’ the grids of specification, but also how both embody specific power 
relations, mainly expresses by the generation of the legitimate ‘truth’ by 
refusing other statements, designated as false. This opposition can be described 
as “games of truth889”, i.e. the dynamic definition and exclusion of statements 
according to their ‘nature’ as true or false, a nature which is deep-seated in 
power relations, shaped as legitimate knowledge, administered by expert 
authorities, and delimited by particular rules890. In our case, the grids of 
specification are then the frameworks of knowledge underpinning the 
demarcation, description, classification of the RJ performed by the authorities 
of delimitation. In this regard, and more precisely, the authoritative 
explanations appear to be built on the opposition between continuistic/non-
continuistic histories whereas the conceptualizations are based on the core 
comparison with the criminal justice. In many authoritative explanations, the 
events, developments, inventions regarding the RJ seem to be linked in a 
continuous and necessarily progressive evolution. It is a linear history 
consisting of a series of events, progressing or regressing in a certain direction, 
usually culminating in the belief that the current period of time is somehow 
fundamentally unique from and superior to any other period of time891. 
Additionally, in the discussion of the RJ origins, events are often considered as 
‘agents’ that can bring about other historical events. In this causal perspective, 
we see the RJ as a product of a genetic connection between some specific 
phenomena (the cause, e.g. the breakdown of criminal justice) under certain 
conditions (e.g. the emergence of a crime victim movement). On the other 
side, we detect the presence of non-continuistic histories which stress the 
innovation brought by the RJ, its link to the late-modernity of western 
societies. Looking at the explanatory authoritative discourses as integral to a 
specific grid of specification, it can be emphasized a last aspect. The RJ is often 
considered a functional ‘answer’ to a specific ‘crisis’, or ‘lack’ and ‘needs’. 
Accordingly, it possible to define these accounts as ‘functionalist’. Underlying 
the authoritative explanations is the idea that social reality is a complex 
system whose parts work together to promote stability. In this perspective, 
when a deficiency or a surplus is present in social reality some natural reactions 
come into being filling the gap or eliminating the excess. Approximately this 
idea underlines the rising of the RJ: a critical situation (breakdown of criminal 
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justice) asks for a solution (the rise of the RJ). As for the authoritative 
conceptualizations, they appear to be always fabricated in reference to the 
criminal justice system, intended as a magmatic mindset, an ensemble of 
professionals, institutional structures and expert knowledge. This reference can 
be critical and oppositional or constructive and positive, i.e. the RJ is 
conceptualized as either an alternative or complementary (to different degrees) 
to the criminal justice. 
 
3.2.3. Points of Diffractions  
The epistemic/conceptual authority of the archive of the RJ, expresses itself in 
defining who can speak and how, what can be talked about the causes, 
concepts and practices of the RJ. Its sources are specific cultural/political 
constructs which have gradually made acceptable the authoritative discourses, 
as a part of our collective imaginary in dealing with crimes. At this point two 
last remarks must be done. The first regards the relationships within and 
between the surfaces of emergence, which so far I described as isolated and 
inactive entities, focusing on their tensions and combinations. The second 
remark is in regard of the dynamic construction of the archive. The surfaces of 
emergence are ‘static’ factors; the problem is to set-in-motion them in order to 
understand how the authoritative discourses have become possible. Starting 
from the first point, it has already been mentioned how the new criminological 
knowledge on victims shapes the identity of the two main actors of the RJ. 
Victim and offender seem to ‘find’ their needs, claims and identities in the 
victimological research, which ‘lands out’ its categories and an overall 
perspective to the authoritative rationalizations of the RJ. At the same time 
emerges a particular tension between the categories of victim and offender as 
conceptualized in the authoritative accounts. In fact, while the presence of a 
crime victim movement filters the identity of victim worked out by the 
victimological research (and crime victims’ movement), the absence of an 
‘offenders’ movement’ defines a kind of lack which potentially affects the role 
of the offender in the RJ theory and practice. This gap between the categories 
of victim and offender in the authoritative accounts, expresses itself in the less 
nuanced identity of the offender, usually depicted as just the counterpart of the 
victim, the ‘other’ silenced by the expert discourses which speak in his/her 
behalf, asking for being ashamed, restoratively punished or pushed toward 
reparation. The existence of epistemic tensions is not only integral to the same 
surface of emergence but can be detected also between them. This is the case 
of the relationship between abolitionist/communitarian discourses and the 
victimological knowledge. What can be easily distinguished is the presence of a 
“point of diffraction892” which characterizes this relationship. Victimological 
research in fact, takes for granted what abolitionism accounts deeply 
deconstruct: the concept of crime (over-determined in victimology and 
deconstructed in the abolitionism). Similarly, the abolitionism/communitarian 
view ‘clashes’ against the spiritual/therapeutic perspective. In the first 
discursive construct, de-professionalization and communitarian regulation of 
problematic situations are unquestionable points. On the other hand, the 
spiritual/therapeutic discourses imply the strong and regulative presence of 
experts, creating a vertical way of regulating social conflicts, which, as a 
consequence of this expert intervention, become inner conflicts. This epistemic 
shift in ‘knowing’ the conflict is a relevant point of diffraction between those 
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two surfaces of emergences. These kinds of tensions have implications for the 
authoritative discourses on the RJ. For instance, the contraposition between 
the different concepts of ‘trigger event’ or the various declinations of 
‘restoration’ seem to be related to the tension abovementioned. The distinction 
between conflict, harm, normative violation or restitution and reparation, the 
link with the punishment and the criminal justice, are all depending on 
different (and divergent) kinds of knowledge which ‘ground’ the different 
authoritative discourses. 
 
3.2.4. Thresholds of emergence 
The second, aforementioned observation is about what Foucault calls the 
“thresholds of emergence893” and its application to the authoritative accounts on the 
RJ. These thresholds are the historical phases faced up by a discourse in order 
to achieve its epistemic authority (or scientificity). Foucault identifies four 
thresholds: positivity, epistemologization, scientificity and formalization894. In the case 
of the archive of the RJ, we can consider the ‘positivities’ as the borderline 
innovative practices of dealing with crimes which in the 1980s will become the 
target of the rationalization carried out by the authoritative discourses on the 
RJ (e.g. Kitchener experiment). Slowly, a system of forming statements 
explaining and justifying those practices can be discerned. This is the hard core 
of many authoritative discourses, characterized for a low level of abstraction 
and a strong procedural attention drawn to the practices such as VOM or 
family conferencing. The epistemologization, i.e. the development of a refined 
epistemic authority and of specific discursive objects and themes, is related to 
the particular ‘retrieval’ of some theoretical writings which originally were not 
meant to contribute to the RJ at all. This is the case of the ‘sacred texts’ of the 
RJ, the seminal contributions which have been representing the hard core of 
the authoritative discourses. Authors such as Christie, Barnett and Eglash, 
widely considered as pioneers in the RJ theory, wrote independently and way 
before the birth of the restorative movement, accordingly ignoring its claims. 
Only from the 1980s the proponents of the RJ started to re-frame those 
writings, taking possession of them as the ‘forefathers’ words’ on the RJ. In 
this way the authoritative discourses on the RJ have gained a more structured 
and refined epistemic authority, i.e. a theoretical pedigree certified by the 
scientific reputation of the ‘forefathers’. The scientific threshold is then 
reached by the emergence of the new criminological knowledge on the crime 
victims combined with the therapeutic expert knowledge (as a secularized 
version of the spiritual/religious one) on the needs of victims and offenders. 
The formalization threshold is lastly attained through the growing of the legal 
codification of many authoritative accounts on the RJ895. This is probably the 
uttermost certification of the authority of those accounts in defining 
(normatively) the possibility of what can be said and done in the RJ field. What 
must be stressed regarding these thresholds is that they are not regular and 
successive historical stages. Neither are they definitive and necessary phases in 
the evolution of the authoritative discourses. In fact, antagonistic accounts 
often are put forward, destabilizing the epistemic authority of the former ones. 
These thresholds are instead the living and magmatic history of the 
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authoritative accounts on the RJ, a dynamic ensemble of institutions, practices, 
academic arguments and practical experiences contingently linked together and 
synchronically interacting which give to the RJ’s edifice that appearance of a 
multifaceted, shifting and conflicting reality. 
 
3.2.5. External systems of exclusion 
The authoritative discourses on the RJ work also through a series of 
exclusionary mechanisms which make possible the emergence of certain 
objects instead of others. As Hook writes896, the first exclusionary mechanisms 
Foucault deals with are the social procedures of prohibition which correspond 
roughly to “taboos, rituals and privileges of the speaking subject897”. These forms of 
prohibition seem fairly straightforward and Foucault does not spend much 
time in elaborating them898. Accordingly I will not dwell on this exclusionary 
mechanism. A second, more complex and interesting (for this work) exclusion 
mechanism operating within the order of discourse is the opposition between 
true and false. We have already identified the combination between authorities 
of delimitation/grids of specification as a crucial condition for the production 
of legitimate (or true) statement regarding whichever entity. Thinking in terms 
of external systems of exclusion means to complement that analysis, illustrating 
the specific form of truth-claims produced thanks to that combination. Our 
‘will to truth’, is, Foucault claims, something “like a system of exclusion, a historical, 
modifiable, and institutionally constraining system899”. Which are then the claims of 
truth held by the authoritative discourses? First of all, we can focus on the 
truths regarding the identity of the RJ’s stakeholders (victim, offender and 
community). The first truth regards the ‘ontological’ distinction between these 
three entities. Probably as consequence of their surfaces of emergence, the 
authoritative discourses take for granted that victim, offender and community 
are three distinguishable and necessary distinct entities with different ‘natural’ 
identities, needs, claims, features, histories. The authoritative accounts are built 
upon this distinction, as the prescribed ways of dealing with them are based on 
that separation. The possibilities of overlapping are mainly excluded. The 
possibility of ‘role reversal’ is simply denied. The idea that victim, offender and 
community are ‘roles’, is just neglected, or defined as false. A second truth is 
that behind the crime there is always a conflict or a source of harm/loss. This 
truth, shaped as objective discourse emerging from the 
communitarian/abolitionist surface, is one of the milestones of RJ 
authoritative discourses. The possibility that crimes might not imply any 
conflict, or damage and loss regarding the people directly involved, is 
obliterated. A third truth is that the criminal justice does not work. This 
discursive object rooted in the ADR/informal justice construct, is another 
certainty of the authoritative accounts. The idea of a ‘criminal justice’ as not 
easily definable entity which is in crisis since ever, excludes any appreciation of 
any possible constructive function performed by this ‘system’, dubbing as false 
this positive appraisal. The idea that between parties involved in 
crime/conflicts, stands normally a ‘relationship’ to be addresses is a recurrent 
truth which excludes the possibility of discard the restorative intervention in 
favor of punishment for instance, defining as false the denial of ‘link’ between 
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parties. The claim of healing potential of the communication, regarding the 
relationship altered by the conflict/crime is another truth purported by the 
authoritative accounts. This statement excludes the possibility that parties 
might not want any communication between them, not looking at it as a 
healing mechanism. This truth additionally imposes the ‘meeting’ between 
parties as privileged site of healing, excluding the possibility that parties would 
claim the distance or avoidance as healing mechanism 
The “will to truth900” is a crucial component in the workings of a successful 
discourse901. The strongest discourses are those which have attempted to 
ground themselves on the natural, the sincere, the scientific -in short, on the 
level of the various correlates of the ‘true’ and reasonable. This situation is 
aptly characterized by Said when he notes: “the will to exercise […] control in society 
and history has also discovered a way to clothe, disguise, rarefy and wrap itself systematically 
in the language of truth, discipline, rationality, utilitarian value, and knowledge. And this 
language in its naturalness, authority, professionalism, assertiveness and anti-theoretical 
directness is […] discourse902”. In the case of the authoritative discourses of RJ, 
their ‘truthfulness’ is anchored to several scientific grounds. The existence of 
counter-discourses within the RJ literature exposes the limits of the 
mainstream truths of the RJ. Nevertheless, scientific ground is offered by the 
victimological knowledge, especially trough victimization reports which work 
as both explanation and justification of the RJ historical emergence. The 
‘quantitative’ criticism regarding the legal justice system, included in the 
ADR/informal justice literature reinforces that ground. 
The “fabrication of divisions903” is another mechanism of external exclusion. 
According this procedure, operating along the lines of ‘division and rejection’, 
certain utterances are rejected by complex processes anchored in dividing and 
sorting, for example the right from the wrong, the irrational from the rational, 
the sane from the mad. For example, ‘rational’ discourses often function to 
exclude the discourses and experiences of the “irrational other904”. In the case of 
RJ’s accounts, multiple divisions stand as milestones. The distinctions 
operating within the discursive formation of the RJ, mainly oppose victim and 
offender, crime and conflict, community and state, restoration and 
punishment, just to recall the main ones. These binaries oppositions continue 
to influence academic, political and media discourses, as well as subjectivity, a 
theme I elaborate further in next chapter. The “censorship905” is the last external 
exclusionary mechanism. Rules of exclusion prohibit speaking about certain 
objects (sexuality, for example, or politics), arrange certain rituals and 
circumstances in which it is permissible to do so, and grant certain people (and 
exclude others therefrom) the exclusive right to do so. Speech is not the mere 
“verbalization of conflicts and systems of domination, but […] is the very object of man’s 
conflicts906”. The prohibitions in authoritative accounts on RJ are various. The 
idea that community would be a criminogenic factor instead as a positive 
stakeholder, the denial of overlapping between victim and offender, the 
impossibility of restoration, the will to revenge or punish as legitimate are all 
objects of prohibition. 
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3.2.6. Internal systems of exclusion 
There are also a number of exclusions which work internally to discourse. 
Foucault identifies as the main ones the discipline, the author and the commentary. 
Each of these permits the generation of new discourses “virtually ad infinitum -
although within certain limits of constraint907”. As for the commentary, Foucault argues 
that every society has its major and privileged narratives which “lie at the origins 
of a certain number of new verbal acts, which are reiterated, transformed, or discussed908”. 
The idea underpinning the ‘commentary’ as a system of exclusion, is that 
originality is impossible while inter-textuality, as the use of pre-existing 
discourses as reservoirs for the construction of other narratives, is just 
unavoidable. At the same time the ‘authority’ of the commentaries entails the 
de-qualification (and then the exclusion) of lowly narratives as potential 
‘footings’ of new discourses. Commentary’s role is to re-articulate and re-enact 
what has already been said: it “gives us the opportunity to say something other than the 
text itself, but on condition that it is the text itself which is uttered and, in some way, 
finalized909”. Foucault distinguishes these foundational narratives of a society in 
primary (foundational religious, juridical or scientific texts) and secondary 
cultural texts910. It is due to “the ‘top-heaviness’ of primary texts that they will remain 
permanent, yet ever capable of being brought up to date, revisited for hidden or multiple 
meanings911”. The commentary “gives us the opportunity to say something other than the 
text itself, but on condition that it is the text itself which is uttered912”. Foucault’s point 
here is that we overestimate “the importance of originality and freedom in everyday 
discourse when in fact much of what is spoken is really the product of repetition, or discursive 
‘re-circulation’913”. Which are the commentaries upon which the authoritative 
accounts on RJ are written? The theories of punishment, social control, but 
also theories of psychological and spiritual development, theories of justice 
especially in western countries seem to play the role of condition for the 
authoritative texts of the RJ, to be produced and kept alive as understandable 
set of principles. In our case, the commentaries refer to the proliferation of 
interpretations by various authors about the ‘true meaning’ of ‘primary’ RJ’s 
texts. They are secondary narratives which accumulate to build a textual 
hierarchy about what can be said or thought about a particular topic or theme. 
This mass of commentary has the potential then, to produce new discourse. A 
specific dimension of commentary is the citational network, which is based on 
the practices of citing the works of particular authors to support or 
alternatively dismiss their standpoints. Along with the other internal rules, 
commentary plays a key role in establishing the conditions of possibility of 
contemporary and future scholarly work by constructing dominant and 
subordinate knowledges. Another mechanism of internal exclusion is that of 
the author914. Foucault means the author in the sense of a principle or grouping 
of discourse, a focus of coherence, a unity and origin of meaning915. Whereas 
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commentary restrains the potential hazards of discourse through the repetition 
and similarity, the ‘author’ limits this same possible and unforeseeable 
discursive developments, through the identity of individuality and the ‘I’916. 
Although the principle of the author is obviously not to be found in each 
instance of discourse, it is a crucial foundation of the legitimacy and truth of 
certain statements917. In “What is an author?”, Foucault develops this 
conceptions affirming that the ‘author-function’ must not be thought as a 
creative, inventing capacity, but rather as a multifaceted and mutable discursive 
function which refers to the existence of certain groups of discourse 
(associated with the author in question) and affirms their status within a given 
time/space918. Asking “what matter who’s speaking?919”, as Hook emphasizes, 
Foucault “inverts the typical causal assumption of author-generates-discourse to ask how 
discourse instead give(s) rise to subjects (like authors) with privileged positions (and a series of 
related possible subject-positions)920”. Instead of examining what the author 
individually produces in the texts, Foucault “suggests we ask instead about what 
possible subject-positions are made possible within such texts921”. Different and 
interconnected are the main factors of grouping the authoritative discourses of 
RJ, disguised behind the voices of individual authors. The opposition to the 
criminal justice system, the reframing of crime as conflict/harm, the attention 
to the psychological/spiritual reality, altogether these principles compose the 
‘author-function’ of the authoritative accounts, the condition of their unity as a 
common body of thoughts, attitudes, means and ends. Accordingly, it is 
neither the work of the ‘founding’ fathers nor the intuitions and achievements 
of the pioneer practitioners of the RJ to give coherence to the authoritative 
discourses. It is indeed, the complex process of inclusion/exclusion of 
statements, articulated by specific expert authorities in reference to specific 
knowledge embedded in certain power relations, which works as ‘author-like’ 
generative mechanism of truths on the RJ. 
The discipline is the last internal principle of discursive limitation. A legitimate 
disciplinary statement is depends on a variety of conditions, related to the 
appropriate domain of objects, theories, methods, propositions, rules, 
definitions, techniques and instruments922. Disciplines are “defined by groups of 
objects, methods, their corpus of propositions considered to be true, the interplay of rules and 
definitions, of techniques and tools: all these constitute a sort of anonymous system923”. A 
discipline is neither the “sum total of all truths that may be uttered concerning 
something924” nor the “total of all that may be accepted, by virtue of some principle of 
coherence or systematization, concerning some given fact or proposition925”. For a 
proposition to belong to a discipline, it must fulfill certain conditions other 
than mere truth: it must refer to a specifically delimited range of objects and it 
must utilize certain “conceptual instruments and techniques of a well-defined type926”. For 
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a proposition to be considered true, it must accommodate itself to the 
theoretical field that prevails in the discipline into which it is inserted. The 
authoritative discourses of the RJ work out as a discipline, i.e. a delimited range 
of interplaying discursive objects, which define the standards of which 
statement is possible to include and which ones to exclude from the same 
discipline. Insofar as they are disciplinary discourses, they embody 
‘automatically’ the exclusionary process proper of any discipline. In our case, 
this discipline is concerned with the control of ‘problematic situations’ at a 
societal level, looking at the individualization of social control as a mean/end 
to be achieved. Moreover, it excludes ‘top-down’ explanations on the 
emergence of conflicts, de-qualifying ‘external’ and coercive means of 
intervention as invading the personal and societal space where conflicts arise. 
In short, the internal systems of exclusion contribute to shape the discursive 
formation of the RJ, as a variable range of phenomena which govern what has 
been possible to think, say and experience about the RJ, in a given space/time. 
The concepts of commentary, author and discipline helps us to recognize the 
restraining ‘forces’ operative in the authoritative discourse. The re-circulation 
of statement, the author-like grouping of discourses and the delimitation of 
rigid disciplinary fields, work as complex of “restrictive and 
constraining927”conditions for the creation of true and (false) statements on the 
RJ.  
 
3.3. ‘Beyond’ the discursive formation  
The archive indispensably requires the re-construction of its conditions of 
intelligibility/possibility and a careful analysis of the epistemic/conceptual 
conditions of its authority. This means to re-construct the articulation of 
cultural constructs, historically positioned, which make the discourses on the 
RJ a meaningful configuration of concepts and strategies. The discursive 
formation is nothing but the archive from a different perspective, a perspective 
which unveils those historical conditions which are necessary part of the 
archive itself. To analyze the discursive formation of the RJ means moreover 
to look at the dynamic relationships between the archive’s basic units 
(discursive objects) which make the archive ‘authoritative’. Stopping the 
analysis at this point would mean to risk reproducing discourses detached from 
the political processes which ‘embed’ them within power/knowledge 
relationships. Discourses cannot be separated by their political performativity. 
As Hook writes, “without reference to the underwriting political conditions of knowledge 
and without reference to the political frame of what constitutes reasonable knowledge, 
discursive analytic procedures will only be able to make isolated comments, with a 
generalizability and political relevance limited to the reference point of the analyzed texts928”. 
Moreover, without reference to the subjectivating effect of the archive, the 
problematization would remain largely condemned to say nothing about 
individuals involved- and constructed- in those discourses as ‘victim’, 
‘offender’ and ‘community’. In order to unify the political and subjectivating 
dimension of the RJ, the analytic efforts included in the next chapters will be 
shaped as the examination of the political rationality, articulated in specific 
political technologies, which is the ‘context’ of the RJ and then the basis for 
the analysis of the power/subjectivity nexus. This double operation makes 
possible to overcome the shortcomings of a pure ‘discursive’ analysis, opening 
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up a way toward the RJ apparatus. In short, the methodological injunctions 
prioritized by Foucault regarding the ‘discursive’ analysis, can be better 
deployed within the ambit of a critical work which locates the archive within 
the broader analysis of power and subjectivity.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE POLITICAL RATIONALITY OF THE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
 
“[...] power can retreat here, re-organize its forces, invest itself elsewhere [...] and so the battle 
continues929”. 
 
4.0. Introductory remarks 
This chapter focuses on the ‘political rationality’ which is integral to the 
emergence of the discursive formation of the RJ. The questions to be 
addressed are: what is the logic of the inscription of the RJ into the social and 
individual ‘body’? Which are the political conditions which contribute to make 
the RJ intelligible and possible? The assumption which leads this part of my 
research is that the discursive formation of the RJ responds to a specific 
political rationality, ‘operationalized’ through a panoply of political 
technologies930. The analytical and conceptual reservoir elaborated by Nikolas 
Rose is a constant reference point in the next sections. Particularly, the 
concepts of ethopolitics and ethopolitical technologies play a role in the 
understanding of the ‘political rationality’ of the RJ. Ethopolitics is style of 
governing not reducible to a particular political philosophy, but rather is 
characterized by its type of technologies931, inscribed in the framework of neo-
liberal governmentality. This means that ethopolitical technologies 
complement the neo-liberal transformation of the market from a limited form 
of social action to the organizational principle for society932, contributing to the 
redefinition of individual/collective ethos of the homo economicus as self-
managing, self-responsible and self-controlling. However, ethopolitics is here 
used as a conceptual construct/analytical tool without direct reference to the 
Rose’s crucial idea of ‘molecuralization’ of life and to how scientific 
developments have changed conceptions of human identity and governance. 
Yet, differently from Rose, I will focus on other ‘media’ and ‘effects’ of 
ethopolitics. Securitization, refeudalization of governance, and psy-
individualization are not alternative to the rise of genetics or biological 
citizenship as ‘explanans’ and ‘explanandum’ of ethopolitics, they are just other 
variants. Here ethopolitics is thought as the political rationality which ‘evolves’ 
the biopolitics embodied in the archetypical welfare state. The ethopolitical 
‘rise’ is represented by the neo-liberal shift from a political system engaged in 
granting collective well-being, to fostering of self-managing competences of 
individuals, in short: from the ‘taking care’ of the social (and individual) bios, to 
political colonization of the individual (and social) ethos. Such colonization is 
implemented by specific political technologies shaping post-social citizens933.  
 
4.1. From Biopolitics to Ethopolitics 
The concept of ‘biopolitics’, as elaborated by Foucault, refers to what “brought 
life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an 
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agent of transformation of human life934”. He distinguished historically and 
analytically between two dimensions of this power to life, namely between the 
disciplining of the individual body, on the one hand, and the social regulation 
of the body of the population, on the other935. The concept of biopolitics 
signals then a theoretical critique of the “juridico-discursive936” model of power, 
emphasizing the productive (against the repressive) capacity of power that 
cannot be reduced to the ancient sovereign ‘right of death’. While sovereignty 
mainly operated as a repressive mechanism937, the new life-administering power 
is dedicated to inciting, reinforcing, monitoring and optimizing the forces 
under its control938. Biopolitics implies two typologies of strategies: totalization 
and individualization. The totalizing strategies refer to the practices aiming at 
controlling of all aspects of life by creating pressure to conform to norms. The 
individualizing strategies come into light because those who fall outside the 
norm are targeted with disciplinary/normalizing interventions939. Power thus 
operates through both the production of knowledge, and the creation of a 
desire to conform to the norms that this knowledge establishes. This desire to 
conform leads people to sustain their own normalization voluntarily, through 
self-disciplining. Three are the historical components/stages of the biopolitical 
paradigm: pastoral power, raison d’état and polizei. Basically, the foucauldian idea is 
that the techniques of differentiation, individualization and submission, 
embodied by the ‘pastoral power’, have been adjusted, modified, improved and 
upgraded, first in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the ‘police’ of 
the raison d’état, and then at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth centuries by the welfare state (whose French name, état providence, is 
reminiscent of its religious origins), thus transforming techniques for the 
‘government of souls’ into techniques for the ‘political government of men’.  
The concept of ‘ethopolitics’ represents a kind development of the foucauldian 
biopolitics. The shift seemingly occurred during the second half of the 20th 
century, changing the focus of biopolitics from the governmental ‘care’ for the 
collective, to the responsibilization of individuals for their own life. This 
neoliberal shift allows for the conduct of individuals to be “governed ‘at a 
distance940’”. The state no longer is directly in charge of the coercive ‘care’ of the 
people. It drastically reduces its action, making available limited resources in 
specific areas which are up to the individual to take advantage of (for example, 
health clinics might offer free flu shots, but individual decide if access such a 
resource). The choice becomes a crucial site of political intervention: 
individuals must become free, must enjoy a specific form of freedom linked to 
certain idea of responsibility. In addition, Rose comments that, because of this 
shift biopolitics has been democratized and political and personal aspirations 
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for health are now the same, “the will to health would not merely seek to avoidance of 
sickness […] but would encode an optimization of one’s corporeality to embrace a kind of 
overall ‘well-being’ -beauty success, happiness, sexuality, and much more941”. Biopolitics is 
now about choice and thus has turned into ethopolitics, i.e. in the shaping of 
individual subjectivities which aim not only at avoiding physical sickness, 
personal damages, formal sanctions etc. but also at being the ‘best person’ they 
can be. Ethopolitics, then, is the ethical-political rationality which drives 
individuals to re-define the relation with themselves, in terms of open-ended 
futures942. Individuals become endless moldable realities: they must believe and 
pursue the infinite plasticity of their being. But there is more to Rose’s account 
than a shift in the target of political rationalities from the political elaboration 
of the life to the actual make-up of individual freedom in relation to the body. 
For Rose, ethopolitics also relates to crucial changes in the relation between 
the individual and the state. He defines an account of a historical shift from a 
biopolitics of populations to an ethopolitics characterized by the individual 
management of the ‘somatic’ self. Within such a perspective, he argues, 
individuals are presented with new ways of rendering their identities to 
themselves in thought and language, evaluating and ultimately acting upon 
them using specific newly shaped categories. Choice, freedom and risk become 
‘individualized’, the individual becomes “intrinsically somatic943” and ethical 
practices “increasingly take the body as a key site for work on the self944”.  
 
4.1.1. Ethopolitics: individual and collective dimensions 
Ethopolitics as an analytic tool, allows us to ‘unify’ the processes of 
constructing values, beliefs and sentiments underpinning responsible self-
government and shaping individuals’ conduct945. As Rose states, “if discipline 
individualizes and normalizes and biopower aggregates and socializes, the ethopolitical 
technologies work through the values, beliefs, and sentiments thought to underpin the 
techniques of responsible self-government and the management of one’s obligations to others. 
Life itself, in its everyday manifestations, is the object of adjudication946”. Foucault argued 
that within liberal modes of governance, subjects are constituted as active 
agents, who can be governed through their autonomy and capacity to act947. In 
this context, governmental objectives are to be achieved not through direct 
acts of intervention, but by realigning individual subjectivities in line with 
governmental aims948, devolving of autonomy and responsibility from the state 
to ‘active’ citizens. This involves the “conduct of conduct949”, the deployment of 
particular strategies and techniques aiming at shaping behaviour towards 
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particular ends950. Ethopolitics represents then, a specific form of government 
‘at a distance’, which entails a particular reconfiguration of state-citizen 
relations951. Gradually, its technologies have sought to govern “individual conduct 
with reference to dominant moral discourses of responsible behaviour. Subjects are constructed 
as ethical citizens who can take responsibility for their own well-being, including their ability 
to purchase and consume goods and services952”. Hence, their ‘success’, depends on 
their ability to ‘actively’ participate in the shaping of their own lives, as 
opposed to passive dependency on the state. The crucial feature of ethopolitics 
has been then defined by this governmental objective of “simultaneously 
empowering citizens and making them responsible for their own life outcomes953”. The wide 
spreading as crucial political themes of issues such as local autonomy, 
participation, community ownership of conflict, communities’ self-help 
services etc., feature prominently the emergence of ethopolitics as neo-liberal 
rationality of government in the last thirty years. Moreover, as “ethopolitical 
‘media’954”, must be included culture, aesthetics and lifestyle choices, all 
channels for encouraging governable subjects to self-regulate their conduct 
with reference to a “certain art of living”955. At the same time, emerges the 
possibility of difficult adjustments to the ‘art of living’ sustained by the 
ethopolitical means. Accordingly, “those who are denied choice or make the wrong 
choice are stigmatized and may be subject to targeted state interventions designed to reconstruct 
them as ‘good’ citizens who can access markets and direct their own normalized acts of 
consumption956”. The individual body is as a site of intervention for ethopolitical 
technologies exactly like the collective body. As Rose argues that “the person 
whose conduct is to be governed is believed to desire personal autonomy as a right, but 
autonomy does not imply that individuals live their lives as atomized isolates957”. He 
continues, “they are understood as citizens, not of societies as national collectivities, but of 
neighborhoods, associations, regions, networks, subcultures, age groups, ethnicities, and 
lifestyle sectors - in short, communities958”. Therefore, the “moral order cannot rest on 
legal codes enforced and upheld by guardians; it is embodied and taught through the rituals 
and traditions in the everyday life of communities959”. The collective dimension of 
ethopolitics refers then to shaping of a reciprocal obligation between 
government and the governed through a community-based ethic that produces 
new subjectifications. It this perspective it is possible to advance Foucault’s 
ideas by emphasizing how contemporary technologies of governance involve 
constructing subjectivities for subjects as citizens within the context of their 
communities960. Here community represents both a territory (i.e. spatial scale of 
intervention) and a governmental technique (i.e. strategy of government) that 
works through the values, meaning and sentiments thought to underpin the 
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social webs of connection that bind us as members of moral communities961. 
Community is the elective space where ethopolitical technologies construct an 
explicit moral rationality that seeks to invoke responsible and ethical self-
conduct962 as well as the medium of such a politics of conducts. Community 
makes possible to match the emphasis on the individuals taking responsibility 
for ‘enterprising’ their own lives with reference to particular (shared) norms of 
civility963. One of the main effects of such a phenomenon is to challenge the 
‘social’ welfare with ‘technologies of agency’ that seek to mobilize the ability of 
individuals to act in their own interests. Such techniques do not seek to negate 
individual initiatives rather put them into action, contributing to their ethical 
construction964.   
 
4.2. The Securitization as ethopolitical technology 
The concept of ‘securitization’ is widely known among social and political 
scientists. Several declinations have been offered by scholars, mainly pointing 
out the distinction between ‘external’ (transformations of the relationship 
among sovereign states) and ‘internal’ (transformations of the relationships 
between state and citizens) as conceptually and empirically crucial. In short, 
two different ‘versions’ of securitization have been traditionally considered and 
analyzed: one is related to international relations; the other to the ‘internal’ 
political bond (citizen/State). Here, is the specific re-formulation of the internal 
dimension which directly matters as ethopolitical technology. From the 
‘internal’ viewpoint, securitization is often conceptualized as the qualitative 
transformation of the processes of social protection in processes of individual 
defense through panoply of instruments which aim at making it possible to 
predict and thus prevent dangerous events. It expresses the “unrelenting de-
socialization of security and the growing securitization of personal safety mainly conveyed 
through the increasing use in different milieus of society of a wide range of techniques designed 
to ensure a safe and secure future965”. The security at stake is then the 
negative/private state of immunization from risk and dangers, as neo-liberal 
product of the celebration of a ‘gated’ freedom966. Internal securitization is 
closely related to the social disintegration of welfare state, appearing indeed as 
the basis for a post-welfare political project. Here the processes of 
securitization are seen in terms of attribution to the security of a primacy-status 
as political technology which deeply affects the production of self-responsible 
subjectivities and as such embodying and deploying the ethopolitical 
rationality. As Colin Gordon argues, security is not merely a self-evident object 
of political power but “a specific principle of political method and practice, distinct alike 
from those of law, sovereignty and discipline, and capable of various modes of combination 
with these other principles and practices within diverse governmental configurations967”. In 
the same vein, Anthony Burke contends that we should see security as “an 
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interlocking system of knowledges, representations, practices, and institutional forms that 
imagine, direct, and act upon bodies, spaces, and flows in certain ways-to see security not as 
an essential value but as a political technology968”. In this perspective securitization 
sets in motion a particular political dynamic, empowering specific political 
actors, and building up technologies and instruments of making responsible 
subjectivities. More analytically, it is possible to realize the internal 
securitization as ethopolitical technology as long as we look at four interlinked 
expressions of this process, three different ways it is deployed on the ground 
today: pluralization, responsibilization, hybridization, and contractualization of 
security. 
 
4.2.1. Pluralization of security 
As Marina Caparini remarks, “contemporary empirical evidence across a variety of states 
indicates that security is being provided by multiple actors969”. What is characteristic of 
this state of affairs is that the state, as a weberian monopolistic provider of 
security, has been paralleling by a multiplicity of security ‘suppliers’ “from the 
private sector, local communities and civil society, and mixed entities that combine public and 
private attributes970”. While the state remains a crucial actor in the provision of 
security, it is not the only ‘player’, and sometimes or under certain 
circumstances, it may not even be the most important one. David Bayley and 
Clifford Shearing have conceptualized this trend as the “pluralization of the 
‘auspices’ and ‘providers’ of security971”. This means that “the state can no longer be 
considered the sole element authorizing security provisions (auspice); other non-state actors 
have assumed the responsibility for their own protection and exercise the power and capacity to 
arrange for and procure their own security, transforming the nature of security governance972”. 
Private subjects such as commercial firms, community-based actors, non-state 
agencies and non-governmental organizations become the ‘new’ providers of 
individual and collective security, by supplying spaces immunized by dangers of 
damages of personal properties or by offering services aiming at neutralizing 
risks for the individual health. The process of pluralization then expresses itself 
“with the proliferation of contract private security firms which sell their services to members of 
the public, including businesses, homeowners and banks […] Individuals, communities, firms 
and other groups are arranging for their own security through the use of commercial security 
firms, or in the case of commercial enterprises, often the establishment of their own in-house 
security departments973”. Concrete examples of the pluralization of security are the 
proliferation of civil society-based forms of preventive governance of crimes. 
Moreover scheme of community policing aiming at creating “relationships and 
cooperation with various sectors of the community, including religious leaders, business groups, 
neighborhood associations and other citizen self-help groups974”, appear a visible 
expression of the pluralization. A further and common characteristic of the 
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actual deployment of a pluralized security, is that the ‘targets’ as well as the 
‘users’ of the new security providers are often individuals who behave as 
‘functional consumers’. For instance, the users (i.e. the direct beneficiaries) 
have social and economic resources to hire private guards for patrolling their 
gated communities while the targets (i.e. the people controlled by private 
security agencies) have the social and cultural means to choose community-led 
initiatives to solve their conflicts and prevent criminal situations. On the other 
side, individuals deprived of economic, social and cultural resources, are 
doomed to be ‘treated’ the most discriminatory and exclusionary apparatuses 
of security and criminal control systems, often the last resort for the central 
state not only to regulate ad distance but to intervene ‘muscularly’ on deviance 
and marginality975. Broadly speaking, the process of multiplying security 
providers and of qualitative re-definition of their features (as later on I will 
further describe), seems consistent with the ethopolitical rationality of 
‘governing at a distance’. The state in fact, performs a “meta-regulatory role while 
the actual implementation of security measures and other functions is taken over by other 
actors976”. The central governments define general frames and criteria whereas 
private actors are delegating of security functions within the standards given by 
the state, whose role in this perspective becomes to regulate the activities of 
non-state actors.  
 
4.2.2. Securitization as responsibilization 
The securitization processes are also expressed by a significant and widespread 
trend toward the responsibilization of individuals and communities as a form of 
preventive governance of risks and dangers977. Individual citizens and 
communities are pushed toward taking responsibility for their own security; 
they are encouraged to distribute among themselves the concern to create 
‘livable’ spaces namely reducing crime’s opportunities978. As Ronen Shamir 
states, “responsibilization -namely expecting and assuming the reflexive moral capacities of 
various social actors- presupposes one’s care for one’s duties and one’s un-coerced application 
of certain values as a root motivation for action979”. Concretely, responsibilization may 
result in greater citizen involvement in community-based voluntary security 
initiatives such as Neighborhood Watch schemes or RJ programs. Is a 
manifestation of this trend also the “privatization, franchising, outsourcing and 
deregulation which contribute to horizontally allocate authority to numerous state and non-
state units that assume the economic enterprise form, follow principles of economic 
sustainability and cost-benefit risk-management and adhere to standards of performance that 
are adjusted to a reality of an all-encompassing market environment980”. In this way 
making individuals and communities responsible for their security produces a 
singular identification between providers and users of security services. In a 
consistent neo-liberal perspective, social actors are the ‘masters of their destiny’ 
as far as the security issues are concerned. The responsibilization’s trend also 
entails the amplified approval and legitimation of security provision by private 
actors. The state itself has played a vital role in the legitimation of the role of 
private actors in the provision of security. This has been possible through 
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decisions to privatize formerly governmental functions, through the 
recognition of the expertise and knowledge the private sector can offer 
through its pursuit of public-private partnerships, and through collaborative 
relations with civil society and the private sector in managing crime and 
security. In a broader sense, responsibilization works as a specific 
governmental strategy, contributing to the construction of a “moral agency as the 
necessary ontological condition for ensuring an entrepreneurial disposition in the case of 
individuals and socio-moral authority in the case of institutions981”. As Shamir 
emphasizes, “neo-liberal responsibilization is unique in that it assumes a moral agency 
which is congruent with the attributed tendencies of economic-rational actors: autonomous, 
self-determined and self-sustaining subjects982”. 
 
4.2.3. Hybridization of security 
Another crucial feature of the securitization, closely related to the previous 
ones, is the redefinition of the line between public and private in thinking and 
providing security. During the last thirty years, in western democracies, we 
have been assisting during a singular “growth in public-private sector relationships 
reflects a blurring of the distinction between the categories and their integration through 
network relations and practices983”. Private security providers are employed by both 
governments and private organizations. At the same time, “the emergence of hybrid 
policing and security structures that incorporate elements of both public and private also 
contribute to blurring: joint public-private policing initiatives, governments and other public 
agents hiring private security firms, and personnel exchanges and flows between public and 
private bodies, as well as the adoption of corporate management practices and the 
commercialization of services by public law enforcement and security agencies984”. Indeed, 
the same public-private dichotomy regarding the security issues, have been 
increasingly conceptualized as “the wrong way to view security more generally today; 
rather, […] since there are hybrid forms of policing and security provision, it is more correct 
to replace the dichotomy between public and private with a continuum985”. The redefinition 
or blurring of the public/private line, presents several and different 
expressions. This is the case of ‘mass private property’ (e.g. business and 
industrial complexes, gated communities etc.), insofar as the owners of such 
complexes more and more discharge the public police’s services for obtaining 
security, hiring private security firms or developing in-house security 
departments in charge of providing security to the mass property and its users. 
Another example is offered by the increasing cooperation between public and 
private security actors. In a wide variety of areas, ranging from the 
information-sharing about country vulnerabilities to the establishment of 
standards for protective security and resilience, private security organizations 
“are asked to join public in developing plans and coordination for possible attacks and 
disasters, especially those involving critical infrastructure986”. The development of 
hybridized security policies and institutions clearly raises a number of 
questions. First of all, the issue of impartiality. Private security providers 
cooperating with public authorities, directly compete with private sector firms 
for contracts, but at the same time enjoy a position of connection with the 
public sector. This creates a specific asymmetry on the market, with potential 
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dangers for economic actors and final users. Moreover the public/private 
structures are also more susceptible to corruption due to their close links with 
the private security sector. In both cases it is impossible to demarcate the exact 
division of responsibilities between public and private actors involved as well 
as the kind of responsibility at stake, jeopardizing any form of concrete 
accountability. 
 
4.2.4. Contractual Securitization  
As Rose notices, security practices of the ‘biopolitical’ welfare state were, in 
principle, “territorialized across a single uniform plane, that of ‘society’987”. A realm of 
collective security was to be maintained by the state on behalf of all citizens, 
through universal measures ranging from old age pensions to a unified and 
socially funded police force. In the present political space, each community is 
to take responsibility for preserving the security of its own members (e.g. 
residents of a neighborhood, the employees of an organization, the consumers 
and staff of a shopping complex etc.). Security, here, is to be managed within a 
variety of discrete spatial-ethical zones, which assume responsibility for ‘their 
own’ risk management988. Moreover, “we witness a multiplication of control expertise 
in alliance with responsibilization, the collective logics of community come into alliance with 
the ethos of individual autonomy characteristic of advanced forms of liberalism: choice, 
personal responsibility, control over one’s own fate, self-promotion and self-government989”. 
These self-managing communities are touted, in the current anti-political 
arguments, as a remedy for both the individualized profit-orientation of free-
market forces, and by the permanent financial crisis of the central government. 
They are the only alternative to the security decay of contemporary era, the 
only trustworthy subjects in daily securing our lives. As Rose states, “new modes 
of neighborhood participation, local empowerment and engagement of residents in decisions 
over their own lives will, it is thought, reactivate self-motivation, self-responsibility and self-
reliance in the form of active citizenship within a self-governing community990”. In this 
perspective, a redefinition of the community as a security provider is much 
needed: “community is not simply the territory within which crime is to be controlled, it is 
itself a means of government: its detailed knowledge about itself and the activities of its 
inhabitants are to be utilized, its ties, bonds, forces and affiliations are to be celebrated, its 
centres of authority and methods of dispute resolution are to be encouraged, nurtured, shaped 
and instrumentalized to enhance the security of each and of all991”. Jonathan Simon 
describes how the approach to the issue of crime is governed by the interaction 
between various parties, of which the state is one (albeit a very influential one), 
as well as how practices such as housing, welfare work, education, and health 
are being restructured according to the logic of the securitization principle992. 
In short, not only is the notion of ‘security’ used to justify all sorts of measures 
that have other intentions, but the technologies, practices, and metaphors of 
the criminal law system are also more evidently present than ever before in 
diverse domains993. Securitization appears here contractually reflected in local 
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alliances between government and other players, where the involvement and 
responsibilities of the participants are reinvented, formulated, and 
legitimized994. These contracts are characterized by a system of reciprocity or 
communality since the parties have to agree on what to do and what not to do, 
as well as the way in which the resources they create will be used. In addition, 
as Crawford puts it, they reflect “a desire to control the uncertainty of the future995” by 
introducing all sorts of measures designed to prevent assumed future behavior. 
 
4.2.5. Ethopolitics and securitization 
The pluralization of security’s ‘auspices’ and ‘providers’, the horizontal 
distribution of responsibility as a security strategy, the qualitative hybridization 
between private and public providers of security, the contractual element of 
securitization, are four interlinked dimensions of the internal securitization as 
ethopolitical technology. This multidimensional phenomenon plays a role 
within the new governmental ‘politics of conduct’ in forging political 
subjectivities. In fact, ethopolitics is expressed through forms of security 
governance ‘beyond-the-state’ that yield a specific emphasis on autonomous, 
freedom-aspiring, self-sufficient social agents in the production of security. A 
key feature of ethopolitics, says Rose, is its concern with the ethical, rather than 
political sensibilities of its subjects; we might say in ethopolitics a trend wholly 
consistent with the moralistic responsibilization of private actors in providing 
security. Securitization marks the ethopolitical shift from state governance of 
the individual to a kind of individual self-governance or care of the self, in the 
domain of a ‘democratized’ security. Within this process one can see a specific 
collective self-actualization, the realization of protected social environments 
through participatory ways, involving private and public in an enterprise that 
blurs their respective boundaries, offering a contractual mean to produce 
‘gated’ milieux where to realize the individual selves.  
 
4.3. The ‘Re-feudalization’ of governance  
The second ethopolitical technology to be analyzed is the ‘re-feudalization’ of 
governance996. This expression is only partially akin to the Habermasian 
concept of ‘refeudalization of public sphere’. According to Jürgen Habermas  
 
“With the interweaving of the public and private realm, not only do the 
political authorities assume certain functions in the sphere of commodity 
exchange and social labor, but conversely social powers now assume 
political functions. This leads to a kind of ‘refeudalization’ of the public 
sphere. Large organizations strive for political compromises with the 
state and with each other, excluding the public sphere whenever possible. 
But at the same time the large organizations must assure themselves of 
at least plebiscitary support from the mass of the population through an 
apparent display of openness997”. 
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Here, refeudalization refers to a political technology which works toward the 
hybridization of public and private governance in neo-liberal regimes, 
engendering a specific ‘third way’ of exercising authority and control over a 
wide range of social issues, first of all the crime and deviance. Particularly, the 
appeal to ‘community’ as a site of governmental authority in both Europe and 
North America, seems to be a crucial expression of this political technology. 
This can be seen, for instance, in respect of policing policy (‘community 
policing’), penal policy (‘punishment in the community’), health care policy 
(‘care in the community’), schools policy (‘community education’) and justice 
policy (‘community mediation’)998. For these reasons the traditional view that 
modern states govern through the exercise of authority, backed by their 
capacity to exert a monopoly of legitimate coercion has produced more 
undefined and multifaceted imagery of the state and governance, now 
described as “hollowing out999” and engaged in the ethopolitical project of “ruling 
at a distance1000”. 
 
4.3.1. Governance through Community 
Rose argues that “community emerged as a rather unexpected theme in debates about the 
governability of liberal, democratic and market based societies in the closing decades of the 
twentieth century1001”. He shows there has been an increasingly amount of 
theoretical endeavors to identify a ‘third way’ of governing based on the re-
discovery of the community as site and vehicle of governance1002. For 
proponents of these various third way strategies of governing, community is 
posited as “the ideal territory for the administration of individual and collective existence, 
the plane or surface upon which micro- moral relations among persons are conceptualized and 
administered1003”. As Rose remarks, neo-classical models of free competition 
between rational economic actors are being supplanted by models that 
emphasize “the significance of interpersonal trust, local and community-based trading 
networks, collaboration among enterprises sharing a commitment to their particular 
geographical region1004”. The concept of ‘community’ here represents a singular 
combination between the notion of ‘civil society’ offered by the ‘left’, as “the 
antidote both to the state and its bureaucratic apparatus of political administration and 
control, and to the free market celebrated by liberal individualists and neoconservatives1005”, 
and the idea championed by contemporary civic republicanism of community 
as a means with which to arrest liberal individualism1006. Community steps into 
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the space previously occupied by ‘the social’1007. Just as the social was 
purported as an antidote to the disintegration initiated by industrialization, so 
to ‘community’ emerges “like a phoenix out of the fragmentation of social and political 
space generated in the course of commodification, marketization and the like1008”. The 
‘third way’ of governance must be then thought as a ‘smooth’ alternative to 
both free market individualism and state-centered collectivism. In this view, 
individuals are constantly stimulated to see themselves as members of a 
community and as such are ethically obliged to adhere to its values. 
Accordingly, social issues are re-formulated in reference to community norms, 
values and cultures. Governmental interventions seek to address such issues by 
acting on (and constructing) the dynamics of community, “by enhancing the bonds 
that link individuals to their community, rebuilding shattered communities and so on1009”. 
This new politics of community moves beyond the ‘basic’ neoliberal 
preoccupation with downsizing the state. In this perspective the state plays “an 
active role, taking on the responsibility for the provision of training, for help with childcare, 
and for a raft of other means with which to ‘enable’ individuals to exercise autonomous, 
responsible liberal subjectivity1010”. The task for politics shifts away from governing 
the morality of a uniform social citizenry toward the reinvention and 
deployment of the forms of community that will establish the ethical basis for 
a self-governing polity1011. Of course, as Rose notices, the appeals to 
community are not a fresh novel. In the last thirty years, liberal political 
discourses have in fact, mitigated the ideal of individual liberties and rights 
advancing arguments of combining them to ‘the interests of community’1012. 
Moreover, “the theme of the loss of community, and the need to remake community or 
substitute something for its benefits, emerges with remarkable regularity in critical reflections 
on the state of the nation, from the nineteenth century onward1013”. Society gives way to 
community, the notion of a welfare state or social state gives way to that of an 
‘enabling’ state, or a ‘facilitating’ state1014. As already seen, the state is no longer 
to be the sole guarantor of security, order, health and productivity, rather, 
“individuals, firms, organizations, localities, schools, parents, hospitals, housing estates must 
take on themselves -as partners- a portion of the responsibility for resolving these issues1015”.  
 
4.3.2. Contractual governance 
The refeudalization of governance is furthermore expressed through the 
spreading of what Crawford calls “contractual governance1016”. One of the features 
of the contemporary social regulation of behaviour in neo-liberal democracies, 
seems in fact, the spreading of mechanisms of contracts and agreements which 
shape private-public ‘horizontal’ synergies as techniques of governance1017. 
First, contracts entail a degree of reciprocity and mutuality and are hence 
concerned with the distribution of responsibilities and obligations. Secondly, 
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they define a role for the subject as an active, responsible agent. Thirdly, 
contracts and agreements are premised on the rational choice of participating 
parties and draw their power for regulating behaviour through the (albeit 
limited) voluntary commitment of subjects, which produces a sense of 
ownership, stimulating an active responsibility for the self-regulating and self-
policing of individual conduct1018. To promote the development of the 
contractual relationships between citizens and state, provides an overall 
framework for the rights and responsibilities’ agenda promoted by neo-
liberalism. On the other side, the contractual relationships require that citizens, 
in return for the increased opportunities they are offered, strictly comply with 
the contracts’ duties. This normative connection of opportunities/rights to 
(increased) responsibilities/duties is deployed through specific intervention 
aiming at addressing the ‘defaulting contractors’, often through exclusionary 
penalties1019. One of the main social effects of the contractualization of 
governance is the creation of complex networks of governance that has 
emerged alongside state governments, or “contractual communities”1020. As 
Shearing states “these include such spaces as communities of library users, the residential 
communities that North Americans term ‘gated communities’, communities of shoppers at 
malls as well as virtual communities such as the communities of credit card holders and 
Internet users1021”. These “arenas of governance1022”, are one of the products of the 
social regulation through negotiated agreements between public authorities and 
those private social actors characterized by a contractual power related to their 
economic, social and cultural status. Particularly, “the contracts that establish these 
arenas of governance are, in part, contracts that set out such things as the proper expectations 
(rights) and responsibilities (duties) of community members1023”. Moreover, these arenas 
are characterized by specific modes of governance and rules that define “the 
conditions of ‘citizenship’ in these new spaces of governance1024”. Notions of ‘inclusion’ 
and ‘empowerment’ are central to these arenas of governance contractually 
created. Exactly like the liberalism of the early twentieth century tried to isolate 
and classify groups recalcitrant to its idea social order, so the re-feudalized 
governance implies the identification of “problematic persons1025” to be reformed 
re-socialized to the rules of the new arenas of governance. In this emerging 
context managing the problematic persons means that they will be given “with 
an opportunity to achieve full membership in a moral community through work and adhere to 
the core values of honesty, self-reliance and concern for others1026”.  
 
4.3.3. Techniques of the ‘Third way’ 
Looking more closely at the techniques of this emerging model of governance, 
we can easily detects a wide array of hybrid and flexible mechanisms, which 
purportedly ensure accountability, reconciling conflicting interests, and 
overcoming the destructive divide between state and society. Examples are the 
“focus groups, citizens’ juries, partnerships of all sorts between the public services and those 
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wanting to make profits, between public, profit-making and not-for-profit organizations, 
between professionals and lay persons, between political institutions and voluntary 
organizations, […] proposals for strengthening and preserving marriages and families to 
build social capital, and in drugs and crime-prevention schemes1027”. Generalizing, the 
‘third way’ techniques are a particular version of ‘traditional’ welfare programs. 
As already hinted, they are characterized by a reformulation of the 
inclusion/exclusion dichotomy. In this perspective, the crucial issue of poverty 
is conceptualized not as effect of a material/cultural deprivation but as 
consequence of a moral deficiency expressed by the dis-connection from 
responsibilizing circuits of moral community. Exclusion, then, is the lack of 
“self-control provided by work, family, housing, and so forth, whereas inclusion is a matter of 
reattachment1028”. It concerns the effects of the moral ‘disintegration’ more than 
political-economic processes. Accordingly, individuals who refuse to adhere to 
communal values or to become responsible and govern themselves ethically, 
are to be addressed through practices aiming at promoting compliance with 
those values1029. The consequence of refusing the moral community’s 
membership is then harsh measures justified on the ground of reattaching 
failing citizens to a virtuous community, consistently reconstructing their 
ethos1030. Excluded persons will be empowered, up-skilled, educated, and 
trained, giving centrality to work and family as central means for that ethical 
reconstruction1031. These strategies employ a wide array of re-moralizing 
techniques such as “psychological and behavioral therapies, pedagogies of citizenship 
competences, shaming, and threats of withdrawal of support1032” in order to stimulate the 
failing citizens “to achieve the disciplining and moralizing benefits thought to flow from 
wage labor1033”. The complement of the communal moralism becomes then the 
“enhancement of the powers of the penal and psychiatric complexes and the transformation of 
social workers and other caring professionals into agencies of control concerned with risk 
management and secure containment1034”. This is a ‘third way’ that pursues to govern 
through the “micromanagement of the self-steering practices of its citizens1035”. Rose 
argues that these strategies do not represent anything like a genuine invention 
in politics but are rather, “an entirely familiar assortment from the grab bag of liberal 
democracy, yet sadly stripped of any residual utopianism1036”.  
 
4.3.4. Ethopolitics and re-feudalization 
The ethopolitics’ core, as already said, is the emergence of a moral vocabulary 
of politics in which the subject is to be governed in accordance with 
(supposedly shared) ethics and in the name of ethics1037. The ethopolitics 
expressed to the specific technology of refeudalization of governance, “seems to 
represent a fundamentally backward looking response to the challenges facing contemporary 
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politics1038”, appealing “to an imaginary universal moral consensus, in order to justify a 
banal and stultifying vision of the future, much like the present only without its 
downsides1039”. The refeudalization is a technology of government that in a 
particular way, ‘revives’ the past, with its reference to the family or the 
community, as crucial spaces of government as well as politico-moral ideals1040. 
The ideals of ‘communal’ inclusion and empowerment that act to enhance the 
opportunities for the promotion of individuals through their own action, 
hardly index anything novel, rather they are entirely congruent with the moral 
technologies emergent in the nineteenth century that similarly sought to instill 
in the subject the “corporeal and moral habits of industriousness1041”. The 
governmental techniques exemplified by the rubric of refeudalization aim at 
managing the moral order, emphasizing the ways in which the institutions of 
the family, the school and the workplace serve to sustain the stability and order 
of a society, now imagined as a single consensual community1042. On the other 
side, sectors of population deemed as problematic, insofar as they break the 
moral rules of the arenas of governance contractually created, are targeted with 
specific ‘third way’ techniques which work along the lines of the ‘traditional’ 
couple inclusion/exclusion reformulated as empowerment/disempowerment. 
However, for the most reluctant population’s segments those techniques are 
often replaced by the traditional panoply of ‘muscular’ instruments of 
marginalization and social ostracism (prisons, asylums, ghettos, etc.). 
 
4.4. The Psy-Individualization: making up post-social citizens  
The last technology to be considered and analyzed is the process of psy-
individualization. This technology involves “a plethora of indirect mechanisms that can 
translate the goals of political, social, and economic authorities into the choices and 
commitments of individuals1043”, contributing to the ethopolitical governing ‘at a 
distance’, via the re-definition of individuals’ subjectivity1044. The psy-
individualization consists then in displacing the concept of society by the new 
concept of the ‘self-governing individual’. It works by installing through the 
diffusion of psy-techniques, a concept of the human subject as an “autonomous, 
individualized, self-directing, decision-making agent at the heart of policymaking”1045. This 
technology ‘offers’ individuals, groups and communities new opportunities to 
participate ‘actively’ in various arenas of action “to resolve the kind of issues hitherto 
held to be the responsibility of authorized governmental agencies1046”. Here, individuals, 
groups and communities are “encouraged freely and rationally, to conduct 
themselves1047”, and to become “‘experts of themselves’, to adopt an education and 
knowledgeable relation of self-care in respect of their bodies, their minds, their forms of 
conduct and that of the members of their families1048”. However, the implication of 
these processes is that individuals and communities “must assume active 
                                                             
1038 Rose, N. (1999). Inventiveness in politics, cit., p. 490. 
1039 Ibidem. 
1040 Ibidem, p. 487. 
1041 Ibidem. 
1042 Ibidem, p. 490. 
1043 Rose, N. (1996). Governing “advanced” liberal democracies. In A. Barry, T. Osborne, N. 
Rose (Eds.), Foucault and political reason (pp. 37-64). London: UCL Press, p. 58. 
1044 Ibidem. 
1045 Rose, N. (1999). Inventiveness in politics, cit., p. 499. 
1046 Burchell, G. (1996). Liberal government and techniques of the self. In A. Barry, T. 
Osborne, N. Rose (Eds.), Foucault and political reason (pp. 19-36), cit., p. 29. 
1047 Ibidem. 
1048 Rose, N. (1996). Governing “advanced” liberal democracies, cit., p. 59. 
152 
 
responsibility for these activities, both for carrying them out, and of course, for their 
outcomes1049”. Furthermore, these processes of ‘responsibilisation’, as 
institutionally dependent processes of individualization and standardization1050, 
incite and encourage the “individual as enterprise1051” to “conduct themselves in 
accordance with the appropriate (or approved) model of action1052”.  
 
4.4.1. A political psy-regulation 
As a form of governing conduct, ethopolitics presupposes the possibility of “a 
self-determining, self-governing individual who fuses ethical and political domains1053”. This 
means that ‘practices of government’ become to depend on, and operate 
through, ‘practices of the self’. In this context, psy-individualization processes 
render “the lives of individuals as private matters free from state intervention by offering 
citizens the opportunity for ‘choice’, for ‘autonomous’ life plans and the ‘freedom’ to be the 
persons they want to be1054”. The premise of such a project is that “‘good’ government 
is a republic of autonomous self-governors1055”. Thus, this political technology aims at 
producing and offering “choice, freedom and autonomy ensuring that norms of obligation, 
accountability and responsibility continually turn the subject back on itself1056”. The overall 
goal is to mold hyper-individualized and responsible individuals, working on 
their identities as crucial political site. Within this process of governmentalized 
self-constitution, individuals ‘naturally’ choose to shape an individualized and 
responsible self. As Rose emphasizes: “Incorporating, shaping, channeling, and 
enhancing subjectivity have been intrinsic to the operations of government. […] This has not 
been achieved through the growth of an omnipotent and omniscient central state whose agents 
institute a perpetual surveillance and control over all its subjects. Rather […] bringing the 
varied ambitions of […] authorities into alignment with the ideals and aspirations of 
individuals, with the selves each of us want to be1057”. Rose with these words describes 
exactly the process of working out individualized selves as decisive political 
technology within neo-liberal regimes. Such individualized selves are the ‘row 
material’ from which drawing up “citizens capable of bearing a regulated freedom1058”. ‘ 
 
4.4.2. Psy-techniques 
Concretely, the psy-individualization is deployed through what Rose calls the 
“psy-complex1059”. This expression refers to the panoply of techniques for the 
incorporation of psychological ideas about human resources and group 
dynamics into an increasing number of social domains, as well as to the ‘‘the 
nature and implications of the proliferation of psychotherapies1060”. Rose argues that ‘‘the 
diversity and heterogeneity of psychology has been one of the keys to its continued inventiveness 
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[…] and wide-ranging social applicability’1061’. Across this diversity Rose identifies 
and emphasizes overarching commonalities in their effects, especially their role 
in producing ‘intensely subjective’ beings, and modern societies that accord a 
central role to the ‘‘subjective aspects of the lives of individuals as they conduct their 
commerce with the world, with others and with themselves’1062’. Of the various 
technologies Rose explores, psychotherapies most fully typify the logic of 
neoliberal subjectivity in prioritizing individual liberty. Psychotherapeutic 
discourses therefore constitute influential vehicles through which neoliberal 
governance is dispersed and achieved. Rose argues that: [psychotherapeutic] 
“technologies for the government of the soul operate not through crushing subjectivity in the 
interests of control and profit, but by seeking to align political, social and institutional goals 
with individual pleasures and desires, and with the happiness and fulfillment of the self1063”. 
Their power lies in their capacity to offer means by which the regulation of 
selves -by others and by ourselves- can be made consonant with contemporary 
political principles, moral ideals, and constitutional exigencies. They are, 
precisely, therapies of freedom1064. There is a strong emphasis on inter-personal 
relationships in these practices, primarily in the form of face-to-face, or co-
present, relationships between clients and practitioners. Rose argues that in 
seeking to govern at a distance via the autonomy of ‘free subjects’, those 
governing psy-techniques needed detailed knowledge of the individuals to be 
governed1065. As such, the psy-disciplines emerged as key technologies of liberal 
government during the late 19th/early 20th century, and have become 
increasingly important during the post war years. The value of psy-disciplines is 
that they provide various ‘human technologies’ for acting upon and producing 
certain outcomes in terms of human conduct, such as “reform, efficiency, education, 
cure, or virtue1066”. In this sense, psy expertise is not intended to crush or 
dehumanize personhood, but rather to produce it. The human technologies 
provided by psy expertise, Rose argues, have come to underpin and ultimately 
transform a range of diverse practices for dealing with persons that were 
previously legitimized in other ways, including via tradition, moral codes or 
rules of thumb1067. In this process, our very ideas ourselves, of identity, 
autonomy, freedom and self-fulfillment were reshaped in psychological terms. 
Human beings in these regions came to understand themselves as inhabited by 
a deep interior psychological space, to evaluate themselves and to act upon 
themselves in terms of this belief. They came to speak of themselves in terms 
of a psychological language of self-description -the language of intelligence, 
personality, anxiety, neurosis, depression, trauma, extroversion and 
introversion and to judge themselves in terms of a psychological ethics. This 
was not just a process of individualization: we also witnessed a 
psychologization of collective life, the invention of idea of the group, large and 
small, of attitudes, public opinion and the like. Practices from factory to army 
were now understood in terms of the psychodynamics of interpersonal 
relations. Social problems from prejudice and warfare to criminality and 
poverty were analyzed in psychological terms. Psychology was a ‘generous’ 
discipline, it gave itself away to all kinds of professionals from police to military 
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commanders, on condition that they came to think and act, in some respects, 
like psychologists.  
 
4.4.3. Risk, participation and psy-individualization 
The psy-techniques, insofar as they ‘create’ hyper-individualized and 
responsibilized subjectivities, spreading the perception of individual and 
collective lives as regulated by the free exercise of choice, appear linked to 
specific risk management strategies. Risk, in this context, is constructed as a 
tool to manage society in a seemingly ‘hands-off’ way and distances experts 
from “direct intervention into personal lives, while employing the agency of subjects in their 
own self-regulation1068”. We have been assisting a proliferation of institutionalized 
risk environments where people spend large proportions of their lives, exposed 
to influence from various governmental strategies and where participation in 
programs and strategies is valorized. Techniques of participation and self-
governance are typically ‘deficit ridden’, meaning there is always ‘more room 
for improvement’. Such approaches locate remedial action with the individual 
‘agent of change’. Broader social and economic factors contributing to the 
generation of discriminations, remain unexamined. Individuals are not passive 
consumers of the processes of governance, control and surveillance in which 
they are expected to engage. Perceptions of risk are then highly subjective, 
locally mediated and may be expected to vary according to particular cultural 
and social contexts1069. Nevertheless, despite the benefits of citizen 
participation in policy-making, there is an extensive critique of the challenges 
of citizen involvement in participatory decision-making processes1070. Citizen 
participation in decision-making may entail cost, problems of 
representativeness, complacency, selfishness, lack of authority and the power 
of wrong decision-making1071. ‘Participants’ often construe participation as no 
more than passive involvement in a managed process. Effective and 
meaningful participation can be liberating, empowering and sometimes lead to 
tangible positive outcomes, but generally requires more time and effort by 
government and an active engagement with citizens. It involves not only 
consultation, but co-decision-making at all stages of the process, so that 
‘participants’ experience ownership, autonomy and efficacy. As such the 
construction of these kinds of risk environments is a complement of the 
ethopolitical psy-individualization as well as a condition for its possibility.  
 
4.4.4. Ethopolitics and psy-individualization 
Ethopolitics illustrates how governance reformulates the agency of subjects as 
their own self-regulation. Individuals participate in becoming good citizens not 
under coercion, “but to be educated and solicited into a kind of alliance between personal 
objectives and ambitions or socially prized goals or activities1072”. The construction of 
individualized and responsible citizens becomes then one of the crucial 
conditions of the ethopolitics as governmental rationality. We might say that 
securitization and refeudalization of governance contribute indirectly to the 
achievement of this individualized ethos. Individualization through the 
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diffusion of risk-mentality and psy-discipline plays a direct role in this 
enterprise, basically integrating and completing the de-socialization of security 
and the emergence of hybrid arenas (and actors) of governance. Ethopolitics 
constructs citizens essentially ‘ethical’, and its technologies act upon “the ethical 
formation and the ethical self-management of individuals1073”. What follows is 
“engagement in the collective destiny in the interests of economic advancement, civic stability, 
even justice and happiness1074”. As a result, individuals take on social responsibilities 
which were formerly the domain of the state, and self-government replaces 
state government: “ethos-politics concerns itself with the self-techniques necessary for 
responsible self-government1075”. These issues from a subjectivation perspective will 
be largely developed in the next chapter.  
 
4.5. Ethopolitics and Restorative Justice  
Securitization, refeudalization of governance and psy-individualization ‘deploy’ 
the post-social ethopolitical rationality, contributing to the stability of the neo-
liberal governmentality. The discursive formation of the RJ is intertwined with 
these technologies; they represent its conditions of intelligibility/possibility 
from a ‘political standpoint’; they are the “governmental activities1076” which make 
the RJ fully “thinkable and practicable1077”. The target of this investigation is not 
institutions, theories, or ideology, but governmental technologies, the 
hypothesis being that discursive formations are not just governed by 
institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic circumstances but 
characterized by specific regularities, logics, strategies, and ‘reasons’ politically 
rooted. It is a matter of analyzing ethopolitics as a ‘regime of practices’, as the 
condition for the creation of “places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed 
and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect1078”. 
Ethopolitics works in order to make the individual a “significant element1079”. 
Which strategy, self-evidence, or logic rendered it acceptable the RJ, integrating 
its discursive formation? Ethopolitical technologies, working toward the 
securitization of personal life (de-structuring the welfare state, through a 
panoply of instruments which aim at making it possible to ‘predict’ and thus 
‘prevent’ dangerous events) the refeudalization of governance (diffusing hybrid 
providers of social/crime control) and the individualization of the citizen 
(imposing self-education, self-management, self-therapy), are pivotal 
governmental techniques in that they perfectly coalesce technologies of 
domination and technologies of self, necessary to the establishment of the RJ 
as a discursive formation. In a controlling and, at the same time, disciplining 
manner, these technologies present the relay between the self-reforming self 
and the reforming social institutions which support the emergence of the RJ 
discursive formation1080. Of course this ‘relay’ is not as consistent as it might 
seemingly appear. Tensions between the aforementioned political technologies 
are actually thinkable. For instance, the communal moral embeddeness 
produced by the ‘third way’ strategies might clash against the hyper-
                                                             
1073 Rose, N. (1999). Inventiveness in politics, cit., p. 475. 
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individualization of neo-liberal subjects. This kind of tension expresses the 
complexity of the neoliberal governmentality, opening up for possibilities of 
resistance in the interstices of its mechanisms.  
As Foucault warned, the analysis of governmental technologies, apart from the 
exercise of political sovereignty, concerns “the relation between self and self, private 
interpersonal relations involving some form of control and guidance, relations within social 
institutions and communities1081”. At this point, then, it is necessary to extend the 
analysis to the micro-level of the ethopolitics. It is indispensable to reduce the 
level of abstraction, shifting the focus from the ‘collective’ targets of 
ethopolitical technologies to the ‘individual’ objectives. The next chapter, in 
fact, drawing upon the imaginable wide range of micro-technologies, focuses 
on those ones which are coextensive of the RJ as a sample of the micro-level 
of ethopolitical rationality 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RESTORATIVE SUBJECTIVATION  
 
“[T]o claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the 
contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency1082” 
 
5.0. Introductory remarks 
In the next sections I analyze a ‘sample’ of the micro-ethopolitical technologies 
which contribute to the creation of post-social citizens. This basically means to 
investigate the construction of subject positions within the archive of the RJ, to 
locate them in the discursive formation of the RJ, and then to ask how 
individuals are actually affected by the process of ‘imposition’ of (and 
resistance to) those ways of being subject. ‘Victim’, ‘offender’ and ‘community’ 
are not natural or essential ‘identities’, but specific subject positions produced 
by combinations, overlaps and conflicts between and within the authoritative 
discourses on the RJ. For individuals, to be confronted with these positions 
entails to be offered with particular images, metaphors, storylines and 
concepts1083, which, once taken up, contribute to shape their selves and then 
their field of possible actions. The general premise of this argument is the idea 
of subject as a discontinuous category composed of a dispersion of ‘postures’ 
within a specific discursive formation1084. The link between these 
discontinuities is not established by the subject itself, “but by the specificity of a 
discursive practice1085”. The discursive formation of the RJ represents then, at the 
same time, the site and the condition for processes of subjection and self-
constitution, informed by the ethopolitical logic. In order to address this 
multifaceted topic, I start by articulating a part of the archive of the RJ just 
sketched out in the chapter 2: the authoritative conceptualizations of ‘victim’, 
‘offender’ and ‘community’. Once completed this archival analysis, I scrutinize 
the surfaces of emergence of those subject positions, operationalizing the key 
concepts of the problematization. Then, I focus on how a specific procedural 
discourse on the RJ (i.e. Victim-Offender Mediation), mobilizes and ‘offers’ the 
positions of ‘victim’, ‘offender’ and ‘community’ to individuals, according to an 
ethopolitical logic.  
 
5.1. Victim, Offender and Community in the archive of the 
Restorative Justice 
The authoritative discourses on the RJ are the bearers of various subject-
positions, i.e. specific positions of agency and identity in relation to particular 
forms of knowledge and practice1086. In order to re-construct the positions of 
‘victim’, ‘offender’ and ‘community’ within the archive of the RJ, I focus on 
and systematize how the ‘textbook’ literature conceives the ‘needs’ of those 
stakeholders. This seems the easiest way to understand the configuration of 
those positions, allowing both analytical parsimony and consistency. As just 
hinted in the chapter 2, Strang and Sherman, in their well-known analysis of 
crime victim’s positions in the literature on the RJ, reduce the victims’ needs to 
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five main meta-areas1087. The first victim’s need detected, it is to be informed. 
They refer to the fact that victims repeatedly consider one of the greatest 
sources of frustration the difficulty in finding out from criminal justice 
authorities about developments of their cases1088. A second fundamental want 
is the personal participation. A persistent complaint of victims is that they are 
not stimulated to feel part of justice proceedings in their case1089. Related to 
this need is the claim, highlighted by Strang and Sherman, of the victims’ 
necessity of emotional restoration and apology1090. Beyond the quantifiable 
damage victims of crime may experience, there are emotional and 
psychological dimensions of loss usually ignored by the justice machinery. On 
the other hand, victims themselves say that emotional harm is truly healed only 
by an act of emotional repair1091. In this perspective, a genuine apology 
exchange is thought to be fundamental to a successful restoration1092. Shapland 
et al.1093 additionally claim that victims are more positive to accept apologies by 
offenders when associated to ‘remorse through action’. In the same vein, 
Achilles and Zehr emphasize that victims need a ‘safe place’, meaning to say a 
physical and emotional space which allows them to recover from the 
victimization1094. They argue that any restorative intervention must first of all 
recognize the victim’s safety and security needs, both physical and emotional, 
giving an opportunity to identify and articulate personal needs. This stance is 
also stressed by Van Ness and Strong who identify the safety, both physical 
and emotional, as the most immediate need for crime victims1095. Heather 
Strang1096 has likewise stated that the need for a symbolic statement about the 
legitimacy of the victims’ status and acknowledgement of the emotional harm 
experienced, is an aspect of victimization which has only recently been given 
attention. The last fundamental victim’s need identified by Strang and Sherman 
is the compliance with the general principles of fairness and respect1097. They 
stress that victims’ sense of satisfaction with the justice system is not only 
related to the sentencing outcome, but fundamentally to the perception of 
fairness of the sentencing process at all. Woolford1098, in his recent overview of 
the RJ’s literature, essentially supports the outcomes of Strang and Sherman’s 
analysis. He identifies the following victim’s frequent requests: 
acknowledgement for being blameless as for the harm suffered; restitution of 
stolen items; monetary compensation; symbolic atonement/apology; sense of 
safety and closure; an opportunity for the victim to voice his/her suffering and 
continuing support. All these requests seem consonant with the 
aforementioned victims’ claims. 
The matter of offender’s needs is a less investigated area in RJ’s literature, 
respect to the victim’s one. Nevertheless it is possible to identify some 
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common and recurrent themes. Zehr argues that offenders usually lack both 
the in-depth understanding of the consequences of their actions and the ability 
to empathize with victims1099. They use neutralizing strategies (i.e. 
rationalizations to distance themselves from the people they hurt) and live in a 
sense of alienation from society at large, sharpened by the legal process1100. 
Zehr maintains that what offenders really need is to be encouraged to 
understand the impact of their behaviour -i.e. the harms done - and to take 
steps to put things right as much as possible1101. Offenders need from justice 
an accountability that addresses the resulting harms, encourages empathy and 
responsibility and transforms shame. They need encouragement to personal 
transformation, including healing for the harms that contributed to offending 
behaviour, opportunities for treatment, support for integration into the 
community, and temporary restraint, at least for some of them1102. Other well-
known analyses, both theoretical and empirical, have expressed considerations 
on offenders’ needs similar to the Zehr’s ones1103. Gavrielides has freshly and 
further supported this well-established representation. He asserts that in the 
RJ, victim and offender are not considered strangers, but related, because of 
the ‘social liaison’ that connects them1104. The offender occurs as a free 
individual, provided with rights that need to be respected and protected. 
Offenders also have obligations, among which is crucial to restore the balance 
that the offence has altered in the community. In general, offenders are “both 
considered mentally competent and hence morally culpable actors, who are expected to take 
responsibility for their actions, not only to the parties directly injured, but also to a wider 
community1105”. In a RJ’s perspective, victim and offender are two sides of the 
same coin; the offender is not a parasite of society, but ‘one of us’1106. 
If the offender’s needs are a scarcely explored area, it is not possible to say the 
same as for the ‘community’. Many and conflicting are the conceptualizations 
of this distinctive stakeholder in the RJ’s mainstay writings, emerging as an 
intensely fragmented topic. As McCold and Wachtel have noticed1107, it can be 
easily acknowledged the existence of a general agreement that ‘community’ is 
as central to the RJ as are the victim and the offender. Nevertheless, the 
concept of ‘community’ in the literature is not something unanimously shared, 
being present different definitions of it1108. As Wright maintains: “community is 
everyone: the shopkeeper, the doctor or nurse -even the bureaucrat from the Ministry of 
Education or Justice is a member of the community when he or she comes home1109”. Yet, 
for the most part, community remains a concept imprecisely defined. 
Community is described as a feeling, a perception of personal connectedness 
both to other human beings and to a group1110, the main actor to establish 
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peace1111, an endless process of transforming the conditions that give rise to 
criminality and criminalization1112. Despite these different views, one thing 
seems commonly assumed: crime is not reducible to the individual, it is a social 
phenomenon. The criminal justice, focusing exclusively on the individual 
offender and the specific harm caused to an individual victim, hinders the 
possibility of collective changes of broader social issues which lie behind 
criminal behaviours. Conversely, building social alliances is crucial in order to 
deal effectively with crimes, connecting people across the community, as well 
as forging pro-active social interventions, independent from the unwanted 
intrusions of the state. In this perspective, the point of intervention is to 
facilitate harmonious community relations, rather than constantly imposing 
rule-binding behaviours through the threat of force1113.  
It emerges from this short overview a basic configuration of the victim, 
offender and community’s ‘needs’ in the ‘textbook’ literature. Several 
inferences can be drawn from this outline. ‘Victims’ are often represented as a 
cohesive, united ensemble of people. They seem to be characterized by 
standard material, symbolical and emotional needs. This subject position 
implies to be dis-empowered, in search of participation, acknowledgement and 
empathy. Especially symbolical and emotional needs are stressed by the 
literature. Therefore, the victim is depicted as an ‘emotional subject’ deeply 
harmed by the offender, looking of healing, empowerment, transformation and 
relational recovery. The offender’s image is quite symmetrical to the victim’s 
one. The ‘relational side’ is frequently highlighted, being routinely underlined 
the offender’s need of transformation and personal development, achievable 
through a process which often entails apology, empathy and ‘reintegrative’ 
shame. Lastly, ‘community’ is mostly described as a consistent social entity, due 
to shared characteristics among its members, such as place or belief. It is a kind 
of communal network, with an assumed shared understanding of social 
phenomena (i.e. the crime) and a sense of connectedness which allegedly plays 
a role in ensuring freedom and security in opposition to the state (and the 
‘mainstream’ criminal justice as its expression). In addition, it must be noticed 
that the authoritative descriptions of ‘community’ usually do not take into 
consideration the possibility that community relationships (namely family and 
peer-to-peer dynamics) might promote or facilitate criminal behaviours1114. 
This overview is just a partial synthesis of what is meant ‘to be’ a victim, 
offender and community in the RJ’s literature. Particularly, it must be 
acknowledged the presence of several attempts to challenge the basic 
assumptions regarding the authoritative conceptualizations of the RJ’s 
stakeholders. This is the case of writings which aim at unveiling gender-, race-
or power-related unbalances which underpin the various conceptualizations of 
‘victim’, ‘offender’ and ‘community’ in the RJ’s literature1115. 
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5.2. Subjectivation 
The positions of ‘victim’, ‘offender’ and ‘community’ emerge from the 
interaction of several authoritative discourses. This virtual space, where 
discourses ‘battle’ over the subject positions’ definitions, by exclusions as well 
as combinations1116, is the discursive formation of the RJ. Legal categories are 
(partially) reshaped within this virtual space, and along with categories drawn 
upon other discourses, they define the meanings of ‘being’ victim, offender and 
community in the RJ, following the ethopolitical logic. From the standpoint of 
people involved in the applications of the RJ, this process is an example of 
how limited traits of subjectivities can be shaped, implicitly contributing to 
define their field of possible actions1117. Participants of RJ programs are, in fact, 
provided with words and patterns to think themselves, potentially influencing 
their self-image, creating possibilities of freedom or subjugation. This process 
is not unidirectional; the individuals who embody those subjectivities are not 
just passive points of application of discursive relations. To become ‘victim’, 
‘offender’ or ‘community’, involves several opportunities of self-organization 
and even active resistance against the backdrop of heteronomous discourses.  
 
5.2.1. Discourses, subjection and self-constitution 
As widely argued for in the previous pages, discourses are more than pure 
linguistic entities which inertly portray the reality. They do not refer to texts, in 
a narrow sense, but to “the ensemble of phenomena in and through which social 
production of meaning takes place, an ensemble which constitutes a society as such1118”. 
More precisely, discourses contribute to constitute subjectivities, offering 
positions from which to act and speak, making possible the establishment of 
specific idea(s) of ‘who we are’, in (and through) a given societal context1119. 
Therefore, subjectivities are not given by ‘nature’, but established through 
conflicting and intersecting discourses that encourage individuals to accept 
‘proper’ or ‘normal’ self-images, linked to broader and fragmented social 
contexts1120. Looking at this entangled process from the perspective of 
individuals, two different but synchronic phases can be considered. The first 
stage (subjection) results from the ways that discourses normalize the idea of 
ourselves, how they ‘interpellate’ us, the second (self-constitution) refers to the 
individual’s active realization of the self1121. Self-constitution concerns 
individuals’ self-identification with definite positions through their own 
volition, even though this might be a consequence of these positions being 
suggested or advocated by others through relations of power1122. Judith Butler 
argues that this double-edged process “denotes both the becoming of the subject and 
the process of subjection - one inhabits the figure of autonomy only by becoming subjected to a 
power, a subjection which implies a radical dependency1123”. She goes on claiming that 
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“such subjection is a kind of power that not only unilaterally acts on a given individual as a 
form of domination, but also activates or forms the subject1124”, implying a space for 
practices of resistance and self-construction. Subjectivities are then the “the 
point of suture1125” between the never-unified products of subjection and 
subjectivation. Not the mere sum of subjects positions, but their precarious 
and incessant synthesis. This process does not take place in a vacuum, but 
actually is imbricated in relation of forces which ensure the reproduction of the 
social system, facilitating, marginalizing or limiting the emergence of specific 
subject-positions, through practices of selection, exclusion and domination1126. 
Starting from these assumptions, the RJ can be thought as the field for a never 
finalized discursive struggle, where some discourses (including ‘mainstream’ 
criminal justice), in the course of time, gain a prioritized- however, temporary 
power in the production of specific subjectivities’ traits1127.  
 
5.2.2. Recalling the discursive formation of the Restorative Justice 
The discourses which make possible/understandable the RJ are multiple, 
intersecting and deeply different. As already highlighted, the first discourse to 
take into account is related to the consolidation of the (general) victimology as 
a scientific and academic discipline combined with the emergence of crime 
victims’ movement(s) in western contemporary democracies. The rise of the 
‘victimhood’, as academic subject and political resource, plays the role of 
crucial discursive pillar of the RJ. The victimological ‘necessity’ of the 
involvement of crime victims in criminal justice, and the political claim of 
meeting the expectations of crime victims have become key categories in the 
language of the proponents of the RJ. This is not a natural phenomenon, but 
the consequence of the consolidation of the victimological research and of and 
popularization of victim movements’ claims. A second discursive ‘actor’ of the 
RJ field, is the lato sensu communitarian claim in penal matters, given by the 
articulation of at least two different but synchronic discourses: the penal 
abolitionism (specially the institutional abolitionism) and the re-birth of 
communitarian philosophy in the late 1970s. Penal abolitionism is not merely a 
theory of decarceration, but an approach, a perspective, a methodology, and 
most of all, a way of seeing1128. As a paradigm, penal abolitionism rejects the 
reliance on penal structures and state-imposed oppression, as legitimate 
reactions to human conflict, harm and violence. This perspective also 
challenges the ontological reality of crime, unveiling its social construction and 
claiming community-led answers to the social problem of crime1129. In the 
same vein, communitarian claims finds the sources of social cohesion in shared 
assumptions so deeply engrained in everyday life, that they do not have to be 
articulated: in folkways, customs, prejudices etc.1130. In this perspective, 
individuals are densely enmeshed in interdependencies which have special 
qualities of mutual help and trust. These interdependencies have a symbolic 
significance which takes precedence over individual interests1131. If properly 
nourished, social interdependencies can work as a positive constraint for anti-
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social behaviours, including criminal acts. A third discourse to be considered is 
the so called ‘Psy-discourse’ and its spreading during the last two decades1132. 
This phenomenon refers to therapeutic languages which have informed a range 
of criminal justice policies emerging in recent years, particularly those designed 
to assist victims of crime, seemingly working as the secularized version of the 
action of religious groups involved in the criminal justice reform. Thanks to 
this discourse, it has now become widely accepted, that crime victims must be 
offered opportunities to tell the story of their victimization, express their pain, 
fear and/or anger about the offence, and to ‘be heard’. The last discursive 
component of the RJ field is the ‘mainstream’ Western legal-criminal discourse. 
Here, the emphasis is put on public needs triggered by the crime and on 
universal claims regarding the human behaviour. This discourse (both in 
utilitarian and Kantian versions) embraces the Enlightenment’s notion that a 
universal and transcendent rationality defines the formation of individual 
subjects1133. It conceives the subject as a transcendent and rationally self-
interested individual, whereas reason and rationality are the unifying principle 
underpinning subjectivity. Moreover, it shows a typical dichotomizing 
attitude1134. The criminal-legal rationality is, in fact, based on a binary 
classification system “both for evaluation of acts and for evaluation of persons. Acts 
become right or wrong -non-crimes or crimes- and persons criminals or non-criminals1135”.  
These seemingly unrelated discourses are pre-existing cultural, academic and 
political constructs which play the role of surfaces of emergence of the RJ1136, 
delimiting the space within which have slowly become 
understandable/possible its concepts and strategies. In this field is shaped a 
dispersal of apparently definite discursive objects, whose ‘victim’, ‘offender and 
‘community’ are nothing but examples. They do not precede their emergence 
under specific discursive conditions, being therefore not defined by their 
internal nature, but by the juxtaposition, intersection and competition of 
certain discourses. Becoming ‘victim’, ‘offender and ‘community’ occurs then 
as social and psychological effect of discursive relations acting upon individuals 
directly involved in RJ processes. Once adopted, those partial self-images 
deeply delimit the participants’ subjective experiences, delineating their field of 
possible actions. Many examples of these complex dynamics within the 
discursive formation of the RJ can be given. Victimological discourses clash 
against the ‘mainstream’ criminal justice because of the identification of the 
victims not as a universal subject, but as a contextual, local and specific entity. 
On the other hand, the focus on victim’ needs is in tension with the 
unalienable rights of the offender conceptualized (and safeguarded) in the 
‘mainstream’ criminal justice discourse. Moreover, insofar as the criminal 
justice discourse makes possible within the wider RJ’s context the emergence 
of human rights claims, the tension with the victimological discourses appears 
even more evident. The communitarian discursive component shows 
conflicting relations with the psy-discourses. In the communitarian perspective, 
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de-professionalisation and communitarian regulation of problematic situations 
are unquestionable points. Conversely, the therapeutic discourses imply the 
strong and regulative presence of experts, creating a vertical way of regulating 
social conflicts, which, as a consequence of this expert intervention, become 
‘intrapersonal conflicts’. These kinds of tensions have several implications for 
many RJ’s discursive objects. For instance, the contraposition between the 
different concepts of ‘trigger event’ or the various declinations of ‘restoration’ 
seem to be related to the tension abovementioned. The distinction between 
conflict, harm, normative violation or restitution and reparation, the link with 
the punishment and the criminal justice, are all depending on different (and 
divergent) kinds of knowledge which ‘ground’ the different RJ’s discourses. As 
already stated, the relationships between the RJ discourses can be seen also as 
of reciprocal integration and not only as conflict. This is the case of the link 
between victimological discourses and psy-discourses. The concept of active 
participation in the RJ processes, expressed also through the necessity of 
‘speaking out’ and ‘being heard’ on the experience of victimization, is a theme 
shared by both discourses. In this case, it must be noticed the particular 
combination between a normative claim which comes from the crime victims’ 
organizations and the descriptive accounts of psy-experts, regarding the 
necessity of expressing inner needs and being heard as a symmetrical 
complement.  
 
5.2.3. Becoming Victim, Offender and Community  
From the discursive formation of the RJ, as an effect of the interaction 
between the aforementioned discourses (especially the victimological/psy-
discourses), originates a ‘victim’ contextualized and characterized by emotions 
such as fear and loss of control, with multiple weaknesses and a unique sense 
of vulnerability. Once taken up, this subject position conveys the self-
perception of a lack of agency, control and resilience. Therefore it entails the 
(ethopolitical) necessity of self-improvement, shaped as enhancement of own 
self-management, self-control and self-actualization. The premise of such a 
position is that it depends on our own will, capacity and action to become 
‘victim’; we are responsible of embracing this status. At the same time, working 
on our ethical substance, we can re-shape this existential condition. Likewise, 
to conceive the relationships between ‘victim’ and ‘offender’ as dynamical, 
emotions-laden, characterized by needs to be re-addressed by personal 
involvement, speaking out and talking of the crime’s consequences, implies the 
development of a self-management posture facilitated by the work of the 
conveners of restorative programs. The position(s) of ‘community’ and its role 
in the restorative discourses, emerges from the combination of the idea of 
community as alternative to the state in dealing with social conflicts 
(abolitionism) with the model of social interdependency broadly worked out 
within the communitarian perspectives. Community appears as a kind of 
‘alternative’ to the state, but also to the social atomization processes caused by 
the privatization of public spaces. Community is the ‘third way’, the space 
where conflicts arise but also where they can be addressed. In the RJ discursive 
field, the binary opposition between the state (and criminal justice system as its 
manifestation) and a ‘virtual’ space radically different, independent and even 
alternative, arises as a recurrent trait. In this perspective, also the different 
versions of the ‘trigger event’ are related to that complex discursive 
combination. Particularly, the concepts of conflict and damage are rooted in 
the idea of ‘problematic situation’, an expression which replaces -in the 
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abolitionist view- identifying terms such as offence, crime and criminal act. At 
the same time, the mainstream means of state interventions on social conflicts 
appear to be an invasion of the community’s domain, an attempt of 
colonization, able to cause damages and social losses1137. As for the offender’s 
subject position, in the victimological discourse the offender is considered only 
as a ‘correlate’ of the victim, and not precisely characterized. In the 
‘mainstream’ criminal justice discourse, the offender is either a rational actor 
able to calculate the ‘price’ of his/her behaviour or a subject with a reduced 
capacity of rule-following due to moral or mental deficiencies. Psy-discourses 
regularly relate with this last account of the offender as a subject with precise 
deficits, whereas from the communitarian view, he/she could be shaped as the 
disturbing-factor of communitarian order, due to being less socialized or 
deliberately a rule-breaker. In the discursive formation of the RJ, these 
different descriptions of offender’s positions, determine a rather composite 
accounts and a less definite configuration respect to the victim’s case. It is 
again the ‘warm side’ which appears to be the prioritized dimension of this 
position, emerging chiefly from the emphasis on transformative ‘opportunities’ 
provided to the offender through the RJ processes. Opportunities shaped as 
spaces and moments of self-reflection, considering the individual reasons and 
consequences of his/her acts, insulating them from the wider social and 
cultural context. Thus, the concrete way to develop such opportunities is the 
work on himself/herself, in order to reach a better capacity of self-
management, self-care, self-surveillance as conditions for a peaceful social life. 
As for the offender’s subject position, must finally be stressed the overall 
limited attention devoted to its characterization in the authoritative discourses. 
It is actually remarkable the offender’s absence, or better, the exclusion of its 
clear representation in the discursive formation of the RJ. In this exclusion, is 
not to be seen a ‘lack’ of the discursive formation but indeed the effect of 
exclusionary processes which play a crucial role in the construction of any 
subjectivity. In this way, it makes it virtually impossible to think of the offender 
as something else than a necessary correlate of the victim or of a subject in 
need of legal protection. This point highlights the fact that the RJ discursive 
field entails both inhibiting and productive ways of defining its actors. 
Moreover, these processes of production, constraints and exclusion, seem 
inseparably linked to power relationships1138. In fact, the offender’s 
characterization through its ‘exclusion’, might be seen as related to the absence 
of an offender grass-root movement able to claim offenders’ needs. 
Conversely, the crime victim movement has intensely contributed to the 
construction of the RJ field, affirming victims’ interests and values in it1139. This 
has led to ‘prioritize’ the description of victims’ features and needs, bringing 
about a particular set of power-relations, rooted in a given historical and social 
context, which seemingly affects the offender’s configuration. 
 
5.3. Victim-Offender Mediation as vehicle of the ‘restorative’ 
subjectivation 
The discursive formation of the RJ ‘reaches’ concrete human beings insofar as 
it is operationalized by micro-level procedural discourses which set up 
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‘restorative’ roles, functions, means and goals directly involving individuals1140. 
The process of ‘restorative’ subjectivation, inspired by the post-social 
ethopolitical rationality, is then functionally depending on such ‘procedures’, 
among which VOM is par excellence the most diffused. For this reason I decide 
to focus on it as paradigmatic example of how the discursive formation of the 
RJ activates processes of subjectivations, ‘offering’ the specific subject 
positions above analyzed, to individuals. The aspects of the VOM procedure 
fitting with this analysis, revolve around the mediation session itself. As we 
have seen in the chapter 2, some variations exist in the way VOM procedures 
unfold, nevertheless are recognizable some ‘authoritative’ patterns. The 
standard VOM procedure is characterized by four steps: case referral and 
intake; preparation for mediation; mediation session(s); mediation follow-
up1141. The mediation session usually consists of the introductory statement by 
mediator; the parties’ storytelling phase; face to face exchange of information 
and clarification of facts; reviewing victim losses and options for 
compensation; developing written agreement; closing statement by the 
mediator1142. When we focus on the ‘restorative’ subjectivation, the case 
referral/intake is the first crucial phase to be analyzed and discussed. In the 
chapter 2, we saw how the authoritative discourses define three alternative case 
referrals hypothesis: the guilty plea of the person charged, the conviction (and 
the admission of responsibility), the voluntary participation without reserves 
regarding the criminal charge. In the first two cases the acceptance of the 
charge automatically entails the acceptance of the legal status of ‘offender’, 
while the counterpart is automatically assigned the status of ‘victim’. ‘Offender’ 
and ‘victim’ are then legal/criminal qualifications projected in the RJ 
procedures and then interacting with the same ‘labels’ but understood from a 
‘restorative’ perspective. The consequence is that the subject positions of 
‘offender’ and ‘victim’ in the deployment of the VOM, are the product of 
specific conflicts, overlaps and combinations between the ‘legal discourse’ and 
the restorative discourses. In the third case the situation is slightly different. 
Here the legal distinction stands between a person charged (but not sentenced 
yet) and a person filing the criminal complaint. This implies that in the case of 
activation of the VOM, the weight of the legal status will be seemingly ‘lighter’, 
i.e. conditioning to a lesser extent the signification of the subject positions and 
the effects of their assignation. As for the storytelling phase, it provides the 
person qualified as ‘offender/charged person’ with the opportunity to offer 
his/her point of view about the happenings leading the case, while the 
‘victim/charging person’ can listen directly, confront and question the other 
party, describing the effects of those happenings on his/her life. The 
responsibility of the person institutionally labeled as ‘mediator’ is to make 
ideally understandable the parties’ narrative, reframing, paraphrasing, 
acknowledging emotions, translating/verbalizing emotions, synthetizing1143. 
The mediator’s role is not to allocate responsibilities, blaming parties or 
offering ‘solutions’. Mediator must remain neutral (change the disputant’s 
perspective; don’t try to change his mind), eventually defining the relevant 
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background information during the second phase of the VOM process 
(preparation for mediation), meeting in private with each party. The mere 
‘procedural’ role of the mediator suggests the parties they are the ‘masters of 
their destiny’, responsibilizing them as well as individualizing the conflict, 
qualified as a mere private issue. On a general note, the mediator must portray 
himself/herself as someone who cares about parties’ situation and is interested 
in seeing their concerns taken seriously. However, the VOM’s sessions are 
considered successful only to the extent that the ‘victim’ and the mediator 
consider the resolution satisfactory. Because the VOM “channels communication 
into areas specifically for redressing harm done, no attention is paid to status, race, ethnicity, 
class, or gender issues1144”. Finally, what distinguishes the VOM from legal dispute 
resolution is the “range of creative possibilities open to mediators who have the power to 
encourage mediation participants in a specific direction toward resolution of their dispute1145”.  
 
5.3.1. Confession as subjectivating technique in Victim-Offender 
Mediation 
As Morgan Brigg argues, in the VOM process the mediator serves as the figure 
to whom the parties confess and as the one who specifies the parameters for 
confessing1146. ‘Confession’ here identifies, in foucauldian perspective, a crucial 
technique of the self in which the individual confesses his/her sentiments, 
opinions, and desires to an external authority1147. The process of storytelling, 
both in the private and in the common sessions, aims at ‘revealing’ the 
individual and activates a process of self-work (re-evaluating thoughts, 
behaviors, actions, and overall way of being) which might be valued by VOM 
participants as an opportunity to speak and to be heard and thereby achieve 
some measure of justice1148. From this phase onward, the VOM processes 
characteristically take the form of a protracted confessional in which a specific 
approach to conflict and selfhood is promoted and reinforced. In this context 
the legal ‘labels’ are partially re-worked and the restorative subject positions 
signified, assigned and resisted by the parties. Such a process is developed 
especially as a consequence of the mediator’s ‘technical’ activities. Depending 
on process differences and mediator styles, parties may be ‘trained’ about 
appropriate communication styles, ‘coached’ on ways of relating more 
constructively, ‘taught’ how to positively express own emotions and face 
other’s behaviour. The (unidirectional) establishment of mediation’s ground 
rules to be accepted by parties at the beginning of the session is the most 
elementary way for the mediator to establish goals and means but also roles 
and identities during the forthcoming phases. In this context, crucial 
techniques are the reframing and the translation/verbalization of emotions. 
Broadly speaking, reframing is “to change the conceptual and/or emotional setting or 
viewpoint in relation to which a situation is experienced and to place it in another frame 
which fits the ‘facts’ of the same concrete situation equally well, or even better, and thereby 
changes its entire meaning1149”. Concretely, reframing involves to choose of 
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paraphrasing/emphasizing or to avoid it “shifting the attitude or orientation of 
parties. At its most subtle, it can involve paraphrasing anger and other emotion that parties 
express in a calm and steady voice, serving as a demonstration that such matters can and 
should be handled in a particular way1150”. In this way the mediator aims at “signaling 
them as inappropriate, suggesting agenda items in ‘neutral’ terms, diffusing personal attacks, 
directing a party to address a shared problem, and redirecting discussion from surface-level 
positions to underlying interests1151”. The technique of reframing is applied through 
mediator’s understated restrictions, encouragements, and recompenses. For 
instance, if an “emotional or accusatory statement from one party to another is reframed by 
a mediator and the party subsequently adopts a more conciliatory tone, mediator intervention 
will be relaxed- signaling appropriate behavior by the party1152”. On the other hand, if a 
party overlooks a reframe, more reframes and other stronger interventions may 
be used in order to indicate censure for that behaviour. In this way, “reframing 
encourages parties to reposition themselves as rational rather than emotional, constructive 
rather than destructive, conciliatory rather than combative1153”. 
The technique of translation/verbalization of emotions is another typical way 
in which the confessional character of VOM is deployed. A basic mediator task 
is to help parties to express ‘correctly’ their emotions. This means to establish 
implicit or explicit parameters of manifesting and discussing emotions as 
crucial issues at stake during the exchange phase. Parties are encouraged to 
express and elaborate their emotions in ‘constructive’, ‘positive’, ‘future-
centered’ ways. A kind of intimacy between the mediators and the parties is 
henceforth created. Such an intimate sharing of emotions on the other side, 
does not directly involve the mediator, who will never declare his/her 
emotions to the parties. This generates a singular power asymmetry ‘in favor’ 
of the mediator (see next paragraph). The translation/verbalization of 
emotions is nothing but a way to produce controlled channels for emphasizing 
the ‘warm side’ of the conflict as well as for shaping the parties’ self-image as 
subjects deeply concerned with their inner world. Moreover, the necessity of 
an external normative regulation of own emotions conveys the message of 
deficiency of self-management and accordingly (tautologically) it justifies the 
mediator’s intervention. ‘Offender’ and ‘victim’ as subject positions, come to 
be characterized by a strong emotional dimension, and as implicitly lacking of 
that crucial ethopolitical quality which is the self-control. 
 
5.3.2. Victim-Offender Mediation, confession and power 
The systematic, confessional pressure on disputants to express their stories and 
selves in ways understandable to the mediators and intelligible within the goals 
of the mediation session, presents itself ad deeply power-embedded. As 
Foucault argues, power relations are integral to the confessional: “one does not 
confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the 
interlocutor but the authority who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and 
intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console and reconcile1154”. In other words, for 
Foucault confession attributes a specific power to the silent interlocutor, i.e. 
the mediator1155. As Schehr argues1156, among the factors Foucault names for 
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producing a power through confession, at least one is applicable to VOM, the 
“clinical codification of the inducement to speak1157”. The clinical codification within 
VOM entails the “narrative reconstructions of events, feelings, attitudes, thoughts, and 
actions are listed, organized, and interpreted consistent with scientific principles1158”. This 
technical aspect of VOM induces a power relationship insofar as demands “a 
subject’s confession through force or coercion and the construction of the facade of neutrality 
through the emphasis on procedural detail1159”. Parties are encouraged to confess their 
innermost emotions, feelings opinions to a subject (the mediator) who is not 
an equal partner in the communicative act but rather “the authority who requires 
the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, 
console, and reconcile1160”. The mediator translates the confession received in 
apparently neutral bureaucratic and rational codes, retaining a position of 
ethical neutrality which amplifies his/her role as benevolent and trustworthy 
authority, whose indictments, rewards and sanctions cannot be discharged or 
even doubted. Broadly speaking, VOM’s confessional structure implies forms 
of normalization and individualization which ‘oblige’ VOM’s participants to be 
free but regulated, experiencing the liberating effects of self-inspection and of 
self-regulation1161. Confession here works as an affirmation of our self and our 
identity that involves “contemporary procedures of individualization” that “binds us to 
others at the very moment we affirm our identity. In truthfully confessing who one is to others 
(e.g. to parents, teachers, friends, lovers and oneself) ‘one is subjectified by another […] who 
prescribes the form of the confession, the words and rituals through which it should be made, 
who appreciates, judges, consoles, or understands1162”. The confessional procedure of 
VOM is the site of formulation, assignment of (but also resistance to) subject 
positions which potentially shape the parties’ selves as emotionally laden, 
aiming at becoming responsible, autonomous, self-actualizing. Confession then 
is a pivotal channel for (re)creating ourselves “by creating our own narrative, 
reworking the past, in public, or at least in dialogue with another1163”. When the subject 
is confessing to the mediator and the other party, creating its ‘self’, it seems to 
feel compelled to tell the truth about itself. Therefore, confession involves a 
type of ‘discipline’ that “entails training in the minute arts of self-scrutiny, self-evaluation 
and self-regulation1164”. Within the VOM session this means to push parties to 
comply with specific the rules of control of the body, speech, and movement 
dictated by the mediator. The VOM as a confessional procedure appears then 
an “autobiographical enterprise1165” which mobilizes certain subject positions, 
“compelling us to narratively recreate ourselves, it is also about assigning truth-seeking 
meaning to our lives1166”.  
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5.3.3. Other subjectivating techniques in Victim-Offender Mediation: 
documentation and individualization 
Other subjectivating techniques in VOM underscore the procedural aspects of 
documentation, i.e. the note taking activities throughout the VOM process1167. As 
Schehr notices, especially pre-mediation private meetings with the parties are 
fundamental for gathering data1168. From these data it is possible to infer “the 
formulation of narrative used in the mediation session. It is these data that will provide the 
guideposts for distinguishing matters of fact from fiction. As the mediation session will be 
contextualized within recognition of the known facts and subject positions, these data also 
allow the mediator to retain the perception of neutrality1169”. In short, the mediator by 
‘neutrally’ documenting the ‘facts’ establishes what is relevant, and how to 
legitimately treat it. In this indirect way the mediator decides “based on previously 
gathered data, who is more accurately, and perhaps compassionately, telling the truth1170”, 
exercising a powerful control over the mediation session, concealed by the 
neutrality’s mantle. Another subjectivating technique must be analyzed when 
we focus on VOM. During the early stages of the mediation session the parties 
come to be separated “from broader politics and networks, coupled with a focus on the 
individual person or group as the locus of the dispute and its resolution1171”. The basic 
non-negotiable assumption of VOM as such, is that parties resolve the dispute 
by themselves; they have the power to create peaceful solutions, enabled by the 
mediator. The mediator since the beginning avoids entering into discussions 
with parties regarding the injustice, unfairness and censurability of behaviours, 
clearly distinguishing between “the ‘process’ and ‘content’ dimensions of the dispute and 
resolution process1172”. Only the ‘process’ is the mediator’s field of action: he/she 
cannot recommend the ‘content’ of solutions, because, form his/her 
perspective, the process is the content. At the same time through the 
documentation procedure, the mediator indeed separates legitimate issues form 
prohibited ones, actually affecting the content through the process. In this 
paradoxical way, parties are stimulated to feel as responsible of the VOM’s 
outcomes, but also as lacking of that control over the ‘process’ which is the 
mediator’s exclusive domain. One of the effect of such a regulation of the 
‘content’ through the guide of the ‘process’ is the detachment of the parties’ 
issues “from broader political forces and other (for example, family and communal) 
networks, in combination with an emphasis on individual responsibility, mark out the terrain 
for the operation of power in the mediation session proper1173”. In fact if the mediator is 
able to make the preparatory stages successful, “disputants are less likely to interpret 
their dispute as part of a broader social issue relating to race, culture, gender, class, power, 
and so on. Instead, they will tend to focus on their role in the dispute and what they can 
possibly do in mediation to resolve it1174”. The purported mediator’s substantive 
neutrality, the documentation as truth-making process concealed by the 
fictional separation between ‘content’ and ‘process’, operative since the 
introductory phases of the mediation process, contribute to produce power 
relationships between mediator and parties with subjectivating effect. It 
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emerges an image of disputing subjects as morally deficient in need of the 
mediator’s guide substantive/procedural, which conveys a parties’ self-image as 
lacking of control and emotionally laden. The necessity of self-examination, 
self-regulation, and responsibilization within the apparently apolitical, neutral 
and procedural framework drafted by the mediator, becomes then the channel 
for the molding of a restorative subject as well as the target of specific forms 
of resistance.  
 
5.4. Resistance (parties) 
The ‘restorative’ subjectivation implies the possibility of counteracting and 
resisting to the discursive assignation of the subject positions of ‘victim’, 
‘offender’ and ‘community’, acting on the power relations they become 
involved in, for example during VOM sessions. The ‘subjection’ to normalizing 
discourses is, indeed, only one dimension of that becoming. The other, 
complementary side of this process, are the practices of resistance as self-
constitution. Discourses in fact, can be contested, challenged and resisted. As 
Butler states “[T]o claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; 
on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its 
agency1175”. According to Foucault, relations of power cannot exist in the 
absence of freedom which gives rise to the possibility of resistance1176. Foucault 
describes a situation within which “different actions, in given power relations, can be 
used as forms of transformation, which consequently change the possible future effects1177”. 
This perspective “does not reduce the living individual to the power practices that secure its 
intelligibility, and thus does not imply a determinism or dispensability of the individual1178”. 
Individuals are actually thought as free, because agents of power, actors of 
contingent practices with a contingent effect. Freedom, in this context, “is 
neither an essential nor an a priori attribute of humans. Rather, it is an integral part of the 
description of social reality in terms of effects, in which freedom designates practices that 
challenge the regularity of power1179”. Freedom is then immanent to the dynamic of 
power as the space of contingency the power itself continuously creates. To be 
aware and to take possession of such a space, directly contributing to the 
production of own individuality, is to exercise resistance. Resistance, then, can 
be thought as a paradigmatic way of performing self-constitution. It consists 
not in finding the true ‘us’ behind ideological façades, but in actively 
contributing to the process of self-production, which as such involves always 
the exercise of power-knowledge. It is possible to resist the discursive 
subjection drawing upon counter-discourses, different narratives that shape 
self-images in many and deeply diverse ways. Subjectivities are always in-relation, 
and as such, are never isolated but instead the product of several discursive 
influences. This entails that people can see themselves as different people in 
different discursive contexts, choosing and/or nuancing their subjective 
subjectivities. In the case of the RJ, this means that individuals involved in 
restorative processes are faced with a field of possibilities in which several 
kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behaviour are 
available. Resistance in this context means to oppose a subject position to 
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‘Postmodernism’, cit., p. 164. 
1176 Foucault, M. (1982). The subject and power, cit., p. 211. 
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another externally imposed, creating space of freedom through the active re-
inscription of subjectivities. It is a specific kind of ‘struggle for the 
acknowledgement’ of a different subjectivity (or subjectivities’ traits), based on 
different discursive resources, which express new possibilities of being. 
Through the production of new and different meanings, it is possible to re-
define subjectivities against subjugating effects of heteronomous discourses. 
Concretely, the possibility of drawing upon diverse and even oppositional 
repertoires of being and behaving, is affected by several factors. The social, 
cultural and economic habitus of the individuals involved in restorative 
processes, might play a relevant role in activating (or reducing) any form of 
resistance. Moreover, as we have seen, the conveners of restorative processes 
(e.g. victim-offender mediators, facilitators, etc.) might enable or hamper the 
re-inscription of subjectivities tentatively performed by stakeholders. 
Accordingly, the tension between the discourses which aim at subjugating and 
the attempts of self-constitution, remains linked to the possibility to access and 
actively use different “discursive environments1180”. This makes the strategy of 
resistance precarious, unresolved or potentially never-ending. Here, the matter 
of power relationships involved in the production of subjectivities comes into 
light1181. In the case of restorative ‘practices’, one might think that the 
assessment of power ‘balance’ between parties must be a precondition of any 
intervention. If one of the parties is not enabled to access alternative discursive 
resources to constitute his/her subject position, the restorative process seems 
doomed to generate the pure subjugation of more ‘vulnerable’ individuals. 
Accordingly, the role of the RJ’s conveners as well as the awareness of their 
cultural and social ‘embeddeness’, emerge as crucial and problematic issues1182. 
 
5.5. Resistance (practitioners) 
How practitioners should handle the power effects of the restorative 
subjectivation? Mary Swigonski1183 outlines some interesting conditions for the 
action of a mediator working with marginalized or disempowered individuals 
or groups, which to some extent can be re-shaped as concrete possibilities of 
resistance to the power the mediator himself/herself conveys. The first 
condition, is to accept that there are many ‘truths’, i.e. there is no overarching 
truth and there are no universal principles, meta-theories, or metanarratives. 
Additionally mediators should resist expressions of normalizing power 
acknowledging that the celebration of difference takes precedence over 
normative goals. To be aware and understand how power relationships both 
produce and are produced by discourses as beforehand stated, is also of crucial 
importance additionally knowing how to challenge the dominant 
discourses/practices avoiding to collude with them1184. Moreover, mediators 
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should be interested in the lived experience of people and discursive effects on 
the subjectivities, and place emphasis on allowing people to construct their 
own identity within the mediation, offering as many discursive environments as 
possible to them. They should be willing to negotiate with parties the 
interpretive framework that is necessary for determining the mediation’s 
outcome, enabling ways of working, facilitating inclusive strategies of decision-
making for whom might be potentially unable to develop counter-discourses. 
Acknowledging tensions and value conflicts associated with recognition of 
diverse values and difference as part of the negotiating process is another 
remarkable way of resisting the power effects of subjectivation processes 
identified by Swigonski. Finally, avoiding the self-definition and own role as 
‘neutral’ (being formal, professional, and avoiding being affected by people’s 
emotions are not neutral behaviors), emphasizing the importance of self-
reflexivity in the mediator, while valuing the creative use of self, might work 
out as effective tools for the resistance of VOM practitioners.  
Brigg has come up with a long list of recommendation for mediators willing to 
take control over subjectivating processes embodied in mediation1185. He 
argues that agendas as well as technical and analytical language may be 
eliminated, “reflecting the importance of poetic, affective, metaphorical, and nonlinear 
understandings and stories as ways of dealing with conflict1186”. Moreover “emotional and 
spiritual spheres may be integral to the mediation rather than being viewed as disturbing 
factors or problems to move beyond1187”. Apparently ‘external’ political and social 
contexts may enter into the mediation process. For instance, the mediation 
may not occur as a discrete process but could be part of a broader facilitated 
negotiation process that may include visits to individuals’ or families’ homes1188. 
It may not be expected that parties will be consistent in their contributions to 
the mediation process1189. Mediators may become more personally involved 
with the parties than traditional notions of professionalism and neutrality 
recommend. They should allow VOM’s session to become be a site for the re-
construction of meaning through conflict1190. This may involve greater 
acceptance of (including resisting intervening into) expressions of anger and 
similar feelings. Outbursts can signal important boundaries and the fault lines 
of (currently) irreconcilable differences that speak to participants’ identities and 
political orientations1191. To attempt to address these can violate participants’ 
perspectives and undermine political and personal goals they may be pursuing 
both through and beyond mediation1192. Mediators should allow subjectivities 
to combine or fragment in ways contrary to see either promoted by or 
accepted in standard VOM practice. For instance, in some cases it should be 
allowed that the person and the problem are one, rather than attempting to 
separate them as a recurrent mediation’s ground rule says. This makes possible 
to acknowledge the integral nature that emotion and affect may play for some 
people and mitigates the extent to which participants’ subjectivities are 
available for examination by mediators. At other times, it may be appropriate 
to allow subjectivities to fragment rather than combine1193. For example, rather 
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than valuing consistent and coherent performances by participants, it may be 
suitable to accept that a person’s behaviors will change throughout a session 
because of different contexts coming into operation. Brigg moreover suggests 
being aware that participation by previously excluded groups is not sufficient 
basis to ensure ethical practice1194. Involving people, for instance, in setting 
their own agenda does not address the operation of power that occurs through 
the process of organizing interactions in this way. Finally to experiment with 
different conversational and organizing structures might facilitate this form of 
resistance1195. This can include resisting ordering strategies drawn from one 
tradition or heritage and experimentation with non-standard approaches, or 
stimulating parties to identify phases of the mediation process which might be 
problematic for them, seeking -and be responsive to- their input1196. To the 
persuasive Swigonski’s and Brigg’s recommendations, it is lastly possible to add 
the necessity for the mediator to transform the legal statuses as a matter of 
discussion and not as coercive projection of the criminal/legal discourse in the 
restorative process. Of course all these concrete forms of practitioners’ 
resistance, clearly intertwined with the parties’ ones, are not immune of 
creating other power relationships, potentially determining asymmetries, 
unbalances, discriminations. This list is just an attempt to show some of the 
countless possibilities of redefining the practitioners’ field of possible actions 
and of contingently acting upon others’ behaviours in a RJ setting. 
 
5.6. The Restorative subject 
The restorative subjectivation as conveyed by the VOM process, profiles a 
somehow overall image of the ‘restorative’ subject. Its features exemplify the 
ethopolitical post-social citizen as “a moral individual […] both self responsible and 
subject to certain emotional bonds of affinity to a circumscribed network of other 
individuals1197”. It emerges in fact, the image of a self-governing subject, further 
characterized by a particular emotional dimension. A subject constitutively 
engaged in practices of choice, enterprise, and self-actualization, responsible 
for managing the outcomes of his life1198, continuously undertaking 
subjectivity-crafting decisions and actions1199. ‘Self-governing subject’ means 
two things: first that from the discursive formation of the RJ emerges a subject 
prone to self-surveillance and second, to self-regulation. Self-surveillance denotes 
the fashioning of individuals’ care to their actions and thoughts when 
constituting themselves as subjects of their conduct1200. This concept of self-
surveillance implies the stipulation that individuals might be ‘dangerous’ to 
themselves, and therefore must be cared for and worked upon, producing in 
this manner a specific ethical substance1201. For this reason it is necessary to 
shape the subjects to constantly ‘survey’ themselves, delimitating in this way an 
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ethical substance that comprises both constituting an internal danger and 
defining the practices for containing it. The second dimension concerns the 
self-regulative aim of restorative subjects. The RJ gives opportunity for 
‘choice’, for ‘autonomous’ life plans and the ‘freedom’ to be the persons they 
want to be1202. This model assumes that ‘good’ government is “a republic of 
autonomous self-governors1203”. The RJ ensures choice, freedom and autonomy, 
conveying the message that norms of obligation, accountability and 
responsibility continually turn the subject back on itself. This perspective shifts 
the necessity for social responsibilities to the domain of hyper-individual 
responsibility. Through these norms, subjects are induced to assume the 
ultimate politics of personal self-rule. Within this process of self-constitution, 
individuals ‘naturally’ choose to fashion a unique, better, more productive and 
regulated self. As Rose writes: “Incorporating, shaping, channeling, and enhancing 
subjectivity have been intrinsic to the operations of government. […] Rather, the government 
of subjectivity has taken shape through the proliferation of a complex and heterogenous 
assemblage of technologies. These have acted as relays, bringing the varied ambitions of […] 
authorities into alignment with the ideals and aspirations of individuals, with the selves each 
of us want to be1204”. But restorative subjects are not simply just ‘free to choose’, 
they are obliged to be free. The link between the spheres of government and the 
‘free’ individual is not just an external imposition but also an internal one1205. 
The RJ centres on ‘healthy subjectivities’, which are designated as the sources 
of freedom, responsibility and choice. In order to help individuals realize their 
potential and dreams, the RJ emphasizes the role played by liberty of choice in 
individual attempts to deal with ‘problematic situations’. Lastly, it is possible to 
argue that the RJ promotes emotional subjects. Emotions are socially and 
institutionally produced and amplified, intimately related to the social 
institutions of power, i.e. to mechanisms of power for inculcating new 
emotional and moral imperatives -rather than to moral ideas and ethical 
prohibitions. Through the RJ, mechanisms of power such as the confession 
structure of VOM, inculcate new emotional imperatives of greater 
consequence than ideas about the emotions and emotional prohibitions. 
Particularly, the RJ, via the discourse of the centrality of emotions, may 
contribute to render subjects increasingly governable1206. Their field of action 
may be structured as wide range of possible actions to be ‘enjoyed’ insofar as 
the emotions are liberated but harnessed, enfranchised but controlled1207. The 
conduct of ‘emotional’ subjects comes to be understood as in need of 
direction1208, paralleled by a purported increased responsibilization1209 which 
derives from the fact that the first controller of the emotional subject is the 
subject himself/herself. But the restorative subject is not only a unidirectional 
product of external forces which shape it as self-governing. Indeed the 
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possibility of resistance to such forces is always possible as attempts to self-
constitution, the construction of new or different truths about himself/herself, 
the production of a new or different self. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS: THE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPARATUS 
 
“Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of 
constraint1210” 
 
6.0. Introductory remarks  
This work started out with a reformulation of the foucauldian meta/theories, 
toward the definition of the problematization as historical and critical approach 
to the RJ. The goal has been to reconstruct the authority of the archive of the 
RJ, as well as its historical emergence and conceptual features as contingent, 
historical, and contextual1211. The main effect of mapping the constitution and 
historically situating the archive of the RJ is to relativize its taken-for-
grantedness, de-familiarizing the ‘present’ of the RJ. From the deployment of 
this approach emerges an epistemological/conceptual tension field within 
which the RJ gains consistence as a four-dimensional historical object. The 
dimension of the archive, as system of authoritative discourses on the historical 
explanation, conceptual justification and procedural aspects of the RJ; the 
dimension of the discursive formation, as the development of the archive and 
its historical set-in-motion; the dimension of the post-social ethopolitical 
rationality integral to the RJ as discursive formation; the dimension of the 
restorative subjectivation deployed by the restorative ‘practices’. Each 
dimension ‘causes’ the others, depending, as a meaningful configuration, on 
them. In these last pages I propose to ‘sublimate’ the four dimensions using a 
different conceptual construct/analytical tool, the apparatus of the RJ. This 
expression refers to the network of relationships between the object researched 
(RJ) and its effects of promoting and sustaining certain types of power-
knowledge1212. In this way it is possible to comprehensively look back to the 
path taken, acknowledging its achievements as well as doubting of its authority 
and its truths. In cutting across the RJ through the ‘apparatus-view’ (i.e. to re-
construct the RJ as apparatus), new and rather different elements, problems, 
associations and relations can be seen and a ‘diagonal’ understanding of the 
power-knowledge embeddeness of the RJ it is possible to achieve.  
 
6.1. What is an apparatus? 
The concept of apparatus (or dispositif) plays the role of a “grid of analysis1213” 
which comprises all the constitutive elements, power and knowledges, contin-
gently linked together by the apparatus itself. As Foucault wrote,  
 
“What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly 
heterogenous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions–in 
short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the 
apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be 
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established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to 
identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that 
can exist between these heterogenous elements. Thus, a particular 
discourse can figure at one time as the program of an institution, and at 
another it can function as a means of justifying or masking a practice 
which itself remains silent, or as a secondary re-interpretation of this 
practice, opening out for it a new field of rationality. In short, between 
these elements, whether discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of 
interplay of shifts of position and modifications of function which can 
also vary very widely. Thirdly, I understand by the term “apparatus” a 
sort of -shall we say- formation which has as its major function at a 
given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The 
apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function. This may have been, 
for example, the assimilation of a floating population found to be 
burdensome for an essentially mercantilist economy: there was a strategic 
imperative acting here as the matrix for an apparatus which gradually 
undertook the control or subjection of madness, sexual illness and 
neurosis1214. 
 
An apparatus is then not only a ‘re-writing’ of existing meanings, but also the 
‘imposition’ of new meanings between a range of heterogeneous elements 
(practices, institutions, conducts, subjectivities). It is a research strategy but 
also the product of such an approach. It is a perspective, an analytical lens, 
which re-shapes specific research objects, enabling the researcher to account 
for the emergence of practices, institutions, conducts, subjectivities, and to 
place these elements in a broader perspective1215. In Foucault’s view, the 
researcher ‘has’ an apparatus when he or she succeeds in isolating a network of 
power relations sustaining and being sustained by certain types of knowledge, 
joined and disjoined by a strategic logic operating against a background of 
discursive formations1216. What keeps together these heterogenous elements, is 
a play of power linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which depend on it 
but, at the same time, are condition it. Furthermore, the apparatus-view allows 
to see the strategic orientation of those networks of elements, how their 
power-knowledge relations manage to give them and maintain a dominant 
position, elevating and enabling particular discourses to ‘explain’ (and therefore 
define) them as necessary, normal, natural etc.1217. Moreover, through the 
apparatus, the researcher is facilitated to capture the “urgent need1218”, the 
specific historical ‘problem’, to which the power-knowledge embedded 
networks respond, in a given time and space. Such an initial response to a 
pressing situation can gradually have a more general rationality extracted from 
it, and hence be turned into a technology of power applicable to other 
situations. The apparatus appears then as a powerful 
conceptual/methodological tool, apt to “cut reality in a different way1219”, in our 
case to re-think the RJ as a complex of power-knowledge relationships with a 
strategic logic responding a specific historical ‘problem’. 
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6.2. The Restorative Justice Apparatus  
In this perspective the RJ refers to the network of all the elements, “the said and 
the not-said1220”, which contribute to enhance and maintain the exercise 
of power within the social body, according to a strategic logic1221. It functions 
to define and to regulate targets constituted through a mixed economy of 
power and knowledge. At the same time is a tool for analyzing or 
understanding a multiplicity of forces in movement and contest. These 
strategic assemblages are initially formed as responses to crises, problems or 
perceived challenges to those who govern. The RJ apparatus must be thought 
then, as a specific strategic response (or at least a part of it) to a specific 
historical ‘problem’. But such a response to a given state of affairs can 
progressively reach a more general rationality, and therefore be turned into a 
technology of power applicable to other situations. Further, despite the initial 
intention that an apparatus will respond in a targeted way to a particular 
problem to achieve a specific strategic objective, diverse and unplanned effects 
can and do result. In the next pages I shortly re-formulate the discourse so far 
developed, in the apparatus perspective, emphasizing two dimensions integral 
to this viewpoint: the kind of power-knowledge of the RJ and the ‘urgent need’ 
it responds. The first step is to identify and analyze which knowledges have 
been called out and developed in terms of certain imperatives of power1222 by 
the discursive formation of the RJ. The RJ, in fact, from the ‘apparatus’ 
perspective (i.e. the RJ apparatus), appears a tangle of knowledges supported 
and supportive of specific power relationships, characterized to be productive, 
diffused, infinitesimal. The second step is to conceptualize the urgent need such 
epistemic-power structures responds. 
 
6.2.1. ‘Partial’ power-knowledge 
As a recurrent epistemic structure in the discursive formation of the RJ, the 
‘partial’ power-knowledge constructs the RJ as a precise approach to non-
functioning social relationships between actors ontologically opposed (‘weak’ 
versus ‘strong’ actor), i.e. defining a power relationship essentially unbalanced, 
dichotomic, and amenable to transformation on condition of parties’ self-
improvement. This knowledge individualizes social issues, connecting their 
causes and effects to the individual ethos. On the other side, it portrays the 
necessity of ‘being directed’ from outside as the ‘procedural’ condition for 
realizing that self-improvement. In this way, it instills a specific freedom which 
is constitutively lacking, an individual responsibility for managing social 
relationships which is always in need of external support. The partial 
knowledge plays the role of main epistemic viewpoint in the definition of the 
authoritative historical explanations, theoretical conceptualizations and 
procedural discourses on the RJ. As for the historical explanations, it mainly 
permeates the explications of the crisis of criminal justice as its impossibility to 
satisfy the ‘weak’ party. Moreover several core conceptual features of the RJ 
seem orientated by this knowledge. Examples are the characteristics of 
different subject positions within the authoritative discourses, the harmization 
of crime (i.e. harming the ‘weak’ party as ‘trigger event’ of the RJ), and the idea 
of reparation/restoration (i.e. how to deal with the harms suffered by the 
‘weak’ party). As for the authoritative discourses on ‘how doing’ RJ, the 
centrality in VORP or VOM of the storytelling phase is, for instance, based on 
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this epistemic perspective, insofar as it is used to allow parties to individualize 
their relationship and to draw boundaries between the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ 
positions. Such an epistemic orientation is embedded is specific power 
relationships. This means that it is integral to a mobile network of 
‘conducts’1223 (in the double meaning of behavior and the shaping of 
behavior1224), of attempts to structure the terrain of action of others1225. The 
‘strong’ party is constructed as the actor with a greater decision-making power, 
he/she ‘decides’ the relationship with the counterpart, structuring him/her as 
‘weak’. Furthermore, an ethical qualification is associated to the two positions 
(‘weak’ is ‘good’, ‘strong’ is ‘bad’). The ‘weak’ party is thought to naturally 
undergo an undeserved situation, and accordingly the fulfillment of his/her 
needs becomes the parameter for the restorative interventions. The ‘strong’ 
actor’s behaviours, in fact, are the conditions for the unjustified situation that 
the ‘weak’ party is undergoing. This differential of power must be balanced by 
the restorative intervention, which essentially overturns that differential 
creating another power unbalance but this time in favor of the ‘weak’ party. 
The ‘weak’ party becomes then the leading epistemic position in the definition 
of the field of the RJ, shaping a particular power relationship with the ‘strong’ 
actor. This power relationship affects the explanations of the RJ, ruling out any 
decisive role of the ‘strong’ party as condition of its possibility. It affects the 
justifications of the RJ, reducing the relevance of the ‘strong’ party’s needs in 
the definitions of core conceptual features of the RJ. When the ‘strong’ party 
comes on the spot, it is because it needs to do something for the ‘weak’, 
(serving the victim), to be reformed/improved/shamed reestablishing a 
‘balanced’ power relationship. This perspective affects also the procedural 
discourses on the RJ. In many RJ ‘practices’ in fact, the ‘strong’ has to address 
pre-defined issues, enlisted in a script made by the convener/mediator, 
implying the dichotomic choice between acknowledgement of guilt and 
apology/restoration or non-acknowledgement and self-justification. In many 
cases to plead guilty or a general statement on personal responsibility is the 
premise of the activation of the practice. Therefore, a visible pressure on the 
ethos of the ‘strong’ party is clearly exercised. What must be lastly emphasized 
is that the couple ‘weak’/’strong’ is evidently overlapping the 
‘victim’/‘offender’ dichotomy. The victim, as subject position, implies his/her 
ontological weakness whereas the ‘offender’, as holder of the decision-making 
power to create a non-functioning social relationship, is the ‘strong’ actor. The 
practical and theoretical implications of such overlapping are clear: the RJ is a 
system of dealing with power unbalances caused by the individual embracing 
the subject position of ‘offender’; accordingly, all the efforts must be put in re-
balancing that power relationship, ‘empowering’ the victim. 
 
6.2.2. ‘Societal’ power-knowledge 
The second epistemic structure which informs the discursive formation of the 
RJ is the ‘societal’ view-knowledge. This expression refers to the knowledge that an 
ideal ‘third’ actor holds of the social relationships at stake. ‘Third’ means 
indirectly involved in non-functioning social relationships. In this perspective, 
the RJ is thought as concerning power unbalances which naturally involve 
                                                             
1223 Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish, the birth of the prison, cit., pp. 26-27. 
1224 Shiner, L. (1982). Reading Foucault: Anti-Method and the Genealogy of Power-
Knowledge. History and Theory, 21(3), 382-398, p. 391. 
1225 Foucault, M. (1980). Two Lectures. In C. Gordon (Ed.), Power/Knowledge (pp. 78-108), cit., 
pp. 90-92.  
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specific actors ‘belonging’ to wide human groups, and at ‘societal’ level must be 
addressed. Here human beings are thought as interlinked social actors in search 
of a ‘communal good’ and depending on it for they self-actualization. What is 
characteristic of this epistemic viewpoint is its ‘thirdness’ and ‘disjunction-
conjunction’ with the other knowledges constitutive the discursive formation 
of the RJ. The first feature denotes the qualitative difference between the 
knowledge of social relationships held by the ‘third view’ and the views of the 
direct actors of the relationships. It seems that this knowledge is based upon 
(and supportive of) a different experience of social reality, different ways of 
addressing human relationships, different understanding of the human world 
respect to the direct-actor knowledges. The ‘disjunction-conjunction’ quality 
refers to the singular capacity of the societal knowledge to become direct-
knowledge under certain circumstances and to re-obtain the indirect status 
under others. The explanation of the historical emergence of the RJ as 
necessity of changing the systems of dealing with dysfunctional social 
relationships, seems widely inspired by this view. The conceptualization of the 
community as an actor (problematic or not) of the RJ histories and theories is 
clearly grounded on the societal knowledge. Several discursive objects 
identified and analyzed in the discursive formation of the RJ, are shaped by the 
epistemic structure under examination. The crisis of the criminal justice 
system, the concepts of harm/and conflict, the dichotomy state/community, 
the understanding of the ‘criminal approach’, are all shaped by this epistemic 
view. The societal-knowledge is embedded in, and functional to, specific power 
relationships. In this case power relationships are elicited by framing the actors 
of any ‘problematic’ situation as ‘inserted’ in a societal realm, supposedly 
sharing its core characteristics. Human beings are firmly entrenched in a 
network of values, beliefs, and moral principles community-based. An example 
of such power-knowledge relationship is the understanding of the trigger 
events of the restorative interventions as anti-societal behaviours performed 
from the ‘strong’ party against the ‘weak’ one. An ‘anti-societal’ behaviour is 
par excellence a behaviour which breaks the ethical substance of the societal 
network, and, as such, blamed and ethically censored. As a consequence, the 
societal orientation ‘supports’ the partial knowledge in ethically de-qualifying 
the ‘strong’ party (as actor of the anti-societal behaviour), strengthening the 
power unbalance between the direct actors which is the goal of restorative 
thinking and interventions, as the only way to re-balance the ontological 
differential of power between the ‘strong’ and the ‘weak’ parties. 
 
6.2.3. ‘Neutral’ power-knowledge 
The third type of knowledge constitutive of the RJ apparatus is what I call the 
‘neutral’ power-knowledge. The neutral knowledge is always qualitatively different 
from the partial one, because ‘not involved’, not concerning the issues at stake, 
it is knowledge from nowhere. The main feature of the neutral knowledge is its 
nature of procedural form of knowledge. This means that the RJ is seen as a 
specific ‘know-how’ to address the different questions at stake. It is posited on 
a kind of meta-level, from where to experience the ‘true’ problems and 
solutions, without mixing its viewpoint with the contextual actors’ ones. This 
viewpoint basically inspires all the authoritative procedural discourses on RJ. 
Particularly, the presence of a convener/mediator as a recurrent element in the 
restorative ‘practices’ is an expression of the neutral-knowledge. The 
configuration of the ways of ‘doing’ RJ and the definitions of the restorative 
solutions rely on the essential capacity of looking at the issues at stake, from a 
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neutral perspective. This view informs the techniques of addressing not the 
‘content’ of the problems, but only working on the ‘procedures’ and ‘frames’ to 
develop the eventual settlement. As a commonplace, a neutral-knowledge is 
supposed to be characterized by its immunity to ‘power’. Indeed it is actually 
productive of power relationships as the former two epistemic views. First of 
all, it supports and endorses the power relationships brought up from the other 
knowledges embodied by the RJ apparatus. This means that it reproduces the 
power imbalance between the societal/weak party and the ‘strong’ one, 
endorsing the ethical pressure to self-management and self-surveillance. The 
knowledge from nowhere is particularly operative at level of procedural discourses 
on the RJ, pervading other kinds of authoritative discourses as well. The 
figures of conveners, mediators, facilitators, inspired by this knowledge, are 
constructed as external to the relationships between the direct parties. At the 
same time, endorsing the ethical-disqualification of the ‘strong’ party, re-
produces and re-enacts the power imbalances constitutive of the restorative 
framework. 
 
6.2.4. The strategic orientation 
The combination between the ‘partial’, ‘societal’ and ‘neutral’ power-
knowledge, constitutes the epistemic backbone of the RJ apparatus. It 
represents the structure which ‘holds together’ (of course not without tensions) 
the RJ as a complex of elements power-embedded. Such an epistemic-power 
structure is characterized by a specific overall strategic orientation. Recalling 
one of the achievements of the previous pages, we might conceptualize this 
overall orientation as ethopower: “ethopower works through the values, beliefs, and 
sentiments thought to underpin the techniques of responsible self-government and the 
management of one’s obligations to others1226”. Ethopower is the hardcore of 
ethopolitical technologies, their common rationality explored from an 
epistemic-power perspective. It claims to preserve individual autonomy and 
self-control, inscribing them simultaneously more deeply into the soul of each 
citizen than can be done through disciplinary or biopolitical technologies1227. 
Whereas Foucault’s biopower implies a separation between those who exercise 
the power and those who are its subjects, ethopower intertwines political 
aspirations and personal aspirations to ‘be well’, electing the ethos, individual 
and collective, as site of intervention1228. Ethopower is diffuse; it is exercised by 
everyone; it forms a complex mosaic in which each local piece plays its 
relatively autonomous role. It expresses itself in the ethical pressure to 
responsabilize parties, using as epistemic pre-condition to envisage their 
relationships according to the abovementioned parameters (epistemic: 
partial/neutral; power: weak/strong; moral: good/bad). In case of the 
strong/partial/bad actor, the ethical pressure is toward his/her transformation 
in weak/good, to become victim (of himself/herself, of the society) acknowledging 
to be individually responsible, controlling his/her emotions and actions, 
engaging in constructive solutions according the ‘societal’ guidelines. The 
weak/partial/good actor is compelled to the confession of his/her 
‘vulnerability’ and disempowerment, the self-control of his/her emotions, the 
identification of a necessary ‘constructive’ solution. Moreover, the societal-
knowledge exercises ethical pressure on the parties, from a peculiar ‘inside’, 
starting from the premise of their societal embeddeness. They have to share 
                                                             
1226 Rose, N. (2001). Community, Citizenship, and the Third Way, cit., p. 5. 
1227 Ibidem, p. 15. 
1228 Rose, N. (2001). The Politics of Life Itself, cit., p. 17. 
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societal values, belief, guiding principles. They have to be re-conducted to the 
societal ethos, a combination of responsibility, self-discipline, integration, even 
love. The neutral-knowledge, third and impartial by definition, performs an 
ethical pressure on the various epistemic actors (including a pressure on the 
convener/mediator/facilitator). The procedures inspired by the ‘thirdness’ of 
necessary component for deploying concepts and strategies of the RJ, impose 
the third actor as the out-of-processes driving force, compelling parties to be 
the only ‘makers’ of their destiny, forcing them to be free. Here the 
responsibilization strategy is evident: pushing towards the self-control, 
controlling at distance. As power relationships circulate, epistemic positions 
shift dynamically, possibilities of resistance and counter-resistance are always 
present. Within the contest of the apparatus we “have to do the most often with 
mobile and transitory points of resistance, introducing moving cleavages in a society, breaking 
unities and creating regroupings, cutting across individuals themselves, cutting them and 
reshaping them, tracing in them, in their bodies and their souls, indomitable regions1229”. 
Ethopower is a game of power, where actors might reformulate their epistemic 
positions-power relations. The ‘weak’ party might refuse his/her 
disempowered status, knowing himself/herself as an agentic actor, the ‘strong’ 
party might claim his/her ‘weakness’, the ‘neutral’ party might refuse his/her 
status of ‘third’. From this overview, the RJ apparatus simultaneously emerges 
as a particular alignment of power and incitement to knowledge, at a certain 
time. There is a last element of such alignment to be highlighted and 
investigated. This is the specific historical emergency to which the RJ responds, 
its “urgent need1230”.  
 
6.3. The urgent need of the Restorative Justice: an ‘inclusive’ neo-
liberal justice? 
As Pat O’Malley writes, “it takes comparatively little effort to see that restorative justice 
could be regarded as the inclusive side of a bifurcated neo-liberal politics of crime control, for it 
reflects much that is valued in neo-liberalism1231”. The ethopolitical focus on 
individual responsibility, the centrality of emotional dimensions, relationships, 
‘communities’, seem echo the parallel emphases in neo-liberalism. The RJ, 
from the apparatus perspective, appears an answer to (and expression of) the 
neo-liberal project of constructing a specific realm of human -individual and 
social- existence. This is possible by molding power-knowledges, modes of 
existence and subjectivity, practices, reflexive modes of action. The RJ is part 
of the deployment of neo-liberalism, as understanding and transformation of 
human nature and social existence. Neo-liberalism constitutes a new mode of 
governmentality, in which people are governed and govern themselves1232. The 
operative terms of this governmentality are no longer rights and laws but 
interest and competition or the spreading of ethical imperatives of 
responsibilization and self-actualization. Politics of control of social conflicts 
are basic part of such governmentality. The state, which remains an actor of 
such paradigm, channels flows of interest and desire by making desirable 
activities, and activates anti-citizenship technologies of control for whom is 
                                                             
1229 Foucault, M. (1980). The History of Sexuality. An Introduction, The Will to Knowledge, Vol. 1, cit., 
p. 127. 
1230 Ibidem, pp. 194-195. 
1231 O’Malley, P. (2009). Risk and Restorative Justice: Governing Through the democratic Minimization of 
Harms. Sydney Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09/88. Retrieved 5 May 2012 
from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473583. 
1232 Read, J. (2009). A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of 
Subjectivity. Foucault Studies, 6, 25-36, p. 29. 
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reluctant to accept such values. On the other side, non-state actors are 
involved in inclusive technologies of control, and the RJ is a clear example of 
such post-social mechanisms. As a form of governmentality, neo-liberalism 
would seem paradoxically to govern without governing; that is, in order to 
function its subjects must have a great deal of freedom to act -to choose 
between competing strategies. As Foucault stated:  
 
“The new governmental reason needs freedom; therefore, the new art of 
government consumes freedom. It must produce it, it must organize it. 
The new art of government therefore appears as the management of 
freedom, not in the sense of the imperative: “be free”, with the 
immediate contradiction that this imperative may contain […] the 
liberalism we can describe as the art of government formed in the 
eighteenth century entails at its heart a productive/destructive 
relationship with freedom. Liberalism must produce freedom, but this 
very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of 
coercion, and obligations relying on threats, etcetera1233”. 
 
The RJ seems to respond to this need of ‘governing without governing’, by 
instilling a certain kind of freedom, exercising a responsibilizing ethical control 
as political mean, on the individual and social body. It works as one of the 
conditions for the stabilization of the neo-liberal governmentality, contributing 
to the constitution of a self-governing form of subjectivity. In this context, 
“those who fail to thrive under such social conditions have no one and nothing to blame but 
themselves1234”. It is exactly here that lies the ethopolitical dimension of the 
‘restorative subject’ as enjoying a constitutively lacking freedom, burdened by 
the duty of self-actualization, shaped by power-knowledge relationships. The 
RJ is also aligned with neo-liberal governance because of the ways in which it 
deals with the crucial category of risk. Neo-liberalism has promoted diffused 
and institutionalized forms of risk, constructed as in need of community-based 
forms of prevention1235. A marked feature of the RJ is that it works as an 
effective means of securing order in the future, in the community, seeking to 
ensure that the anti-social (and then a-moral) behaviours do not recur1236. It is 
therefore reasonably simple “to see how restorative justice could appear as the favored 
inclusive technique of crime control in a neo-liberal polity where, for instance, actuarial justice 
constitutes the exclusionary technique for dealing with the recalcitrant and the high risks1237”. 
The RJ contributes to the neo-liberal re-configuration of all activity as forms of 
personal investment, and transforming all actors as entrepreneurs of the self. 
In short, neo-liberal governmentality creates a specific programmable reality, 
by introducing regularities into reality: moral forms, epistemological structures 
and specific languages1238. The RJ, in its authoritative versions, is one of the 
neo-liberal technologies which shape human subjectivity producing ideas of 
                                                             
1233 Foucault, M. (2008). The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, cit., p. 
63.  
1234 Hamann, T.H. (2009). Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethics. Foucault Studies, 6, 37-
59, p. 38. 
1235 O’Malley P., Palmer D. (1996). Post Keynesian Policing. Economy and Society, 25, 137-155. 
1236 O’Malley P., Risk and Restorative Justice: Governing Through the Democratic Minimisation of Harms , 
cit., p. 11. 
1237 Ibidem. 
1238 Cotoi, C. (2011). Neoliberalism: a Foucauldian Perspective. International Review of Social 
Research, 1(2), 109-124, p. 117. 
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freedom, responsibility, moral autonomy and justice1239. The RJ works then as 
one of the neo-liberal “discursive fields characterized by a shared vocabulary within 
which disputes can be organized, by ethical principles that can communicate with one another, 
by mutually intelligible explanatory logics, by commonly accepted facts, by significant 
agreement on key political problems [from which] derive different conclusions as to what 
should be done, by whom and how1240”.  
 
 
6.4. Words of closure 
The question ‘what is RJ?’ is a genuine philosophical problem, in a Wittgenstein 
sense. This is because proponents and opponents, usually do not hold any 
common ‘way around’ about that question. A set of moral principles? A theory 
of justice? A theory of criminal justice? A Weltanschauung? A lifestyle? Insofar as 
they look for a common frame at a mere theoretical level, they seem 
condemned to the disagreement or even to the incommensurability of their 
stances. As Wittgenstein suggests, philosophical problems are mental knots we 
create by thinking theoretically, and untying it requires considerable mental 
clarity and simplification efforts. Here, the general ‘way around’ regarding the 
meaning of ‘RJ’ is that the RJ is nothing but all the discourses on the RJ. 
Discourses on the history, concepts, practices, supporting, opposing or 
discharging, celebrating or contesting the RJ, is the RJ. However, some discourses 
are more equal than others. To understand the epistemic/conceptual features of 
these ‘special’ discourses, the conditions of their authority and the truths they 
are able to produce, has been the main goal of this study. The ‘order of the RJ’, 
as a tangle of authoritative discourses, informed by specific knowledges and 
power relations, is not immanent in history, is not grounded in or constituted 
by a transcendent natural or subjective ordering. Rather, I have proposed a 
value-based ‘grid of intelligibility’ that re-constructs these historical orders by 
showing how they were as contingent as possible. The main focus then, has 
been not so much on the significance of fundamental texts and concepts of the 
RJ but on bringing to light the possible discursive practices that connect and 
make visible and intelligible the close relationships between epistemic and 
conceptual dimensions, the conditions of intelligibility/possibility for 
enouncing “serious statements1241” on the RJ. I have tried to conduct a critical 
examination of the role of authoritative discourses as the dominant matrix for 
organizing scholarly, practical and advocacy activity on the RJ and for setting 
of research agendas and priorities for studying the RJ. In this way, spaces for a 
self-critical reflection upon the ‘truths’ on the RJ might open up. Destabilizing 
the present of the RJ, revealing its ‘natural’ and ‘essential’ qualities as produced 
in specific discourses, embedded in particular power-knowledge relationships, 
lets emerge the possibilities for self-problematizing accounts on the RJ. The 
meta/theoretical infra-structures which orientate our understanding of the RJ, 
often unconsciously, are more visible and modifiable. The Wittgenstein’s knots 
on the meaning of the RJ are at least brought on the surface, favoring different 
lines of interpretation at a meta/theoretical level. This awareness is the first 
stage of liberation from the ‘mental cramps’ inducted by whom or what holds 
the ‘authority’ to define what matters and what does not, and as such the 
                                                             
1239 Rose, N. (1999). Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought, cit., p. 42; Rose, N., Miller, P. 
(1992). Political power beyond the state: problematics of government, cit., p. 179. 
1240 Rose, N. (1999). Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought, cit., p. 42. 
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condition for new and different engagements1242. At this point, new applied 
ethics which reformulate the conceptualizations, uses and applications of the 
RJ can be more simply devised. New discourses on histories, justifications and 
procedures can be more definitely brought forward. Actions, drawing upon 
such possibilities, to mold in different ways the power-knowledge 
relationships, and subjectivating processes in and through the RJ ‘practices’, 
can be more hopefully undertaken.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1242 Wittgenstein, L. (1960). The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 1; Berger, P. (1968). 
Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 41. 
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